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Abstract	
This thesis examines the relationship between folk psychology and scientific 
psychology, and argues that the conceptual taxonomy provided by the former is 
unsuitable for fine-grained cognitive scientific research. I avoid traditional 
eliminativism by reserving a role for folk psychology as a socio-normative discourse, 
where folk psychological concepts primarily refer to behaviour rather than to mental 
states, and also exert a regulative influence on behaviour. 
 In the first half of this thesis I develop a positive account of folk psychology 
as a broad discourse that includes mental state attributions, behavioural predictions, 
narrative competency, and regulative mechanisms. In the second half I argue that the 
conceptual taxonomy provided by this discourse has led to theoretical confusions in 
both philosophy and cognitive science, and I propose a systematic methodology for 
developing a novel ‘cognitive ontology’ that is better suited for contemporary 
scientific research.   
 What is folk psychology? In chapter 1 I survey the history of the term folk 
psychology and demonstrate that the term only really came into general usage 
following the work of Fodor and Churchland in the 1970s and 80s. I also argue that it 
is a mistake, stemming from this era, to identify folk psychology exclusively with 
propositional attitude psychology, which is just one particular way in which the folk 
might understand one another.  
 If folk psychology is not just propositional attitude psychology, what else 
might it be? In chapter 2 I consider what I call the ‘universality assumption’, i.e. the 
assumption that folk psychological intuitions are shared across all cultures and 
languages. If this assumption were justified then it might provide partial support for 
the claim that folk psychology presents an accurate account of human cognition. 
However, there is significant evidence of variation in folk psychological intuitions, 
suggesting that folk psychology might be at least partially biased by cultural and 
linguistic influences.  
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 If folk psychology is not the same in every culture, how come it is so 
successful at predicting behaviour? In chapter 3 I look at various ways in which folk 
psychological discourse can play a regulative or normative role by exerting an 
influence on our behaviour. This role helps to explain how folk psychology can be 
predictively successful even if it fails to accurately describe the fine-grained details 
of human cognition, as via regulative mechanisms it is able to become a kind of self-
fulfilling prophecy.  
 How well does folk psychology match up with our scientific understanding of 
cognition? In chapter 4 I present evidence of cases where folk psychological 
concepts have served to mislead or confuse theoretical debates in philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science. I consider several case studies, including the false belief task 
in social cognition, the taxonomisation of sensory modalities, the extended cognition 
debate, and the recently emerging ‘Bayesian brain’ hypothesis.   
 If folk psychological concepts do not refer to entities in our scientific 
theories, then what do they refer to? In chapter 5 I examine the status of folk 
psychological kinds as natural kinds, and argue that even under a very liberal account 
folk psychological kinds probably do not constitute viable scientific kinds. However, 
due to the regulative mechanisms described in chapter 3, they do constitute what 
Hacking has described as ‘human’ or ‘interactive’ kinds, which exhibit complex 
looping effects. 
 What kinds of concepts should cognitive science use, if not folk 
psychological concepts? Finally, in chapter 6 I look at recent developments in 
‘cognitive ontology’ revision and argue that we should adopt a systematic 
methodology for constructing novel concepts that better reflect our current best 
understanding of cognitive systems. In closing I consider the relationship between 
these novel concepts and the ontology presented by folk psychological discourse.  
 
 
 
4 
Acknowledgements	
My parents Mark and Lesley have supported me throughout my time as a student, 
and I thank them for always encouraging me and my siblings to pursue our interests, 
no matter how unlikely the career prospects.  
 I am grateful to Guy Goodwin and Tim Lawrence for first introducing me to 
philosophy and psychology, respectively, and for instilling in me a light-hearted but 
nonetheless rigorous approach to my studies.  
 My work on this thesis was supported by a scholarship from the Carnegie 
Trust for the Universities of Scotland. The title is a shameless adaption of Stich’s 
From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, which has heavily influenced my work. 
 Dave Ward and Suilin Lavelle have excelled, both as supervisors and as 
mentors, and I hope one day to pass on all they have given me to students of my 
own. Suilin also supervised my undergraduate dissertation, and taught me all that I 
know about social cognition. Without her influence I may never have considered 
postgraduate study.  
 Rosa Hardt has been a steady companion and friend over the past four years, 
as well as an antidote to my reductionist tendencies. The other MLECers (and 
honorary MLECers) have also influenced me greatly, and I hope we stay in touch for 
many years to come.  
 Ana-Maria Cretu spent many hours discussing natural kinds with me, and 
Jonny Lee and Dan Calder kept me sane with philosophical conversations about 
something other than folk psychology. Many people have read drafts of these 
chapters for me, but I would especially like to thank Marco Viola for his comments 
and suggestions. Fiona Doherty and her tomatoes gave me the final push I needed to 
get this thesis finished. 
 Emma persuaded me to work on this thesis, and without her I would not be 
where I am today. I am eternally grateful to her for putting up with me for so long. 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother Brenda Croydon, who 
passed away on March 1st, 2015. She was a keenly intelligent and compassionate 
woman, and an inspiration to us all. 
 
 
6 
Declaration	 
This thesis has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. It has not been 
submitted for any other degree or professional qualification. Much of the material in 
section 4.4 is forthcoming as “Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain”, in 
Metzinger & Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing.  
 
 
Joe Dewhurst 
3rd February 2017	
 
 
7 
ABSTRACT	 2	
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	 4	
 
INTRODUCTION:	TWO	DISCOURSES,	BOTH	ALIKE	IN	DIGNITY	 11	
 
CHAPTER	1	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	DISCOURSE	 19	
1.1	–	HISTORY	OF	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	............................................................................................	21	
1.1.1	–	VÖLKERPSYCHOLOGIE	AND	PROPOSITIONAL	ATTITUDES	(EARLY	20TH	CENTURY)	.................	23	
1.1.2	–	THE	MYTH	OF	JONES	(1949-1963)	...............................................................................................	25	
1.1.3	–	FOLK	THEORY	AND	ELIMINATIVISM	(1966-1981)	.....................................................................	26	
1.1.4	–	CLASSICAL	COGNITIVE	SCIENCE	(1968-1987)	............................................................................	29	
1.1.5	–	SOCIAL	COGNITION	(1978-PRESENT	DAY)	....................................................................................	30	
1.1.6	–	CONNECTIONISM	AND	EMBODIMENT	(1986-PRESENT	DAY)	.....................................................	31	
1.2	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	AS	SOCIAL	COGNITION	...........................................................................	33	
1.2.1	–	THEORY-THEORY	AND	THE	FALSE	BELIEF	TASK	.............................................................................	33	
1.2.2	–	SIMULATION	THEORY	AND	MIRROR	NEURONS	................................................................................	36	
1.2.3	–	ALTERNATIVE	THEORIES	....................................................................................................................	37	
1.2.4	–	INTERACTION	THEORY	AND	DIRECT	PERCEPTION	..........................................................................	38	
1.2.5	–	MINDSHAPING	AND	SOCIAL	REGULATION	........................................................................................	40	
1.2.6	–	TOWARDS	A	UNIFIED	ACCOUNT	OF	SOCIAL	COGNITION	................................................................	41	
1.3	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	AS	FOLK	DISCOURSE	..............................................................................	42	
1.3.1	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	DISCOURSE	....................................................................................................	42	
1.3.2	–	BEHAVIOUR	READING	..........................................................................................................................	43	
1.3.3	–	MENTAL	STATE	ATTRIBUTION	...........................................................................................................	45	
1.3.4	–	NARRATIVE	COMPETENCY	..................................................................................................................	47	
1.3.5	–	NORMATIVE	CONSTRAINTS	................................................................................................................	48	
1.3.6	–	SUMMARY	OF	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	DISCOURSE	...........................................................................	50	
1.4	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	DISCOURSE	AND	SOCIAL	COGNITIVE	MECHANISMS	........................	51	
 
CHAPTER	2	–	THE	MYTH	OF	A	UNIVERSAL	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	 55	
2.1	–	THE	UNIVERSALITY	ASSUMPTION	.........................................................................................	55	
2.1.1	–	LEVELS	OF	EXPLANATION	...................................................................................................................	56	
2.1.2	–	SOCIAL	COGNITIVE	UNIVERSALITY	...................................................................................................	58	
2.1.3	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	UNIVERSALITY	............................................................................................	60	
2.1.4	–	NO	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	MIRACLES	..............................................................................................	61	
2.2	–	EVIDENCE	FOR	AND	AGAINST	UNIVERSALITY	.......................................................................	63	
2.2.1	–	SOCIAL	COGNITION	..............................................................................................................................	64	
2.2.2	–	ANTHROPOLOGY	...................................................................................................................................	66	
2.2.3	–	COMPARATIVE	LINGUISTICS	...............................................................................................................	69	
2.2.4	–	EXPERIMENTAL	PHILOSOPHY	............................................................................................................	72	
2.3	–	ACCOUNTING	FOR	THE	EVIDENCE	.........................................................................................	74	
2.3.1	–	TRANSLATION	ERRORS	.......................................................................................................................	75	
2.3.2	–	EXPERT	INTUITIONS	............................................................................................................................	76	
2.3.3	–	CONCEPTUAL	CONVERGENCE	............................................................................................................	78	
2.3.4	–	THE	DISAMBIGUATION	STRATEGY	....................................................................................................	79	
2.3.5	–	UNCOVERING	HIDDEN	UNIVERSALS	.................................................................................................	81	
 
 
8 
2.4	–	LIFE	AFTER	UNIVERSALITY	....................................................................................................	83	
2.4.1	–	INTELLECTUAL	HUMILITY	..................................................................................................................	84	
2.4.2	–	TWO	SYSTEMS	REVISITED	..................................................................................................................	85	
2.4.3	–	A	SELF-FULFILLING	PROPHECY	........................................................................................................	86	
2.5	–	THE	MYTH	OF	A	UNIVERSAL	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	.................................................................	87	
 
CHAPTER	3	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	AS	A	REGULATIVE	PRACTICE	 89	
3.1	–	FOUR	KINDS	OF	SUCCESS	........................................................................................................	90	
3.1.1	–	THE	PREDICTIVE	ROLE	.......................................................................................................................	91	
3.1.2	–	THE	EPISTEMIC	ROLE	.........................................................................................................................	91	
3.1.3	–	THE	EXPLANATORY	ROLE	..................................................................................................................	92	
3.1.4	–	THE	REGULATIVE	ROLE	......................................................................................................................	93	
3.2	–	VARIETIES	OF	MINDSHAPING	.................................................................................................	96	
3.2.1	–	IMITATION	.............................................................................................................................................	97	
3.2.2	–	PEDAGOGY	.............................................................................................................................................	99	
3.2.3	–	NORM	COGNITION	AND	ENFORCEMENT	........................................................................................	100	
3.2.4	–	LANGUAGE	BASED	REGULATIVE	FRAMEWORKS	..........................................................................	102	
3.3	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	AS	A	COGNITIVE	NICHE	.......................................................................	102	
3.3.1	–	COGNITIVE	NICHE	CONSTRUCTION	................................................................................................	103	
3.3.2	–	THE	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	NICHE	.................................................................................................	104	
3.4	–	FAILING	WITH	STYLE	..........................................................................................................	106	
3.4.1	–	EPISTEMIC	FAILURE	(AND	OCCASIONAL	SUCCESS)	.....................................................................	106	
3.4.2	–	REGULATIVE	SUCCESS	.......................................................................................................................	108	
3.4.3	–	EXPLANATORY	AND	PREDICTIVE	SUCCESS	....................................................................................	110	
3.5	–	THE	REGULATIVE	ROLE	OF	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	................................................................	112	
 
INTERLUDE:	THE	POSITIVE	ACCOUNT	OF	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	 115	
 
CHAPTER	4	–	FOLK	CONCEPTS	IN	COGNITIVE	SCIENTIFIC	DISCOURSE	 119	
4.1	–	THE	FALSE	BELIEF	TASK	AND	THE	PUZZLE	OF	RETROGRESSIVE	DEVELOPMENT	..............	121	
4.1.1	–	VERBAL	AND	NON-VERBAL	FALSE	BELIEF	TASKS	.........................................................................	121	
4.1.2	–ACCOUNTING	FOR	RETROGRESSIVE	DEVELOPMENT	.....................................................................	123	
4.1.3	–	DISAMBIGUATING	‘BELIEF’	...............................................................................................................	125	
4.2	–	TAXONOMISING	SENSORY	MODALITIES	..............................................................................	126	
4.2.1	–	FOLK	INTUITIONS	ABOUT	THE	SENSES	...........................................................................................	127	
4.2.2	–	SCIENTIFIC	TAXONOMISATION	OF	THE	SENSES	.............................................................................	128	
4.2.3	–	EXPLANATORY	PLURALISM	AND	SYSTEMIC	DISAMBIGUATION	..................................................	130	
4.3	–	EXTENDED	FUNCTIONALISM	AND	CONCEPTUAL	DISAMBIGUATION	..................................	132	
4.3.1	–	SUMMARY	OF	HEC	.............................................................................................................................	132	
4.3.2	–	CLASSIC	CRITICISMS	...........................................................................................................................	133	
4.3.3	–	SPREVAK’S	EXTENDED	FUNCTIONALISM	........................................................................................	136	
4.3.4	–	FINE-GRAINED	FUNCTIONALISM	AND	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	AMBIGUITY	...............................	137	
4.3.5	–	DISAMBIGUATING	THE	FOLK	TAXONOMY	......................................................................................	142	
4.4	–	ALIEN	REPRESENTATIONS	AND	OPAQUE	CONTENTS	..........................................................	144	
4.4.1	–	PREDICTIVE	PROCESSING	..................................................................................................................	145	
4.4.2	–	PREDICTIVE	PROCESSING	AND	PROPOSITIONAL	ATTITUDE	PSYCHOLOGY	...............................	146	
4.4.3	–	PREDICTIVE	PROCESSING	AND	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	DISCOURSE	...........................................	153	
 
 
9 
4.5	–	FAILURES	OF	THE	FOLK	ONTOLOGY?	..................................................................................	155	
 
CHAPTER	5	–	FOLK	KINDS	AND	NATURAL	KINDS	 157	
5.1	–	NATURAL	KINDS	AND	SCIENTIFIC	PSYCHOLOGY	................................................................	158	
5.1.1	–	ESSENTIALIST	THEORIES	.................................................................................................................	159	
5.1.2	–	CLUSTER	THEORIES	..........................................................................................................................	160	
5.1.3	–	SCIENTIFIC	KINDS	AS	CLASSIFICATORY	PROGRAMS	...................................................................	162	
5.1.4	–	PRAGMATIC	THEORIES	.....................................................................................................................	164	
5.2	–	FOLK	KINDS	AND	SCIENTIFIC	KINDS	...................................................................................	166	
5.2.1	–	FOLK	KINDS	IN	PHYSICS	AND	CHEMISTRY	...................................................................................	166	
5.2.2	–	FOLK	KINDS	IN	BIOLOGY	.................................................................................................................	168	
5.2.3	–	FOLK	KINDS	IN	PSYCHOLOGY	AND	COGNITIVE	SCIENCE	............................................................	169	
5.2.4	–	THE	LOOPING	EFFECTS	OF	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	KINDS	........................................................	170	
5.3	–	CASE	STUDIES	.......................................................................................................................	172	
5.3.1	–	CONCEPTS	...........................................................................................................................................	172	
5.3.2	–	EMOTIONS	..........................................................................................................................................	175	
5.3.3	–	MEMORY	.............................................................................................................................................	176	
5.3.4	–	MIND	AND	COGNITION	.....................................................................................................................	178	
5.4	–	FURTHER	CONCERNS	...........................................................................................................	179	
5.4.1	–	CAUSAL	THEORIES	OF	REFERENCE	.................................................................................................	180	
5.4.2	–	TYPE	IDENTITY	THEORY	AND	NATURAL	KIND	ESSENTIALISM	...................................................	182	
5.5	–	FOLK	KINDS	AS	HUMAN	KINDS	...........................................................................................	183	
 
CHAPTER	6	–	REVISING	OUR	COGNITIVE	ONTOLOGY	 185	
6.1	–	THE	COGNITIVE	ONTOLOGY	DEBATE	.................................................................................	186	
6.1.1	–	FUNCTIONAL	ONTOLOGIES	FOR	COGNITION	(PRICE	&	FRISTON)	............................................	187	
6.1.2	–	THE	COGNITIVE	ATLAS	PROJECT	(POLDRACK)	............................................................................	190	
6.1.3	–	AFTER	PHRENOLOGY	(ANDERSON)	...............................................................................................	192	
6.1.4	–	CONTEXT	SENSITIVE	MAPPINGS	AND	MULTIFUNCTIONALITY	(KLEIN	AND	MCCAFFREY)	...	193	
6.2	–	CASE	STUDIES	IN	COGNITIVE	ONTOLOGY	FORMATION	.....................................................	197	
6.2.1	–	THE	FIVE-FACTOR	MODEL:	A	CASE	STUDY	IN	CROSS-CULTURAL	CONVERGENCE	...................	197	
6.2.2	–	THE	NATURAL	SEMANTIC	METALANGUAGE	................................................................................	200	
6.2.3	–	AN	ONTOLOGY	FOR	COGNITIVE	CONTROL	...................................................................................	202	
6.3	–	METHODOLOGICAL	ISSUES	AND	MECHANISTIC	EXPLANATION	.........................................	204	
6.3.1	–	SYSTEMATIC	UNDERDETERMINATION	...........................................................................................	204	
6.3.2	–	ONE	ONTOLOGY	OR	MANY?	..............................................................................................................	207	
6.3.3	–	MECHANISTIC	EXPLANATION	AND	MULTILEVEL	INTEGRATION	...............................................	208	
6.4	–	THE	CONTRIBUTION	OF	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	TO	COGNITIVE	ONTOLOGY	REVISION	........	211	
6.4.1	–	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGICAL	DESCRIPTIONS	AS	SKETCHES	OF	MECHANISMS	...................................	212	
6.4.2	–	PERSONAL	LEVEL	EXPLANATIONS	AND	SUB-PERSONAL	SKETCHES	.........................................	214	
6.4.3	–	CONVERGENCE	ACROSS	DISCIPLINES	.............................................................................................	216	
6.4.4	–	HOW	RADICAL?	..................................................................................................................................	218	
6.5	–	THE	RELATIONSHIP	BETWEEN	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	AND	COGNITIVE	SCIENCE	................	219	
 
CONCLUSION:	FROM	FOLK	PSYCHOLOGY	TO	COGNITIVE	ONTOLOGY	 223	
 
REFERENCES	 226	
 
 
10 
	
 
 
11 
"So in the end, when one is doing philosophy, one gets to the point where one 
would like just to emit an inarticulate sound." 
Ludwig Wittgenstein  
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Introduction:	Two	Discourses,	Both	Alike	in	Dignity 
This thesis is concerned with the interaction between two ways of talking about 
human behaviour, the everyday and the scientific. I will refer to these two ways of 
talking as folk psychological discourse and cognitive scientific discourse 
respectively. The diagram below gives a schematic overview of their interactions, 
which will be described in more detail in the following chapters. The remainder of 
this section provides some initial definitions to help orientate the reader, and an 
overview of the chapters that follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure	0.1.	The	relationship	between	folk	psychological	and	cognitive	scientific	discourse.	
 
’Folk psychological discourse’ describes the everyday and intuitive ways that we 
talk about the behaviour of ourselves and of other people (and sometimes animals 
and other non-people such as machines or natural phenomena). This includes not 
only the attribution of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, but also 
behavioural predictions, narratives and other alternative ways of describing and 
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explaining behaviour. These discourses at least partially overlap with cognitive 
scientific discourse, especially when it comes to the scientific investigation of social 
behaviour, but also when scientists’ own folk intuitions exert an influence on their 
research. It is the scope and impact of this influence that I am primarily concerned 
with in the second half of this thesis. 
 
‘Cognitive scientific discourse’ describes the language and terminology used by 
scientific researchers to explain the behaviour of cognitive systems (of which 
humans are just one especially interesting example). This covers a wide range of 
disciplines, spanning from those that are concerned with the fine-grained details of 
the brain and nervous system, such as cognitive neuroscience, to those that are 
concerned with coarse-grained characterisations of personal level behaviour, such as 
social psychology. As such, cognitive scientific discourse encompasses multiple, 
potentially incompatible characterisations of how cognitive systems work. In 
addition, some of these characterisations will be compatible with folk psychological 
discourse, whilst other might not be. Cognitive scientific discourse can also influence 
folk psychological discourse (e.g. the popularisation of psychoanalytic theories of the 
unconscious), although influence in this direction will not be the primary focus of 
this thesis.  
 
‘Cognitive systems’ refers to any system studied by cognitive science (this 
description is transparently circular, but it is intended to be descriptive rather than 
carrying any metaphysical importance). This includes the human brain and nervous 
system, bodily behaviour produced by the brain and nervous system (including 
linguistic utterances), and interactions between such behaviour and the external 
world (which can include other cognitive systems). Cognitive systems are (ideally) 
explained by cognitive scientific discourse, and produce language and behaviour (or 
are perhaps part constituted by them; see below). 
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‘Language and behaviour’ refers to the outputs generated by cognitive systems. 
There is, of course, a high degree of overlap between a cognitive system and the 
behaviour that it produces, and cognitive science studies both of these phenomena, 
but for the purposes of this orientation it is useful to introduce an artificial distinction 
between the two. Language and behaviour are constrained and predicted by folk 
psychological discourse, produced by cognitive systems, and generate, amongst other 
things, both folk psychological discourse and cognitive scientific discourse. This 
introduces recursive, looping effects that make any study of these systems especially 
complicated. 
 
Each chapter of this thesis will examine one part of the above diagram in more detail. 
The thesis as a whole is split into two halves. In the first half (chapters 1, 2, and 3) I 
will present a positive account of folk psychology as a complex socio-cultural 
discourse, one that is capable of predicting and explaining behaviour, and that also 
exerts a regulative influence. In the second half (chapters 4, 5, and 6) I will argue 
that despite the many successes of folk psychology, it is often ill-suited for usage in 
philosophy and cognitive science, and propose a new methodology for developing 
novel, non-folk psychological concepts for the study of cognition. A chapter-by-
chapter breakdown can be found below.   
 Chapter 1 will focus on explicating exactly what is meant by folk 
psychological discourse, and clarifying several distinct uses of the term folk 
psychology in contemporary philosophy. Chapter 2 will discuss cross-cultural 
variation in folk psychological discourse, and challenge the assumption that folk 
psychological intuitions are universal. Chapter 3 will look at the relationship 
between folk psychological discourse and language and behaviour, and argue that 
folk psychology should be understood as having a regulative as well as a predictive 
role with regard to behaviour. By the end of the first half I hope to have clarified 
what I think folk psychology is, and how I think it can contribute to predictions and 
explanations of our behaviour. Between the two halves there is a short interlude that 
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summarises my account of folk psychology, and compares it to several similar 
accounts.  
 The second half opens with Chapter 4, which will explain what is meant by 
cognitive scientific discourse, and then explore a number of case studies where folk 
psychological intuitions and terminology appear to have confounded theoretical 
issues in philosophy and cognitive science. Chapter 5 will examine the status of folk 
psychological kinds as natural kinds, and consider the role of natural kinds in 
cognitive science. Chapter 6 will look at recent work on cognitive ontology 
revision, and propose that we adopt a mechanistic approach to cognitive ontology, 
wherein folk psychological concepts and explanations can sometimes serve as 
sketches of mechanisms. At the end of the second half I will conclude by considering 
in more detail the relationship between folk psychological and cognitive scientific 
discourse. 
 The aim of this thesis is twofold. Firstly, to further our understanding of ‘folk 
psychology’, and to clarify the ways in which that term is currently used in 
philosophy and cognitive science. Secondly, to ask whether folk psychological 
concepts, i.e. intuitive ways of categorising mind and behaviour, are really suitable 
for technical application in philosophy and cognitive science. The upshot of this 
latter question will be that often they are not, and that therefore we should investigate 
ways of developing novel conceptual taxonomies that better reflect our growing 
understanding of how cognitive systems function. The upshot of the first aim, 
however, will be that despite this conceptual mismatch between folk psychology and 
cognitive science, there remains an important role for folk psychology as a personal 
level, social and normative discourse that is valuable in its own right. Thus whilst at 
times I might seem to endorse a form of eliminativism with regard to folk 
psychology, I only advocate the elimination of folk psychological concepts from 
scientific discourse (and even then, only when it is actually the case that such 
concepts are being misapplied).  
 My hope is that this thesis will be both useful and interesting for anyone 
working in the cognitive sciences, broadly construed. The first half is perhaps of 
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especial interest to those working in social cognition, as I argue against conflating 
the content of folk psychological discourse with the structure of social cognitive 
mechanisms, and propose a distinctive and novel way of characterising folk 
psychology. The second half is likely to be of more general interest, as it deals with a 
number of cases where folk psychological intuitions and concepts might be being 
misapplied, or might otherwise turn out to be unhelpful. Finally, by suggesting that 
folk psychological explanations might sometimes serve as sketches of mechanisms, I 
hope to contribute to the development of mechanistic explanations in cognitive 
science.  
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Chapter	1	–	Folk	Psychological	Discourse	
Talk of folk psychology is ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy, and yet despite 
this ubiquity it is not always clear what it is meant to refer to. Is it a theory of how 
the mind works, a non-theoretical body of knowledge, or some other kind of 
mechanism or process? The aim of this chapter is to clarify what we mean when we 
talk about folk psychology, and to give an initial description of several distinct 
phenomena that can all be referred to as folk psychological. I will also provide an 
overview of the historical usage of the term ‘folk psychology’, both in philosophy 
and in cognitive science, and describe in more detail the amalgamation of folk 
knowledge and social practices that I will be referring to as folk psychological 
discourse. Subsequent chapters will consider the impact that this discourse has had 
on research in philosophy and cognitive science, and what (if anything) we should be 
doing to counteract this impact.  
 I take it that folk psychology, in its most general sense, simply refers to 
“whatever interpersonal understanding consists of” (Ratcliffe 2009: 380), but there 
are at least two ways of characterising what this might be. ‘Folk psychology’ is used 
interchangeably in current literature to refer to two distinct phenomena: the explicit 
way that we talk about and understand the behaviour and cognition of other people, 
which I call folk psychological discourse and Ratcliffe calls “folk folk psychology” 
(ibid: 381), and the implicit processes that facilitate social interaction, which I call 
social cognitive mechanisms. Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) make a similar distinction 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ folk psychology, where internal folk psychology 
refers to the “tacit rules and generalizations [that] play a central role in explaining 
folk psychological capacities” (ibid: 459), whilst external folk psychology refers to 
the “consciously accessible consequences” (ibid) of these rules and generalizations. 
Ignoring, for the moment, the question of whether social cognitive mechanisms are 
in fact best characterised as a set of tacit rules and generalizations, let me try and 
explicate this distinction in some more detail. 
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 Whenever I interact with another person, I am able to more-or-less 
effortlessly predict subtle changes in their behaviour, and subsequently respond in 
the right sort of way.  For example, I might step out of the way as someone walks 
towards me, or stop talking when I sense that they are about to say something. Of 
course, these predictions are often unsuccessful; I might bump into someone on the 
street, or talk over someone when they try to say something; but when these 
predictions are at their most successful I am almost unaware that I am making them, 
and no conscious effort goes into the process of working out what someone else is 
about to do. This capacity (or set of capacities) for effortlessly predicting and 
responding to the behaviour of other people is underpinned by what I ‘social 
cognitive mechanisms’, what Stich & Ravenscroft call ‘internal folk psychology’, 
and what is more typically (and confusingly) referred to simply as ‘folk psychology’ 
or ‘theory of mind’. 
 At the same time, whenever I interact with another person, I am able to 
consciously reflect on their behaviour, and if prompted could offer an explanation of 
why they behaved like they did. I can also consciously reflect on my own behaviour. 
For example, I might say that I bumped into that stranger because we were both in a 
hurry, or that you and I spoke over one another because we were both so excited 
about the conversation that we were having. These explanations may or may not be 
true, but regardless they seem to serve an important social function, and are 
philosophically and psychologically interesting in their own right. It is this explicit 
capacity to reflect on and explain behaviour that I call ‘folk psychological discourse’, 
Stich & Ravenscroft call ‘external folk psychology’, and Ratcliffe calls ‘folk folk 
psychology’. More typically it is also referred to as ‘folk psychology’, bundling 
together the two phenomena that I have described here, which I think is the source of 
many confusions and misunderstandings. Thus I will make a concerted effort to keep 
the two distinct, using the terms social cognitive mechanisms and folk psychological 
discourse, or just social cognition and folk psychology, unless otherwise specified.  
 These two phenomena may overlap to a greater or lesser extent, and each can 
be further subdivided, but they must be kept at least in principle distinct from one 
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another. This is essential if we are going to be able to ask questions such as whether 
folk psychological discourse and/or social cognitive mechanisms are culturally 
universal, without the assumption that the answer will be the same in both cases. It is 
also essential if we want to question the scientific accuracy of folk psychological 
discourse, without denying that social cognitive mechanisms exist, or consider 
whether folk psychological discourse might serve some other, non-scientific role. 
The rest of this chapter will explore the distinction between folk psychological 
discourse and social cognition in more detail, starting with a historical overview of 
the term folk psychology in philosophy and cognitive science before proceeding to 
explain how I think the distinction between social cognition and folk psychological 
discourse should be understood.     
1.1	–	History	of	Folk	Psychology	
Despite its ubiquity, the term folk psychology is relatively young, making it possible 
to present a more-or-less complete history of its usage, in both of the senses 
described previously. This will help clarify the distinctions that I introduced above, 
and which I explain in more detail in the rest of this chapter. My history of the term 
folk psychology is divided into six eras, some of which overlap chronologically, but 
each of which corresponds to a particular way in which the term has been understood 
or applied. The six eras are as follows: 
 
1. Völkerpsychologie and Propositional Attitudes (Early 20th century) 
2. The Myth of Jones (1949-1963) 
3. Folk Theory and Eliminativism (1966-1981) 
4. Classical Cognitive Science (1968-1987) 
5. Social Cognition (1978-present day) 
6. Connectionism and Embodiment (1986-present day) 
 
It is worth noting that the term folk psychology is only used in its modern sense from 
about 1980 onwards. Prior to this the term is either used to refer to a distinct 
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methodology, as in the work of Wilhelm Wundt, or else it is replaced with the term 
common-sense psychology, which I am assuming has roughly the same meaning. 
Thus a history of the term folk psychology is also a history of the term common-
sense psychology.  
 
Figure	1.1.	Google	Ngram	for	“folk	psychology”	from	1900-2000.	
 
Figure	1.2.	Google	Ngram	for	“common-sense	psychology”	from	1900-2000.	
 
Figure	1.3.	Google	Ngram	for	both	terms	from	1900-2000.	
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 The diagrams above were created using Google Ngram to show the frequency 
of the phrases “folk psychology” and “common-sense psychology” in English 
language books published during the 20th century. 1  Note the spike in “folk 
psychology” beginning around 1980 (fig. 1.1), which coincides with the 
Churchlands’ work on eliminative materialism (see section 1.1.3). The earlier blip 
from 1928-36 is probably the result of translations of the German word 
Völkerpsychologie (see section 1.1.1). The graph for “common-sense psychology” 
(fig. 1.2) is messier but shows a similar spike starting around 1949, when Gilbert 
Ryle’s The Concept of Mind was published (see section 1.1.2). The graph for both 
(fig. 1.3) is included to indicate the relative frequencies of the two terms. These 
diagrams are merely suggestive, but the patterns they reveal seem to correlate well 
with the eras that I have chosen to focus on. 
1.1.1	–	Völkerpsychologie	and	Propositional	Attitudes	(Early	20th	century)	
The term folk psychology first appears as a translation of the German word 
Völkerpsychologie, used by the early experimental psychologist Wilhelm Wundt to 
describe the kind of social and cultural enquiry that he thought should accompany 
psychological experimentation (Wundt 1912/1916; Kim 2008: sec. 6). This would 
involve a wide-ranging synthesis of techniques and data from disciplines such as 
history, linguistics, and anthropology, but only insofar as they cast light on the 
psychological processes that he was primarily interested in. We can find echoes of it 
in modern psychological anthropology, which is “the study of the behaviour, 
experience and development of individuals in relation to the institutions and 
ideologies of their sociocultural environments” (LeVine 2010: 1). Later in this 
chapter (1.3) I will argue that folk psychology is best characterised as a complex 
discourse, and one consequence of this characterisation is that something like the 
anthropological technique suggested by Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie is in fact 
required if we are to fully understood how the ‘folk’ think about other minds. 
                                                
1 This use of Google Ngram was inspired by Andow (2015), and facilitated by Michel et al (2011). 
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Chapter 2 will pursue this methodology in more detail, and consider recent evidence 
of cross-cultural variation in folk psychological discourse.  
 Wundt’s work on scientific psychology proper also indicates an awareness of 
some of the issues associated with drawing on what we now refer to as folk 
psychology in an experimental context. In an intriguing passage that I quote in its 
entirety below, Danziger seems to suggest that Wundt, the father of modern 
psychology, was steadfastly opposed to any use of folk psychological terminology or 
concepts in the scientific context. 
 
[In the introduction to his Principles of Physiological Psychology,] 
Wundt notes that ordinary language provides us with certain terms for 
classifying psychological events, e.g. feeling, understanding, sensibility 
and also memory, which, in pre-scientific psychology, are taken to 
identify distinct faculties or mental powers. Such ordinary-language 
psychological categories are dangerous for the project of a scientific 
psychology because they tend to confound descriptions and explanation. 
Scientific psychology has to make a clear separation between categories 
of observed phenomena to be explained and theories that do the 
explaining. (Danziger 2008: 126) 
 
Danziger is primarily concerned with Wundt’s influence on the early days of the 
scientific study of memory. Immediately after the passage quoted above, he indicates 
that it was precisely this dismissal of folk concepts that prevented Wundt from 
engaging in any serious way with the study of memory. According to Wundt, 
memory was only a “surface product generated by more fundamental psychological 
processes” (Danziger 2008: 126), and as such did not qualify as a phenomenon 
worthy of detailed scientific study. This attitude echoes that of the later eliminative 
materialists, whom I discuss in more detail in 1.1.3. So even here, in the pre-history 
of both folk and scientific psychology, there was a close but not always friendly 
relationship between the two.   
 Wundt’s word Völkerpsychologie appears to be relatively unconnected to our 
modern usage use of the term folk psychology (Ratcliffe 2007: 42-3), but it 
nonetheless provides an interesting counterpoint to the received view of folk 
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psychology as propositional attitude psychology. This received view dates back to 
Frege and Russell’s work on propositional attitude reports, which introduced the idea 
that thought should be characterised as a series of attitudes (such as belief or desire) 
towards language-like propositions (such as “it is raining” or “the sky is green”). 
Early work on propositional attitude reports, including that of Frege (1892/1980) and 
Russell (1910), focused primarily on elucidating a satisfactory semantics of 
propositional attitudes, but as we will see later on (in section 1.1.4), this 
characterisation eventually developed into a full-fledged, semi-empirical theory of 
cognition that to this day continues to influence the philosophical understanding of 
mind and cognition. In contrast to this characterisation I will argue that propositional 
attitude reports in fact constitute only a fraction of folk psychological discourse, and 
that equating folk psychology with propositional attitude reports gives a very narrow 
perspective on both cognition itself and the folk understanding of behaviour. Despite 
recent attempts to challenge this orthodoxy, it remains the dominant position in both 
philosophy and cognitive science, resulting in the oppositional nature of the debates 
over eliminative materialism (discussed in section 1.1.3), where it is assumed that 
folk psychology must either accurately describe the structure of cognition, or else be 
eliminated entirely. 
1.1.2	–	The	Myth	of	Jones	(1949-1953)	
A crucial development in the formation of our contemporary understanding of folk 
psychology was Gilbert Ryle’s influential attempt to analyse the use of mental state 
terms in natural language (see his 1949). Ryle advocated a form of philosophical 
behaviourism that maintained a principled scepticism towards the existence of 
unobservable mental states, which led him to characterise common-sense 
psychological states such as belief and desire as dispositions towards observable 
action rather than unobservable  (and discrete) states of the human cognitive system. 
The philosophical behaviourist research program quickly ran into trouble, most 
notably as a result of high profile critiques by Chisholm (1957) and Geach (1957) on 
the philosophical side, and Chomsky (1959) on the side of cognitive science. 
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Nonetheless it presents an interesting alternative to the characterisation of folk 
psychology as attributing internal mental states, an alternative that Dennett (1987) 
arguably advocates a version of, and that I will return to in section 1.3. 
Stich & Ravenscroft (1994: 450-3) trace the origins of folk psychology in the 
modern sense to Sellars’ “myth of Jones” (Sellars 1956: 90-107), which describes 
how our fictional “Rylean” ancestors might have begun to ascribe propositional 
attitudes to one another, as well as to themselves. These ancestors begin with a 
language that refers only to external (i.e. non-mental) events and behaviours, before 
the eponymous genius, “Jones”, develops a theory that relates these behaviours to 
postulated internal events (i.e. mental states). Sellars characterises these postulated 
internal events as propositional attitudes (ibid: 106), and quite aside from any further 
impact his argument might have had, this proto-functionalist analysis of mental states 
as propositional attitudes entered the philosophical mainstream. 
 DeVries (2006) explores how Sellars’ myth has further influenced two 
modern philosophical projects, eliminativism and the theory of mind debate. I return 
to both below, in 1.1.3 and 1.1.5 respectively, but it is worth mentioning them here 
by way of illustrating the huge impact that Sellars has had on contemporary 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science. For eliminativism, Sellars provides the 
basis for the idea that folk psychology is a theory, and thus open to being judged 
according to the same standards as any other theory (ibid: 58). For the theory of mind 
debate, this idea is taken up by the theory-theorists, who argue that our 
understanding of other minds is theoretical in nature (ibid: 68). In both cases DeVries 
is sceptical as to the validity of interpreting Sellars as arguing that propositional 
attitudes are (simply) theoretical entities. Nonetheless, Sellars has been interpreted 
this way, and this interpretation has had a strong influence on how we now think 
about folk psychology.  
1.1.3	–	Folk	Theory	and	Eliminativism	(1966-1981)	
Whilst Sellars might have been responsible for introducing the idea of propositional 
attitudes being theoretical entities, it was three papers by Lewis (1966, 1970, 1972) 
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that first explicitly formalised the idea of a folk psychological theory consisting of 
commonly accepted platitudes about mental states (see Ravenscroft 2010, sec. 3).  
 In the first paper (1966) Lewis describes the idea that mental states2 should 
be characterised in terms of their causes and effects, and then identified with physical 
states that share these causes and effects. Furthermore, he allows that the causes and 
effects of mental states might be other mental states (ibid 21), thus forming a causal 
network of mental states. Lewis was not the first or only theorist to come up the 
general idea of treating mental states as causal networks, which appears in various 
forms of functionalism around the same time, including Smart’s analytical 
functionalism (1959), Putnam’s machine functionalism (1960, 1967), and Fodor’s 
psycho-functionalism (1968). I will return to the development of this now classical 
approach to cognitive science in section 1.1.4. 
 In the second paper (1970) Lewis lays out a general structure for defining and 
interpreting theoretical terms, following earlier proposals by Ramsey (1931) and 
Carnap (1959, 1961, 1963, 1966). Ignoring some of the technicalities, he argues that 
theoretical terms (T-terms) can be defined in relation to observation terms (O-terms) 
that have “conventionally established standard interpretations” (Lewis 1970: 429). 
Thus T-terms are essentially shorthand for long strings of O-terms that uniquely pick 
out some feature of the world. Replacing any occurrence with an expanded O-term 
definition can eliminate T-terms, but there is no particular reason (short of outright 
reductionism) why we should want to do this, as it is simply more convenient to use 
the T-terms. 
 In the third paper (1972) he applies this account of theoretical terms to his 
earlier analysis of mental state terms in order to elucidate a common-sense or folk 
theory of psychology. The mental state terms posited by the folk are derived by 
treating our everyday talk about the mind “as a term-introducing scientific theory”, 
and collecting/systematizing all (or most) of the platitudes contained in this theory 
(ibid: 256). Thus a mental state term is a kind of theoretical term, and we can treat 
                                                
2 In the paper he is actually talking specifically about “experiences”, but the arguments apply to 
mental states more generally. 
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folk psychology as a whole as a primitive or naïve theory. Lewis explicitly relates 
this argument to Sellars’ myth of Jones, and suggests that it provides a potential 
means by which to test the plausibility of that myth (ibid: 257). He also notes that 
according to his account, “the mental terms stand or fall together” (ibid: 258) – if 
they are part of an integrated and holistic theory, then the failure of any individual 
term to refer will prove fatal for the theory as a whole.  
 Churchland (1979, 1981) followed Lewis’ lead in taking folk psychology to 
constitute a primitive theory, but pressed this final point by arguing that the theory 
was very likely to be false, and should therefore be replaced by a new theory drawn 
from “the conceptual framework of a completed neuroscience” (1981: 67). He called 
this position eliminative materialism, or eliminativism for short. His argument is that 
if folk psychology is genuinely a (proto-)scientific theory, then it ought to be held up 
to the same standards as any other scientific theory, which includes the potential for 
its eventual elimination or refinement. Churchland’s eliminativism followed earlier 
projects by Feyerabend (1963) and Rorty (1965, see Leach & Tartaglia 2014 for an 
overview), but Churchland’s argument is more explicit in targeting folk psychology 
as a propositional attitude invoking theory. Stich (1983) presents a slightly different 
form of eliminativism, arguing that future cognitive science is likely to contradict the 
theory embodied by folk psychology. In any case it is Churchland (and to a lesser 
extent Stich), rather than Feyerabend or Rorty, who has entered the popular 
philosophical imagination as the eliminativist par excellence.  
 Churchland’s 1979 book and 1981 paper are also notable for another reason. 
It is here that the characterisation of folk psychology as propositional attitude 
psychology finds its clearest expression, along with a clear statement of the reasons 
for thinking that it constitutes a theory. Given that Lewis’ set of papers were fairly 
technical, it is plausible to think that Churchland might have (somewhat ironically) 
ended up popularising the notion of a folk psychological theory, especially one 
consisting of propositional attitudes. 
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1.1.4	–	Classical	Cognitive	Science	(1968-1987)	
Whilst folk psychology is rarely mentioned explicitly in cognitive science (outside of 
social cognition), it has played a role in formulating the conceptual scheme within 
which the scientific study of cognition is conducted. This is most apparent in what is 
sometimes called ‘classical cognitive science’, a research tradition that developed 
during the latter half of the 20th century and remains heavily influential today. The 
foundational assumption of this tradition is that cognition is basically a matter of 
computation, and that cognitive computation can be characterised as operations 
performed over what are essentially folk psychological states such as belief and 
desire.  
 Classical cognitive science dates back to the 1950s, when it emerged in 
opposition to the then-dominant behaviourist paradigm in psychology (see Thagard 
2012: sec. 1). Chomsky’s extremely critical review of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour 
was a crucial turning point in this respect. Right from the beginning this research 
program was driven by the search for what Putnam (1967) characterised as 
functional states. These were often assumed to be isomorphic with the apparent 
posits of folk psychology, as made most explicit in Fodor’s language of thought 
hypothesis (see his 1975).3 Here Fodor argued for the logical necessity of an 
internally represented language, mentalese, which would encode the propositional 
attitudes and allow for their systematic manipulation in cognitive processing. Thus 
Fodor combined Lewis’ formalisation of folk psychological structure with Putnam’s 
functionalism to explicate the newly emerging paradigm that would implicitly guide 
cognitive science for at least the next decade (cf. Pickering & Chater 1995: 313; 
Piccinini 2004a, 2004b). Fodor also makes an explicit claim about the universality of 
propositional attitude psychology (or at least beliefs and desires), even going so far 
as to deny that there are any conceivable alternatives (1987: 132). This move by 
Fodor enshrined the conflation of folk psychology with propositional attitude 
                                                
3 Strictly speaking there is something of an anachronism here, as folk psychology only explicitly 
entered the philosophical discourse after the emergence of classical cognitive science. However, prior 
to this something like propositional attitudes were already being invoked with the idea of discrete 
internal states that might guide behaviour. 
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psychology, and committed classical cognitive science to one very particular way of 
understanding cognition. 
1.1.5	–	Social	Cognition	(1978-present	day)	
Social cognition is the specific study of social interaction from the perspective of 
psychology and cognitive science. Premack & Woodruff (1987) established the 
problem of other minds as a field of legitimate psychological interest, rather than as a 
question of merely philosophical interest. The primary distinction here is between 
asking how we can know whether or not other people have minds at all (a primarily 
philosophical question), and asking the more specific question of how it is that we 
can understand their mental lives, assuming as a starting point that they do in fact 
have one (a question that both philosophy and cognitive science can contribute to). 
Since the publication of this paper there have been a number of interesting 
developments, both theoretical and experimental. I will summarise the historically 
relevant aspects below, before discussing social cognition in more detail later in this 
chapter.  
Initially the dominant theory in social cognition was theory-theory (cf. 
Morton 1980), which postulates the tacit use of a literal theory of how minds work as 
the primary cognitive mechanism for understanding other minds. This theory is 
normally fleshed out in terms of propositional attitudes, and thus embodies the 
identification of folk psychology with propositional attitude psychology that I 
introduced in the previous section. As Baker (1999a) notes, this has led to some 
confusion in the philosophical literature. It is often unclear what kind of a theory 
mindreading requires (cf. Botterill 1996, Lavelle 2012) or even whether it makes 
sense to characterise common sense psychology as a theory at all (Baker 1999b). 
Perhaps as a result of this, there have been several attempts to account for our 
understanding of other minds in non-theoretical terms, most notably including 
versions of simulation theory (e.g. Gordon 1986; Heal 1986; Goldman 1989, 2006), 
and interaction theory (e.g. De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; Gallagher 2008a, 2012). 
Each of these accounts distinguishes the mechanisms by which we understand other 
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minds from our explicit verbal reports about mental states and behaviour, thereby 
detaching, at least partially, social cognition from folk psychology. More recently it 
has been suggested that explicit folk psychological discourse might even have a very 
different purpose to the mechanisms that we use to understand other minds. A 
number of writers (e.g. McGeer 2007; Hutto 2008; Zawidzki 2008, 2013; Andrews 
2008, 2015) have argued that folk psychology has a social or normative role, quite 
distinct from the epistemological role played by social cognition. I will return to the 
broader implications of these arguments later in this chapter, and again in chapter 3.  
1.1.6	–	Connectionism	and	Embodiment	(1986-present	day)	
Since the late 1980s there have been a number of trends in cognitive science that 
have called into question various aspects of the folk psychological framework. The 
first of these was the move towards connectionist models of neural processing 
(usually dated to Rumelhart & McClelland 1986), which envisioned cognition as a 
process that takes place across wide and parallel neuronal structures, rather than via 
serial computations at a higher level of abstraction. This brought with it the possible 
elimination of the symbolic level of processing, or even of folk psychology entirely 
(see Ramsey, Stich, & Garon 1991; see Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988 for a defence of the 
classical account). Connectionism received an early endorsement by Churchland, and 
also became associated with other eliminative materialists such as Stich. The debate 
over the implications of connectionism remains controversial, but it undoubtedly 
changed the way that we think about the interaction between different levels of 
cognitive processing, and what this means for folk psychology (see e.g. Clark 1990, 
O’Brien 1991, Botterill 1994; see Clark & Millican 1999 for an overview of key 
issues). One important outcome was the idea, now broadly accepted, that folk 
psychological or otherwise ‘high level’ mental states could be implemented with 
‘lower level’, sub-symbolic processing, such as that proposed by connectionism. 
 Following connectionism, the early 1990s to the early 2000s saw the 
emergence of a broad paradigm known as embodied cognition (see Shapiro 2010 for 
an overview). This consists of a number of distinct research programmes, but 
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essentially emphasises the role of the body and/or the environment in cognitive 
processing. These programmes are sometimes associated with a non-classical 
interpretation of folk psychology, in that they often downplay the role of abstract, 
conceptual, or serial reasoning (see e.g. Brooks 1991; Beer 1995; Van Gelder 1995; 
Garzon 2008). More modestly, it seems likely that embodied approaches to the study 
of cognition would at least challenge the disembodied interpretation of folk 
psychological explanation that is associated with the classical approach. This is the 
assumption that folk psychological discourse deals mostly in the attribution of 
mental states alone, rather than with the prediction of behaviour alongside more 
complex capacities such as narrative competency (I discuss all of this in more detail 
later in the chapter).  
 Sometimes associated with embodied cognition, but in many ways 
importantly distinct, is the hypothesis of extended cognition associated primarily 
with the work of Andy Clark (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Menary 2010). 
This proposes that cognitive processes might literally extend into the environment, 
which initially seems in radical opposition to our folk conceptions of the mind. 
However, as I will explore in chapter 2, it is possible that the brain-bound conception 
of the mind is partly an artefact of the specific European-American scientific culture 
from which cognitive science emerged. If this is the case then extended cognition 
might in fact be less radical than it first appears.  
 In his more recent work Clark has drawn attention to a growing cluster of 
theories that model the brain as a Bayesian prediction machine (Hohwy 2013; Clark 
2013, 2016). Clark has written that predictive processing “may one day deliver a 
better understanding even of our own agent-level experience than that afforded by 
the basic framework of ‘folk psychology’“ (2013: 17, repeated in Clark 2016: 82). I 
will explore the relationship between predictive processing and folk psychology in 
chapter 4.  
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1.2	–	Folk	Psychology	as	Social	Cognition	
At the beginning of this chapter I distinguished between two primary ways that the 
term ‘folk psychology’ can be used, referring either to folk psychological discourse 
or to the cognitive mechanisms that enable social cognition. In the rest of this chapter 
I will describe in more detail what each consists of, and discuss several on-going 
debates about the nature of each kind of folk psychology. This first section will focus 
on folk psychology understood as mechanisms that enable social cognition. It is 
important to distinguish between the implicit understanding of the mind imparted by 
these mechanisms, and the explicit understanding contained within folk 
psychological discourse (I discuss this distinction in more detail in 2.1.1). There is 
likely to be some overlap between folk psychological discourse and social cognition, 
especially when it comes to the content of attributed mental states and the regulative 
function that I am calling mindshaping (see 1.3.5, 1.4, and chapter 3 for further 
discussion).   
 Social cognition, in the broadest possible sense, refers to the cognitive 
mechanisms and processes that enable interpersonal understanding. This includes 
language processing, joint attention, and many other capacities, but the study of 
social cognition has typically focused on one core aspect: the attribution of mental 
states to others, sometimes known as mindreading or theory of other minds (although 
this latter term begs the question somewhat against accounts that do not posit a 
theory). The exclusive focus on mindreading in social cognition has recently been 
criticised (see e.g. Hutto, Southgate, & Schwenkler 2011; Zawidzki 2013), and I will 
return to these criticisms towards the end of the section, but it remains the core area 
of study to this day.  
1.2.1	–	Theory-theory	and	the	false	belief	task	
As I mentioned in the previous section, the formal study of social cognition began in 
the 1970s, after Premack & Woodruff (1978) published a Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences target article that argued that chimpanzees might have a “theory of mind” 
nearly as advanced as our own. This target article not only introduced the term 
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‘theory of mind’ as a characterisation of interpersonal understanding, it also 
described an experimental framework for testing whether or not chimpanzees do in 
fact possess such a theoretical understanding of other minds. The debate about 
whether or not chimpanzees have a theory of mind continues to this day, but 
Premack & Woodruff’s paper was also instrumental in kick-starting the study of 
human social cognition, as researchers began thinking about how to implement 
similar experiments with human subjects. These developments were partially 
prompted by philosophical commentaries written by Dennett (1978), Bennett (1978), 
and Harman (1978), each of which “independently suggested that a proper test of a 
creature’s possession of the belief concept would involve the determination of its 
ability to impute false belief” (Goldman 2006: 11). 
 By far and away the most successful and influential of the experimental 
paradigms inspired by Pemack & Woodruff was the false-belief task, first conducted 
by Wimmer & Perner (1983), and subsequently developed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, 
& Frith (1985), who coined the name “Sally-Anne task” by which it is commonly 
known (in reference to the dolls used in their version of the task). The basic structure 
of the task is that the participants (typically children) are presented with a scenario in 
which two actors (either dolls or humans) interact. One actor hides an object and 
then leaves the scene. The second actor then enters, hides the object somewhere else, 
and leaves. Finally the first actor returns, and the participant is asked where they 
think the actor will look for it. If they correctly identify that the actor will look where 
they originally hid the object, rather than where it actually is, then they are said to 
have an understanding of false belief, and by extension a fully developed theory of 
other minds. There are many variations on this task, the most well known of which 
involves tracking looking time (as a proxy for expectation) rather than (or as well as) 
verbal responses (e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon 2005). The development and evolution 
of this task has been extremely important to the study of social cognition, as it 
established a broadly accepted measure of knowledge of other minds, and allowed 
for subtle experimental manipulation in a way that previous studies of social 
interaction had not. For instance, by varying the task structure to involve food rather 
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than toys, and conspecifics or experimenters rather than dolls, it is possible to probe 
the social cognitive competency of non-human animals such as chimpanzees and 
orangutans (see Heyes 1998 for an overview).  
 The aim of Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith’s false-belief task was to determine 
the extent to which development of a theory of other minds was impaired in children 
with autism. Subsequent applications of the experimental design were used to put 
together a more general understanding of the developmental trajectory of social 
cognition in human children. One early finding was that children below the age of 
around 4 typically failed to pass the test, and so it was argued that a theory of other 
minds did not develop until the age of 4 or 5. However more recent versions of the 
task (see e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon 2005), based on using looking time as a proxy for 
expectation, have demonstrated that children as young as approximately 15 months 
seem to expect the actor to look in the wrong location. The debate about how to 
interpret these results in still on-going, and I will return to it in chapter 4, as it serves 
as an interesting illustration of how folk intuitions can potentially disrupt 
psychological experimentation.  
 The main theoretical outcome of the false belief task paradigm was the 
emergence of what has become the establishment position in social cognition: the 
idea that interpersonal understanding is based on an implicit theory of other minds, 
sometimes known as the ‘theory-theory’. The theory-theory also draws on the 
philosophical tradition mentioned in the previous section, taking the idea, introduced 
by Sellars and developed by Lewis and Churchland, that we can treat the common 
sense understanding of how other people behave as an either implicit or explicit 
theory of how their minds work. There are two main versions of the theory-theory, 
one that claims we have an innate theory of mind module (Leslie 1994, 2000) and 
one that claims that children develop a theory of other minds in a proto-scientific 
manner (Gopnik & Wellman 1992). 
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1.2.2	–	Simulation	theory	and	mirror	neurons	
The earliest proposed alternative to the theory-theory was the idea that rather than 
theorising about other people’s mental lives, we could just put ourselves into their 
shoes, so to speak, by using our own cognitive system to simulate their mental 
processes based on the situation that we see them in. This alternative proposal is 
known as simulation theory. It was first formulated by Gordon (1986), who proposed 
that we predict other people’s behaviour in the same way that we predict our own. 
This can of course be interpreted in different ways (Sellars, for instance, suggested 
that introspection might consist of self-directed folk psychological theorising), but 
Gordon took it to mean that we might interpret the behaviour of others by pretending 
that we were in the same situation as them, and then simply “speak our mind” about 
what we felt they would do (ibid: 160). Heal (1986) made a simultaneous argument 
for a similar approach based on “replication” rather than “simulation”. 
 These proposals were then developed by empirical research carried out 
throughout the 1990s, culminating in the discovery by Vittorio Gallese, and others in 
working in his lab, of so-called “mirror neurons” in rhesus macaques (see Di 
Pellegrino et al 1992, and Rizzolatti et al 1996). This cluster of neurons in the 
inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobe fire both when an activity is carried 
out and when the macaque observes someone else carrying out the same activity, 
leading to the proposal that the mirror neuron system might be essential to social 
cognitive simulation. Mirror neurons have only been inferred to exist in humans, as 
no direct observation via single cell recording has been carried out in human 
subjects, but Gallese and others have argued at great length for the fundamental role 
played by the mirror neuron system in social cognition. Whilst the simulation theory 
is not necessarily committed to the existence of a human mirror neuron system, in 
practice many proponents of it have bought in to Gallese’s approach (see especially 
Goldman 2006).  
 There have been numerous criticisms of the simulation theory, including 
early defences of theory-theory by Stich & Nichols (1992), Gopnik & Wellman 
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(1992), and Perner & Howes (1992), although Perner has since come to defend a 
hybrid approach (which I discuss in the next section). One common criticism is that 
whilst simulation might form a part of how we understand other minds, it cannot do 
all the work by itself, as it needs to be embedded in a theory that tells us how and 
when to simulate the mind of another, and also tells us which aspects of theory in 
question are relevant to the simulation. The mirror neuron theory in particular has 
also come under attack for lacking empirical support in humans (see e.g. Hickok 
2009). 
1.2.3	–	Alternative	theories	
In recent years the debate between simulation theory and theory-theory has reached 
something of an impasse, leading to the development of a range of alternative 
theories. One type of alternative theory, known as hybrid theories, attempt to agree 
on a middle ground between the two theories. What most of these hybrid accounts 
have in common is the idea that whilst simulation may play an important role in 
mindreading, it requires the support of a theory in order to be correctly applied (see 
e.g. Botterill 1996; Goldman 2006; Carruthers 2011; Stich and Nichols 2003). The 
theoretical component of the hybrid accounts is also used to account for systematic 
errors and to explain how we can successfully predict the behaviour of people in 
situations that we have never been in before. Insofar as the debate between theory-
theory and simulation theory has reached an impasse, hybrid accounts seem like a 
sensible way forward, although later in this section I will suggest that they still miss 
some crucial aspects of social cognition. 
 Another type of alternative theory are those that argue for the existence of 
two distinct systems for social cognition, one fast and operating in response to 
observed behaviour, the other slow and theoretically mediated (see e.g. Apperly & 
Butterfill 2009). These accounts were originally inspired by the so-called 
“developmental paradox of false belief understanding” (De Bruin & Newen 2014), 
which is the strange result that infants are able to pass a non-verbal version of the 
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false belief task well before they can pass the standard, elicited response version.4 
According to the two systems account, the non-verbal task is processed by system 
one (fast), which develops earlier in life than system two (slow), but does not allow 
for explicit verbal reports. Hybrid theories of this type are not exactly the same as a 
combination of simulation theory and theory-theory, but they share some important 
properties, such as positing the existence of two distinct mechanisms for social 
cognition. Two systems proposals are also somewhat orthogonal to the theory-
theory/simulation theory debate, as one could combine either approach (or a hybrid 
approach) with a two systems architecture. I will discuss these theories in more detail 
in section 2.4.2. 
1.2.4	–	Interaction	theory	and	direct	perception	
A relative latecomer to the social cognition debates, although pre-empting Apperly & 
Butterfill, are the various interaction theories proposed by the likes of Shaun 
Gallagher (2008a, 2012), De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007), and Dan Hutto (2008, 
2009). Each of these theories differs somewhat in emphasis, but what they all have in 
common is a commitment to the idea that social cognition, as it has traditionally been 
studied, has focused too much attention on internal processing (either via theory or 
simulation) at the expense of external interaction with other social agents. Thus 
Gallagher argues that social cognitive development consists of three distinct stages: 
primary intersubjectivity, secondary intersubjectivity,5 and narrative competency 
(Gallagher 2008a), which are defined as follows: 
 
1. Primary Intersubjectivity: Newborn infants respond to voices, faces, and 
movement, and are soon able to engage in interactive imitation and response. 
                                                
4 In a typical non-verbal false belief task the subject will be placed in front of an eye-tracker, which 
will keep track of how long they fixate on any given scene, with length of fixation being used as a 
proxy for how unexpected that scene was. So if they look longer during the scene where Sally looks in 
the right place despite having a false belief, then it is inferred that the subject does have the capacity 
to attribute false beliefs, explaining why they were surprised.  
5 The terms primary and secondary intersubjectivity, and the associated account of social cognitive 
development, originates in the work of Colwyn Trevarthen (see especially Trevarthen 1979; 
Trevarthen & Hubley 1978).   
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By 12 months they are capable of what Gallagher calls “non-mentalistic, 
perceptually-based embodied understanding of the intentions and dispositions 
of other persons” (2008a: 166).  
 
2. Secondary Intersubjectivity: After 12 months infants begin to develop an 
awareness of pragmatic context, along with a capacity for shared/joint 
attention. In some direct sense they “are able to see bodily movements as 
expressive of emotion, and as goal directed intentional action” (ibid). 
 
3. Narrative Competency: By the age of 4 (but from as early as 2) children are 
able to situate their interaction with others within a detailed narrative 
framework that provides a capacity for empathic and novel understanding 
(Gallagher 2012: 16-8). This framework is distinct from a theory in the sense 
that it is not reliant on folk psychological or propositional mentalising (ibid: 
18-9). 
	
Adult social cognition, according to Gallagher, involves capacities drawn from each 
developmental stage, but only rarely consists of explicit theorising or simulation. 
Similarly, De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007) argue that social cognition primarily 
consists of “participatory sense-making”, involving both explicit narratives and 
embodied intersubjectivity. I will return to these suggestions later in this chapter, and 
propose that regardless of their status as basic social cognitive mechanisms, these 
explicit forms of intersubjective understanding will inevitably form an important part 
of folk psychological discourse considered more broadly.   
 A distinct challenge emerging out of the interaction theory camp is to argue 
that both theory-theory and simulation theory incorrectly characterise social 
cognition as an indirect process, mediated by either a theory or a simulation. 
Gallagher (2008b) argues that for both phenomenological and theoretical reasons this 
cannot be possible, and that social cognitive perception is in fact direct and 
immediate. Gallagher draws on Gibson’s ecological theory of perception (see e.g. 
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Gibson 1966, 1979), whilst theory-theory is firmly grounded in more mainstream 
inferential theories of perception (see e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981). As such, the 
debate over direct perception may just reflect a more general theoretical 
disagreement, rather than being a dispute about social cognitive perception in 
particular (cf. Dewhurst, ms). In any case, Lavelle (2012) has responded to 
Gallagher’s criticism by proposing a way in which theory-theory can be made 
compatible with direct perception. This suggests a general trend towards a growing 
consensus approach, which I discuss in more detail at the end of this section.  
1.2.5	–	Mindshaping	and	social	regulation	
There is one final alternative to the classical debate between theory-theory and 
simulation theory that I wish to mention, especially as it is one that I think plays an 
important role in developing an alternative, non-epistemic role for folk psychological 
discourse. This is the idea that social cognition might involve more than prediction 
and explanation, that it might also play a normative role in constraining our 
behaviour and cognition. A version of this idea was first proposed in the modern 
context by McGeer (2007), although it has precursors in Dennett (1989) and Morton 
(1980). It was then developed independently by Zawidzki (2013), who builds on the 
idea of “mindshaping” introduced by Mameli (2001). I discuss both proposals in 
more detail in section 1.3, and again in chapter 3, which is dedicated to the topic of 
mindshaping and social regulation. 
 McGeer (2007) claims that folk psychology, even under more traditional 
accounts, contains what she calls a “normative core”, i.e. the assumption that folk 
psychological attributions can somehow ‘make sense’ of the behaviour that they are 
attributed to. In order to do this, folk psychology must appeal to some minimal 
norms of rationality (ibid: 140-5). From here she argues that it is no great leap to see 
folk psychological attributions as performing a further regulative role, where our 
attributions also carry social expectations that those to whom they are attributed 
typically end up trying to fulfil. 
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 The normative role that McGeer describes for folk psychological attributions 
is just one component of the broader framework articulated by Zawidzki (2013). He 
describes social cognition as a complex relationship between mindreading, 
mindshaping, co-operation, and symbolic communication. According to his account 
each of these capacities is crucial to what he calls the  ‘human sociocognitive 
syndrome’, and yet only the first has really received much critical attention from 
within philosophy. He focuses on explicating a structured framework for studying 
the second, and advocates a shift from the “mindreading-as-linchpin” hypotheses, 
which emphasises mindreading both onto- and phylogenetically, to the 
“mindshaping-as-linchpin” hypothesis. I will discuss Zawidzki’s proposals in more 
detail in chapter 3, but introduce them here to give a full picture of the current state 
of the art in social cognition. 
1.2.6	–	Towards	a	unified	account	of	social	cognition	
Although it is not the primary aim of this thesis, I would like to suggest in passing 
that there seems to be a general move towards a unified account in social cognition, 
based on a growing consensus that purely theoretical disputes should be replaced 
with empirically verifiable hybrid approaches, or left by the wayside if no empirical 
resolution is forthcoming. Something like this has already occurred in the case of 
theory-theory/simulation theory hybrids, and also in the disputes of behaviour 
reading vs. mindreading in primate social cognition. Lavelle’s (2012) proposal for 
reconciling direct perception with theoretical inference marks another such attempted 
reconciliation of a classic debate. Zawidzki’s novel proposal that social cognition 
should emphasise mindshaping over mindreading leaves room for more traditional 
work that focuses exclusively on mindreading, and there is no in-principle reason 
why a rich account of mindshaping should not be compatible with a hybrid approach 
to mindreading that allows for direct perception. We seem to be entering an era 
where social cognition is beginning to develop into a mature scientific discipline, 
with a relatively stable core theory that will allow for more interesting and 
exploratory research into specific issues such as joint attention, the relationship 
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between mindshaping and mindreading, and the recursive influence of language and 
culture on social interaction. With that in mind I will move on from social cognition 
as such, and look in more detail at the folk psychological discourse that it produces 
(and is perhaps part-constituted by).  
1.3	–	Folk	Psychology	as	Folk	Discourse	
In the first two sections of this chapter I looked at the historical usage of the term 
folk psychology, and at the historical and contemporary study of social cognition, 
which is sometimes (potentially misleadingly) described as the study of folk 
psychology. In this penultimate section I want to argue for a novel characterisation of 
folk psychology as an explicit folk discourse or practice, one that encompasses 
multiple different components including traditional propositional attitude 
psychology, mental state attribution more generally, behaviour reading, social 
regulation, and narrative competency. This explicit discourse is importantly distinct 
from the implicit social cognitive mechanisms that I described in the previous 
section, although the latter play an important role in generating the former, and may 
in turn be constrained and influenced in interesting ways by the folk discourse. In 
this section I will describe what I mean by a folk psychological discourse, and 
discuss each of the elements that it is composed of. In the final section that follows I 
will say something about how I envisage the relationship between folk psychological 
discourse and social cognition. 
1.3.1	–	Folk	psychological	discourse	
By describing folk psychology as a discourse, I hope to encourage a more open-
minded and pluralistic approach, in which it becomes conceivable that our everyday 
descriptions of behaviour could consist of more than just theoretically motivated 
ascriptions of propositional attitudes. I also want to clearly distinguish folk 
psychology in this broader sense from the more traditional accounts that I have 
described in previous sections. I will go on to argue that we also describe and predict 
behaviour in non-mentalistic terms, situate our descriptions and predictions in an on-
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going narrative structure, and make explicit normative judgements about how one 
ought to behave – where “ought” is understood as carrying both ethical and rational 
weight. I do not want to give any formal definition of what a discourse is, and I 
certainly do not have in mind the more critical sense of a socio-political discourse 
that comes out of the works of Foucault and other social theorists (although studying 
folk psychological discourse in this latter sense might well constitute an interesting 
project in its own right). The rest of this section will focus on discussing in more 
detail the various facets of folk psychological discourse, but first I will say a little 
about how I see them all fitting together. 
 In our everyday lives, we are often able to make predictions about how 
someone is likely to behave, both in the short and long term. We might make such 
predictions explicitly, and can typically verbalise them if asked (although we might 
just keep them to ourselves). Or we might do this implicitly, via some combination 
of the processes and mechanisms described in the previous section. For my purposes 
it doesn’t matter: any basic behavioural prediction of this kind qualifies as what I am 
calling ‘behaviour reading’. Sometimes we may also attribute mental states when 
predicting behaviour, although more typically such ascriptions are used in an attempt 
to explain or justify either past or future behaviour. Another type of explanation or 
justification is narrative competency, which is distinct from either behavioural or 
mentalistic language in that it embeds a person’s actions in a wider narrative, and 
may not attribute any agency to their actions in particular. All three of the above 
kinds of folk psychological discourse (i.e. behaviour reading, mental state attribution, 
and narrative competency) can also be used to impose normative constraints on 
behaviour, i.e. by using them in an imperative rather than descriptive mode. I discuss 
each of these four categories of folk psychological discourse in more detail below.  
1.3.2	–	Behaviour	reading	
This is the most basic category of folk psychological discourse, and it overlaps 
somewhat with the implicit social cognitive mechanisms that I discussed in the last 
section. Regardless of how our behavioural predictions are generated, it is 
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undeniably true that people are in general relatively competent at predicting the 
future behaviour of their conspecifics – at least under normal circumstances. At a 
very basic level, we are able to avoid bumping into strangers on the street and can 
make use of physical cues to understand what someone is about to do, or what they 
expect us to do. Below I will consider a couple of more complex examples that 
demonstrate the kind of things that we can achieve using behavioural predictions 
alone.  
 When I see my colleague get up from her desk and head empty-handed 
towards the fridge that stands in the corner of our office I can safely predict that she 
will probably open it and take something out.  Of course, predictions of this kind 
only go so far – without any additional information I probably couldn’t tell what she 
was going to get out of the fridge, although once I knew what she had got out I could 
probably predict what she was going to do with it. The additional information 
required to predict what she might get out is precisely what is provided by the other 
components of folk psychological discourse. For example, if I had seen her put some 
chocolate in there earlier in the day, and if she had just told me that she fancied a 
snack, I might be able to successfully predict not only that she would open the door, 
but that she might take out the chocolate, break off a piece, and eat it. If I was further 
aware of her kindly nature, and that she knew I liked chocolate, I might predict that 
she would offer me some as well. So behavioural predictions that go beyond very 
simple and immediate circumstances seem to typically require further, non-
behavioural information. 
 Having said that, there is quite a lot that we can achieve with behavioural 
predictions alone, provided that we are familiar with the situation and/or person in 
question. Consider another example. This time, I am observing a group of people 
who are engaged in a team sport. Based on my knowledge of the sport in question, I 
can predict what the players are likely to do, without needing to attribute any kind of 
hidden mental states to them. My predictions will undoubtedly not be perfect, but 
will certainly go beyond what I could achieve if I was not familiar with the sport. 
Add in a little extra information about each player, such as how they have tended to 
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play in the past, and my predictions will once again become more reliable.  At this 
point it perhaps becomes an open question whether what I am doing should be 
described as behavioural prediction or explicit theorising, as my information about 
each player’s previous performance could either be something I am explicitly aware 
of, or something I only know tacitly. The precise answer to this question does not 
matter for my purposes – it is sufficient that at least some of the time I might predict 
the behaviour of these sports players without attributing mental states to them.6 
 As the previous example demonstrated, we can improve on our basic capacity 
for behavioural prediction by engaging in explicit theorising. Rather than just 
predicting future behaviour on the basis of current behaviour, I can supplement my 
prediction with a model of the kind of situation that I am observing, and how it 
normally plays out. Note that this is distinct from the kind of implicit theory 
proposed by the theory-theory, which I do not have explicit access to, and which is 
based on a set of assumptions about how the mind works, rather than the situation 
which I am in.7 Explicit theorising of the kind that I mention here can be purely 
behavioural, but it can also posit hidden mental states, or be expressed in terms of a 
narrative structure. I expand on each of these possibilities below. 
1.3.3	–	Mental	state	attribution	
As we saw in the previous sub-section, there is a very thin line between exclusively 
behavioural predictions and more complex attributions of mental states as hidden 
causes of behaviour. The latter are what have typically been emphasised in previous 
philosophical discussions of folk psychology, normally under the more specific guise 
of propositional attitude attributions. I think it is important to distinguish between 
                                                
6 Botterill (1996: 107) notes that we could predict the outcome of a football game without having 
access to a ‘theory of football’, but I want to go one step further and say that we can sometimes 
predict the behaviour of a football player without having access to, or without having to use, a theory 
of mind.  
7 Although a theory theorist could argue that we do in fact have access to the content of our theory of 
mind, and that mental state attribution involves explicit theorizing, in which case my explicit 
theorizing about the behaviour of this sports team might be an example of theory-theory in action. 
This version of theory-theory is not very popular, however, and seems to suffer from a number of 
phenomenological and conceptual inconsistencies (see e.g. Gallagher 2008b). 
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mental state attributions in general and the particular case of propositional attitude 
ascriptions, if only to make room for the in-principle possibility that there could be 
non-propositional mental states attributed by the folk, such as character traits like 
kindness. With that in mind, let’s consider what kind of mental states are in fact 
attributed in folk psychological discourse, and additionally what function such 
attributions might serve. 
 When giving behavioural descriptions and predictions of the kind I sketched 
out in the previous sub-section, it is extremely natural to supplement the description 
with additional mentalistic language, to the point where not doing so can in fact feel 
somewhat artificial. Consider again my prediction of what my colleague will do 
when she stands up from her desk and walks towards the fridge. Based only on 
behavioural assumptions, I can predict that she will open it and take something out, 
and perhaps even predict what she will take out if I saw her put something there 
earlier, or if she only ever uses the fridge to store one item, but my predictions 
immediately become much more powerful if I have access to mentalistic data. Now I 
can predict that she will take out some chocolate and eat, because I know that she is 
hungry, and that she believes there to be some chocolate in the fridge. I can also 
predict that she will offer me some, because I know that she is kind, and I know that 
she knows that I am hungry. This is only a very simple case, but immediately the 
complexity of both the predictions and explanations begins to increase, especially 
once we get into recursive attributions (“I know that she knows that…”). 
 Note that we have at least two kinds of attributions in the above vignette, at 
least prior to further analysis. We have propositional attitude attributions: “she 
believes x” and “she knows x” 8. We also have something like emotional or 
dispositional attributions: “she is hungry” and “she is kind”.  Whilst these can easily 
be reinterpreted as propositional attitude attributions – “she desires food” and “she 
wants to please others” – I think that doing so mischaracterises the nature of the folk 
                                                
8 The predicate “knows” must here be treated as a naïve folk psychological attribution – nothing of 
any epistemological significance is intended, and “knows” could perhaps be reinterpreted as a strong 
version of “believes” in almost every case. 
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discourse, as we typically interpret dispositional attributions as having a wider remit 
than propositional attitude attributions. “She is hungry” implies not only that she 
desires food, but also that she might be somewhat irritable, and that she might use 
food-related examples when making philosophical arguments, for instance. In a 
sense these kinds of attributions constitute a basic narrative, which I will discuss in 
more detail in the next subsection.  
 Note also that I slipped into folk psychological discourse in order to justify 
my own predictions, such as when I stated that I could predict her behaviour 
“because I know that she is hungry”. This points towards not only the prevalence of 
folk psychological discourse, but also a justificatory function that it performs in 
addition to prediction and explanation. One is implicitly required to provide folk 
psychological justifications for one’s behaviour in all kinds of situations, and we are 
typically able to give such justifications even if they are not normally elicited. Later 
in this section I will argue that even if these justifications are typically ad hoc and 
unreliable, they provide constraints on our future behaviour that can end up turning 
them into self-fulfilling prophecies.  
 So, we have at least two kinds of mental state attributions, propositional 
attitude and dispositional, both of which appear to greatly expand the predictive 
success and explanatory power of folk psychological discourse. Whilst this explains 
some of the historical focus on propositional attitude attributions, in the rest of this 
section I will argue that there are other, equally powerful components of folk 
psychological discourse.   
1.3.4	–	Narrative	competency	
As we have seen in the previous two sub-sections, there is a natural progression from 
behaviour prediction, to mental state attribution, culminating in full-blown folk 
psychological narratives. Whilst I can predict my colleague’s behaviour by engaging 
in crude behaviourism or by attributing mental states, it is often easier (and perhaps 
even more natural) to simply situate her actions in an on-going narrative structure, 
one that I have built up over the weeks, months, and years that I have known her. 
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This narrative allows for predictions, as if I am familiar with the narrative then I 
know what comes next, but it also provides a contextual justification for her 
behaviour (the importance of which I will turn to in the next subsection). Bruner 
(1990) first introduced the notion of a folk psychological narrative, but it has since 
been developed extensively by Hutto (2008).  
 We do not only acquire folk psychological narratives via direct observation 
of conspecifics – if this were the case then this capacity would arguably be no more 
than a complex version of behaviourism. As part of our social cognitive and folk 
psychological development, we learn all kinds of narratives, either by explicitly 
being taught them in the form of fictional stories, or through implicit observation of 
generalizable everyday situations.  
 It is important to recognise that narrative competency cannot be all there is to 
folk psychological discourse. Hutto notes that narratives seem to be inherently reliant 
on “having a grasp of the core propositional attitudes” (2008: 129). Similarly, 
Gallagher’s alternative account of social cognition relies on the acquisition of what 
he calls primary and secondary intersubjectivity prior to narrative competency 
(2008a). Whilst according to my taxonomy these are more properly understood as 
social cognitive rather than folk psychological mechanisms, because they take place 
below the level of explicit awareness, they do both include elements of behaviour 
reading, and it seems right to say that without some kind of basic understanding of 
people as predictable agents, it would be hard to make sense of narratives that 
included them as characters. Narrative competency is best thought of as a 
continuation and complexification of behaviour reading and mental state ascription, 
buttressed with socio-cultural schemas, rather than a totally different way of 
understanding behaviour. 
1.3.5	–	Normative	constraints	
The final component of folk psychological discourse that I will consider in this 
section is the normative or regulative pressure that this discourse can exert on us. 
Morton (1980) first articulated the suggestion that folk psychology might be partially 
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normative, and Mameli (2001), McGeer (2007), Zawidzki (2013), and Andrews 
(2015) have all explored it more recently. I will discuss this idea and its implications 
in more detail in chapter 3, but for the time being I focus on just giving a rough 
impression of how it fits into the overall picture of folk psychological discourse. 
 Folk psychological discourse can be considered to be playing a regulative 
role whenever it causes us to adjust our behaviour in some way. Zawidzki lists 
several different forms that this can take, “including imitation, pedagogy, norm 
cognition and enforcement, and language based regulative frameworks, like self- and 
group-constituting narratives” (2013: 29). Note that mindshaping, as Zawidzki calls 
it, spans the whole range of folk psychological discourse, from “self- and group-
constituting narratives” right down to the basic, perhaps pre-folk psychological, 
imitation of the behaviour of conspecifics. One particularly interesting case that 
Zawidzki explores in some detail is the way in which our explicit attributions of 
mental states to ourselves and to others ends up becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
as we consequently feel social pressure to conform to those attributions and thus 
maintain at least a kind of surface level consistency.  For example, if someone 
attributes to me the belief that it is raining, they are not only making an epistemic 
claim, but also exerting social pressure on me to perform certain actions (putting on a 
raincoat, carrying an umbrella, etc.) at risk of otherwise looking either irrational or 
contrary, or else making them look foolish, which comes with its own social costs.  
 Another kind of normative constraint is imposed when we try to justify our 
behaviour or the behaviour of others. Whilst such justifications can often be ad hoc, 
and may not closely match our actual reasons for doing something (assuming such a 
reason even existed in the first place), they do help us make sense of our behaviour 
as situated in a narrative, and they also exert an influence on our future behaviour as 
we try and keep this narrative consistent. Hutto suggests that folk psychological 
narratives are in fact primarily invoked “to make sense of […] seemingly aberrant 
actions” (2008: 37; also McGeer 2007). He goes on:  
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Bruner is right that rather than merely providing a framework for 
disinterested prediction and behaviour, narratives – and especially folk 
psychological narratives – work to regulate our actions; as such they are 
“instruments of culture”: they summarize “not simply how things are but 
(often implicitly) how they should be.” (Hutto 2008: 37, quoting Bruner 
[1990: 40]) 
 
 Andrews (2015) gives the helpful example of being late for a meeting, and 
explaining that you were late because of bad traffic. This story justifies your late 
arrival, but at the same time also exerts a normative pressure on you to consider 
alternative forms of transport in the future – there’s only so many times that the 
excuse will work before your colleagues grow tired of it. I explore these mechanisms 
in much more detail in chapter 3.  
1.3.6	–	Summary	of	folk	psychological	discourse	
I have described folk psychological discourse as being a complex phenomenon 
composed of (at least) four somewhat distinct capacities. At perhaps the most basic 
end, we are able to make successful short-term behaviour predictions, such as when 
we side step someone to avoid bumping into them on the street. More complex 
capacities include the explicit attribution of mental states, the invocation of 
narratives to explain behaviour, and the establishment of normative constraints that 
help structure our social environments.  
 These capacities are obviously closely related to one another, and 
distinguishing between them in this way is inevitably going to feel somewhat 
artificial. Mental state attributions can be used in order to help predict behaviour, and 
narratives are an important component of the normative constraints that we impose 
through folk psychological discourse. Nonetheless they are distinct enough that we 
can make sense of talking about them separately, even if this is often a simplification 
of the actual state of affairs.  
 
 
51 
1.4	–	Folk	Psychological	Discourse	and	Social	Cognitive	Mechanisms		
So far in this chapter I have presented a history of the term folk psychology, and 
explored two distinct ways in which it can be used: to refer to social cognitive 
mechanisms and to refer to folk psychological discourse, the latter being a personal 
level description of how we actually engage with one another in a social context, 
whilst the former describes the sub-personal mechanisms that make social interaction 
possible. The previous sections have surveyed the current state of play with respect 
to both these uses of ‘folk psychology’, and provided some brief suggestions about 
the direction in which I think debates in each area should be headed. In this final 
section I will consider how these two phenomena interact with one another.  
 As I have already noted, the distinction between social cognitive mechanisms 
and folk psychological discourse is to some extent an artificial one. Depending on 
which account of social cognition you think is correct, you might think of the folk 
discourse as simply being an articulation of the implicit knowledge embodied in our 
theory of other minds. In this case the two would be more or less identical, although 
perhaps some components of the folk discourse, such as narrative competency, 
would be seen as a culturally mediated addition to the core theoretical structure. 
Alternatively one could see the entirety of the folk discourse as an additional layer 
built on top of our basic capacity for social interaction – this is something like the 
position expressed by Gallagher (2008a), although one could remain more neutral 
with regard to what form the social cognitive mechanisms take.  
 There are further important questions to be asked about the interaction 
between social cognitive mechanisms, which I take to be relatively implicit and at 
least to some extent universal, and folk psychological discourse, which is highly 
culturally mediated and, as we will see in chapter 2, nowhere near as universal as 
traditionally assumed. To what extent is the folk discourse constrained by our actual 
capacity for social cognition? To what extent are social cognitive mechanisms 
influenced by the vagaries of folk psychological discourse? Whilst answering these 
questions is not the main aim of this thesis, I will briefly say a few words about each. 
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 Our capacity for successfully predicting behaviour is a product of social 
cognitive mechanisms, although as I suggested in the previous section, it is probably 
also facilitated by normative constraints imposed by folk psychological discourse. 
This makes behavioural predictions an interesting borderline case – whilst we 
sometimes make explicit reference to them in our folk discourse, they are more often 
at work ‘behind the scenes’, where we might even lack explicit awareness of them. It 
is typically only when someone’s behaviour is odd or unexpected, or when someone 
else requests guidance, that we engage in explicit behavioural predictions. 
 The status of mental state attributions is heavily dependent on which account 
of social cognition one favours. Traditionally minded theory-theorists will be happy 
to say that the mental states attributed by our folk theory are essentially the same as 
those attributed by our social cognitive mechanisms, whilst simulation theorists and 
more liberal theory-theorists might draw a distinction between the kinds of states that 
we attribute explicitly and the kinds of states that are attributed by our implicit social 
cognitive mechanisms. Some, such as the interaction theorists, might even deny that 
our social cognitive mechanisms attribute any mental states at all. One benefit of my 
proposed distinction between social cognitive mechanisms and folk psychological 
discourse is that one can make sense of this denial whilst at the same time accepting 
that we engage in at least some explicit attribution of mental states and behaviour.  
 Narrative competency is typically understood as a capacity that we only draw 
upon when trying to make sense of complex social situations in which predictions of 
future behaviour are not immediately obvious. Likewise, normative constraints are 
usually understood as a product of our explicit folk discourse, although we may not 
always be explicitly aware of the influence that they exert on us. Nonetheless, one 
might wish to draw on both processes as part of an explanation of how our implicit 
social cognitive mechanisms are able to function. Ultimately where one draws the 
line between social cognitive mechanisms and folk psychological discourse is going 
to be heavily dependent on one’s other theoretical commitments, and as we will see 
by the end of this thesis, keeping the two completely distinct is neither necessary nor 
desirable. 
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 The most important point for my purposes is that we should keep the two 
kinds of phenomena at least in principle distinct from one another, even if in practice 
we discover that they overlap significantly. This ‘in principle’ distinction is 
necessary in order allow for the possibility that the content of our explicit folk 
psychological discourse is entirely unrelated to the content or structure of whatever 
implicit mechanisms implement social competency. This could be the case, for 
instance, if folk psychological discourse were nothing more than an exercise in 
rational reconstruction, where we create post hoc explanations for each other’s (and 
our own) behaviours that bear no relation to the actual causes of those behaviours. 
Note that this could be true even if the underlying social cognitive mechanisms were 
able to accurately track the actual causes of behaviour – perhaps not at all likely, but 
nonetheless a coherent enough possibility that it is worth bearing in mind as a 
limiting edge case. Going forward it is important to keep this in principle distinction 
in mind, as a sort of foundation upon which we can begin our investigations of folk 
psychology and cognitive ontology. 
 This chapter has introduced a distinction between implicit social cognitive 
mechanisms on the one hand and explicit folk psychological discourse on the other. 
In chapters 2 and 3 I will look at how folk psychological discourse differs cross-
culturally, and how it can serve a regulative as well as a predictive or explanatory 
role. In chapter 4 I will turn to cognitive scientific discourse, and consider how and 
when the explanations given by cognitive science differ from those given by folk 
psychology. I will also identify some historical cases where folk psychological 
intuitions and terminology have influenced cognitive scientific discourse. Finally, 
chapters 5 and 6 will take a more systematic look at the role played by folk 
psychological taxonomies in cognitive scientific explanations, and then propose a 
new methodology for replacing these taxonomies with more empirically supported 
terminology. 
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Chapter	2	–	The	Myth	of	a	Universal	Folk	Psychology	
This chapter will focus on cases of potential variation in both folk psychological 
discourse and social cognitive mechanisms. The focus will be primarily on the 
former, for two reasons. Firstly, there is more evidence of variation in folk 
psychological discourse than in social cognitive mechanisms. Secondly, the 
assumption that folk psychological discourse is universal is used implicitly as a way 
of licensing philosophers (and to some extent psychologists) to infer that the mental 
states posited by folk psychology are those that really exist. The aim in this chapter is 
to motivate one initial reason to be cautious of the role that folk psychological 
intuitions play in philosophy of mind and scientific psychology. By itself the 
argument presented is not sufficient to prove conclusively that folk psychology is 
unreliable, but it should at least give us cause to reconsider our reliance on folk 
psychological intuitions, and to explore alternative ways of categorising mental 
states. 
 In section 2.1 I will introduce what I call the universality assumption, and 
disambiguate two distinct versions of this assumption, along with the implications 
that they have for philosophy and cognitive science. In section 2.2 I will review 
studies of cultural variation in both social cognitive mechanisms and folk 
psychological discourse, and conclude that there is evidence of significant variation 
in the latter but not the former. In section 2.3 I will consider various critical 
responses to evidence of this kind. Finally, in section 2.4 I will argue that if we take 
the evidence of variation in folk psychological discourse seriously, we should be 
cautious about how we apply our own folk psychological intuitions. 
2.1	–	The	Universality	Assumption	
In this section I will introduce two versions of the assumption that folk psychology is 
universal, one based on sub-personal social cognitive mechanisms and the other 
based on explicit folk psychological discourse. The former is prima facie more 
plausible than the latter, although examples will be given of theorists who endorse 
both claims. It is somewhat hard to find explicit endorsement of the universality 
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assumption (aside from by Fodor), precisely because it is an unspoken commonplace 
that no one usually thinks to mention. As such, this section will involve some reading 
between the lines in order to establish that the assumption does actually play an 
important theoretical role. I will argue that the main way that the assumption 
manifests itself is via what I call the ‘no folk psychological miracles’ argument: 
assuming that folk psychology is universal, and that it tracks real mental states, 
licenses theorists to simply take it for granted that the mental states posited by folk 
psychology are those that really exist. 
2.1.1	–	Levels	of	Explanation	
Before going any further it will be useful to clarify some of the terms used when 
discussing ‘levels of explanation’; terms such as personal/sub-personal, 
doxastic/subdoxastic, conscious/unconscious, and explicit/implicit. In this chapter I 
will be focusing primarily on a distinction between two kinds of folk psychological 
universality, which I will characterise as sub-personal and explicit respectively, but I 
will also refer back to the broader clarifications made here in future chapters.   
 Drayson (2012, 2014) draws attention to some philosophical confusion 
surrounding the use of the personal/sub-personal distinction. She distinguishes 
references to personal/sub-personal explanations on the one hand, and references to 
personal/sub-personal states on the other. The former is a distinction between two 
kinds of psychological explanation: personal level explanations are horizontal,9 
citing a sequence of events that led up to and caused the behaviour in question 
(Drayson 2012: 2-3), whilst sub-personal explanations are vertical, decomposing the 
person into component parts that together produce the behaviour to be explained. 
Drayson emphasises the fact that sub-personal explanations still typically rely on 
‘psychological’ (as opposed to physiological) predicates, such as belief and desire – 
                                                
9 Drayson asserts that folk psychological explanations are typically horizontal, but here she has in 
mind the traditional interpretation of folk psychology as propositional attitude psychology. Under a 
broader definition of folk psychology, such as that which I argued for in the previous chapter, folk 
psychological explanations need not necessarily be horizontal.  
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what is distinctive about sub-personal explanation is that it applies such predicates to 
decomposed parts of persons rather than whole persons. 
 Personal/sub-personal states, meanwhile, are somewhat more complicated. A 
personal state is just a state of a whole person, such as believing that the sky is blue, 
and importantly does not necessarily need to be localised to any particular internal 
state (Drayson 2012: 9) – this is all perfectly consistent with how I argued folk 
psychology should be conceived in the previous chapter. Subsequently a sub-
personal state is just a state of a sub-person, i.e. a belief attributed to a component 
part of a person, which only makes sense if one is giving a sub-personal explanation. 
For this reason Drayson argues that there is not really any distinction between 
personal and sub-personal states – they are exactly the same kind of thing, just 
applied in different ways or under different explanatory frameworks (ibid: 11). 
Importantly for Drayson, the kinds of states attributed in both personal and sub-
personal explanation typically remain both intentional and distinctly psychological – 
whilst we can use non-psychological predicates in sub-personal explanations, this is 
not a defining feature of the sub-personal level. 
 To capture this further complication Drayson reintroduces the distinction 
between doxastic and sub-doxastic states (2012: 12), first described by Stich (1978). 
Doxastic states are simply those that correspond to standard folk psychological 
mental states, whilst subdoxastic states “don’t correspond to anything posited by 
personal explanation” (Drayson 2012: 12). Both kinds of state can be used in sub-
personal explanations, but the contents of doxastic states are potentially accessible to 
conscious introspection, whilst the contents of subdoxastic states are not. So beliefs, 
desires etc. attributed to sub-persons constitute doxastic states, whilst the attributions 
that figure in explanations of grammatical knowledge and early visual processing 
(for example) pick out subdoxastic states.  
 Drayson further clarifies that distinctions between the conscious and the 
unconscious, and between the normative and the non-normative, are also different to 
the personal and the sub-personal. What she calls the “cognitive unconscious” (2012: 
15), i.e. the unconscious as studied by contemporary consciousness science, seems to 
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correspond to subdoxastic states, whilst the more traditional Freudian notion of the 
unconscious appears to be situated entirely at the personal level of explanation. The 
normative/non-normative distinction may pick out something interesting about 
personal level explanations, but not without further argumentation – I will return to 
this topic in the next chapter.  
 With all this in mind, I can clarify the distinction that I made in the previous 
chapter between social cognitive mechanisms and folk psychological discourse. The 
positing of social cognitive mechanisms is a form of sub-personal explanation, 
involving either doxastic or subdoxastic states. For example, the theory of mind 
posited by the theory-theory is (typically) a doxastic theory at the sub-personal 
level,10 whilst the mental simulations posited by simulation theory are subdoxastic 
simulations, also at the sub-personal level. Folk psychological discourse, on the other 
hand, involves doxastic states at the personal level of explanation. So when I 
describe somebody as (explicitly or verbally) attributing belief or desire, or as 
(explicitly or verbally) situating someone else’s behaviour in an on-going narrative, I 
am describing doxastic states at the personal level of explanation. I could also give a 
sub-personal level explanation of how that person is able to make those attributions, 
in terms of social cognitive mechanisms. The upshot of this distinction is that we 
could plausibly have universality at the level of social cognitive mechanisms without 
having universality at the level of folk psychological discourse, or vice versa. In the 
following subsections I will consider the evidence for and against both possibilities.		
2.1.2	–	Social	Cognitive	Universality		
One way in which folk psychology could be universal is if the sub-personal 
mechanisms responsible for implementing it, i.e. the mechanisms studied by social 
cognition, were universal. We can call this social cognitive universality. Social 
cognitive universality would obtain if, for example, theory-theory were true and the 
                                                
10 Depending on how you spell out the details, theory-theory might be either non-doxastic or non-sub-
personal, but I will not worry about that here. At least as it is most commonly interpreted, theory-
theory seems to be a theory of doxastic states (such as beliefs and desire) implemented at the sub-
personal level. 
 
 
59 
exact same (sub-personal) theory of mind was acquired in all cultures, or if 
simulation theory were true and all cultures performed (sub-personal) simulations in 
the exact same way. This could be the case even if there was variation in the verbal 
or behavioural expressions resulting from these sub-personal mechanisms. For 
example, cultural factors might prevent people talking about or acting on their 
knowledge of other minds, or might lead people to interpret attributions of belief 
very differently at the personal level. I will discuss this possibility in more detail in 
the next section. 
 There are a number of prima facie reasons for thinking that social cognitive 
universality might at least partially obtain. As soon as one concedes that there might 
be an evolutionary component to our explanations of social cognition, it seems 
plausible that at least the basic mechanisms will be shared across cultures (see e.g. 
Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 1992; Carruthers, Laurence & Stich 2005). Of course, 
innateness is a distinct issue from universality, but it would be extremely unusual to 
find an evolved mechanism that was not at least somewhat universal (even if its 
expression depended on environmental factors). Even putting the evolutionary 
argument to one side, we might expect social cognitive mechanisms to converge on 
similar strategies for predicting behaviours that are shared across cultures, such as 
those motivated by innate drives like hunger, fear, and procreation. To the extent that 
one thinks human behaviour is universal, one might also expect social cognition to 
be universal. 
 However, human behaviour is of course not entirely universal, and neither is 
human cognition. Successful social cognitive mechanisms should be sensitive to 
cultural variations in behaviour, although this might not require the mechanisms 
themselves to vary (by analogy, the visual system could be both universal and 
capable of adjusting to novel environments). A more interesting result would be if 
the mechanisms themselves varied between cultures – say, hypothetically, if one 
culture relied more on simulation whilst another relied more on theoretical inference. 
In 2.2 I will consider evidence for this kind of variation and conclude that we in fact 
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have good reason to think that sub-personal social cognitive mechanisms are fairly 
universal. 
2.1.3	–	Folk	Psychological	Universality		
Another way that folk psychology could be universal is if all cultures made the same 
kind of explicit claims about how other people think and behave. We can call this 
folk psychological universality, to distinguish it from the social cognitive 
universality that I described in the previous section. Whilst there is some overlap 
between this kind of universality and that which I described in the previous section 
(social cognitive universality), it also seems plausible that we might find more 
variation in explicit folk psychological reports, even if the underlying mechanisms 
were the same.  
 To illustrate this point, consider the following example: two groups of people 
have the same underlying social cognitive mechanisms, but differ in the way that 
they report their experience of other minds. In both cases the groups are able to 
systematically identify and categorise the same set of facial expressions, once that 
we might identify with the term ‘anger’. However, the first group understands these 
facial expressions to be correlated with a kind of madness, and behaves accordingly, 
locking the person up but not thinking ill of them in anyway – they are a sick person 
to be treated, not just someone who cannot control their anger. The second group 
believes that controlling one’s emotions is a moral imperative, and socially ostracises 
anyone who displays anger in this way. Both groups appear to detect the same 
‘mental state’, but report it and respond to it in different ways that will have distinct 
cultural, social, and scientific implications. This is a fictional example, but I will 
discuss some real-world cases that might raise similar issues in the next section. 
 Nonetheless, even if it is plausible that there might be cultural variation in 
explicit folk psychological reports, the conventional assumption in philosophy has 
been that folk psychology will in fact turn out to be universal. Both Fodor and the 
Churchlands assume that the folk psychological theory over which they are arguing 
will be the same in all cultures, and furthermore that it will take the form of 
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propositional attitude psychology in particular. Fodor goes so far as to state “if an 
anthropologist claimed to have found such a group [that does not attribute beliefs and 
desires], I wouldn’t believe him” (1987: 132). The Churchlands are less explicit, but 
it is apparent in their discussion of eliminative materialism that what they have in 
mind when they talk about the failure of folk psychology is a traditional 
propositional attitude psychology that is assumed to be universal across all cultures. 
When they criticise the folk theory for remaining static over several millennia, they 
have in mind a single theory, not a multitude of fragmented, culturally diverse 
theories. This is not to say that their criticisms are not valid, but rather that their 
choice of target reveals an inherent assumption of a universal propositional attitude 
psychology. 
 Stich does briefly consider the possibility that folk psychology might not be 
universal (1983: 217), quoting a passage where Hacking notes “ethnographers often 
find themselves quite unable to locate familiar mental states in alien cultures” (ibid; 
Hacking 1982: 44). Whilst acknowledging that this is an issue, he glosses over it 
swiftly by suggesting that the folk terms could simply be redefined so as to better 
suit the philosophical project in question. I will return to this issue in the next section 
after considering the evidence for cultural variation in explicit folk psychological 
discourse. 
2.1.4	–	No	Folk	Psychological	Miracles		
Whether or not social cognitive mechanisms are universal is an interesting question 
for the study of social cognition, and whether or not folk psychological discourse is 
universal is an interesting question for psychological anthropology. Both questions 
might be philosophically interesting insofar as one has a philosophical interest in 
social cognition and folk psychology, but what makes these questions especially 
interesting (for my purposes) is a further inferential step that I will call the ‘no folk 
psychological miracles’ argument. In brief, the argument is that if folk psychology 
were universal, then the best way of explaining this universality would be that it 
accurately captures how minds actually work, and therefore licenses us to use our 
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folk psychological intuitions as a guide to cognitive scientific discovery. Some 
version of this argument seems to be implicit in the work of those who take folk 
psychology to be universal in some sense, and in this subsection I will formulate the 
argument explicitly and consider its implications.  
 In philosophy of science the ‘no miracles’ argument originates with Putnam’s 
claim that realism “is the only philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a 
miracle” (1975: 73). The thought here is that if a successful scientific theory posits 
the existence of certain unobservable entities, then the best way of explaining the 
success of that theory is to accept that those entities really do exist. For example, our 
best theories in physics and chemistry seem to be committed to the existence of 
electrons, even though we cannot directly observe them. If electrons did not exist 
than the success of these theories would appear to be miraculous; therefore, electrons 
exist. Whilst the status of this argument is hotly contested in philosophy of science 
(see Chakravarrty 2015, especially sections 2.1, 3.2, and 3.3), it seems to be a prima 
facie plausible way of reasoning about unobservable entities, and something very 
much like it seems to underlie the inference from folk psychological universality to 
the use of folk psychological concepts in cognitive science. 
 By analogy, if folk psychological discourse is universally committed to the 
existence of the same kinds of mental states and processes, and enjoys explanatory 
and predictive success, then we might feel licensed to make the inference that these 
mental states and processes actually do exist – otherwise, the success of folk 
psychology would be a miracle. Fodor seems to be implicitly committed to this kind 
of argument when he populates his language of thought with propositional attitudes 
drawn from his own folk psychological discourse, as do many other philosophers 
who simply assume that the correct psychological theory is that posited by folk 
psychology (and that there is only one such theory). In an odd way the Churchlands’ 
are also committed to at least the logic of this argument, in that they target the 
success (or lack thereof) of folk psychology as a reason for or against elimination, 
rather than simply denying that we should be basing our scientific psychology on our 
folk psychological intuitions in the first place. In contrast, my argument will be that 
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even if folk psychological discourse exhibits explanatory and predictive success, 
there are still reasons that we should not use it as the basis for our scientific theories 
of the mind. 
2.2	–	Evidence	For	and	Against	Universality	
In the previous section I characterised two versions of the universality assumption, 
one claiming that sub-personal social cognitive mechanisms are universal, and the 
other claiming that explicit folk psychological discourse is universal. For most of the 
20th century these two assumptions went unquestioned, but in the last couple of 
decades they have come under scrutiny from a number of distinct angles. Below I 
will introduce some initial reasons for being sceptical about the universality of folk 
psychology. In the rest of the section I will consider evidence of variation from four 
different fields: social cognition, anthropology, comparative linguistics, and 
experimental philosophy. 
 Lillard (1998) identifies “an assumption that everyday, unschooled 
knowledge of human psychology is basically the same everywhere” (ibid: 3), and 
suggested that if this assumption were false it might call into question some central 
findings in social cognition. She provides a useful definition of this assumed 
universal knowledge of human psychology as “the naïve folk psychology described 
or implied by the late 20th century academic literature on psychology and philosophy 
of mind” (ibid.), which she refers to as the ‘European-American Social Sciences 
Model’ (EASSM). This is essentially equivalent to the folk psychological discourse 
that philosophers such as Fodor and the Churchlands assume to be universal. Lillard 
also notes an additional subtlety, which is that there may be variation of this model 
within European and American cultures, as thus far most research in social cognition 
has primarily targeted a relatively small population centered in and around university 
departments.  
 Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan make a similar point in their now-classic 
paper “The weirdest people in the world?” (2010), where they introduce the acronym 
WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) to refer to the 
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societies that have provided the subjects for the majority of experiments for pretty 
much the entire history of experimental psychology. Their concern is that as “there 
are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon 
is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation” (ibid.), it is possible that 
psychological science may be systematically biased by the limited (WEIRD) 
population it draws its samples from. My focus in this section is on challenging the 
assumption that the folk psychological discourse common to WEIRD/EASSM 
societies will generalize unproblematically to humankind as a whole. 
 When looking at the evidence either for or against the universality 
assumption, it is important to keep in mind the distinction that I introduced in the 
previous section. There may be evidence for cultural variation in what people 
explicitly say about other minds without there being evidence for variation in the 
sub-personal mechanisms responsible for social cognition. Astuti makes this point 
very clear when she writes,  
 
we should not be tempted into using folk theories of the mind […] to 
make claims about cross-cultural variation in people’s Theory of Mind. 
This is because people’s folk theories are explicit reflections about the 
human mind, whereas Theory of Mind – as understood by psychologists 
– operates implicitly. (Astuti 2014) 
 
 I will first consider evidence for and against the assumption that sub-personal 
social cognitive mechanisms are universal, and conclude that this assumption is 
probably a fairly reasonable one. I will then look at several kinds of evidence for and 
against the assumption that explicit folk psychological discourse is universal, and 
conclude that this is a questionable assumption with potentially serious implications 
for theoretical work in philosophy and cognitive science. 
2.2.1	–	Social	Cognition		
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the classic paradigm in social cognition is the 
false belief task, which is used as a proxy for general social cognitive development. 
The standard versions of the task, where infants are asked where they think the actor 
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or doll will look, are referred to in the literature as ‘elicited response’ tasks. Whilst 
the elicited response version of the false belief task does typically involve an explicit 
verbal report, it is intended to track the capacity of sub-personal social cognitive 
mechanisms, and as such falls under the category of the first kind of potential 
universality that I discussed above. Nonverbal tasks, such as those performed by 
Onishi & Baillargeon (2005), may be more directly related to processing at the sub-
personal (and perhaps subdoxastic) level, as they do not require an explicit verbal 
report. 
  WEIRD children are typically able to pass the elicited response task around 
the age of four or five, and some versions of the nonverbal task significantly earlier, 
perhaps even as early as 13 months (Surian, Caldi, & Sperber 2007) although the 
evidence for this is controversial. Originally this result was taken as evidence for a 
standard developmental trajectory, with autistic childrens’ slow development 
providing an interesting contrast, but more recently there have been some attempts at 
conducting false belief tasks in other cultures and contexts as a way of confirming 
whether or not the development of this capacity does in fact follow a universal 
pattern. 
 One of the earliest attempts to explore cross-cultural variation in false belief 
acquisition was carried out by Vinden (1996), who conducted a culturally 
appropriate version of the elicited response task with Junín Quechua children living 
in the Peruvian Andes. The Junín Quechua culture is traditionally oral, with a 
language that refers only indirectly to mental state concepts, e.g. by using a word 
more like “say” where other cultures might use “think”. The children performed 
relatively poorly on the false belief task, answering no better than chance even up to 
the age of 7 (the oldest included in the study). Vinden concluded that Junín Quechua 
children develop a theory of mind competency later than comparable “Western 
literate children”. 
 In the two decades since Vinden’s study there has been a more concerted 
effort to explore potential variation in false belief acquisition, with the general 
consensus being that there is a small degree of variation in developmental trajectory 
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across cultures, but no major variation in eventual outcome (i.e. all neurotypical 
children do eventually acquire an understanding of false beliefs). Wellman et al 
(2001) found variation in timing of false belief acquisition across several cultures, 
but had a relatively small sample size in non-European American cultures. Callaghan 
et al (2005), in contrast, found no significant variation across Canadian, Indian, 
Peruvian, Samoan and Thai children. Naito & Koyama (2006) focused specifically 
on Japanese children, and found a delay of roughly one year in acquisition of false 
belief understanding, which they attributed to a greater emphasis on environmental 
causes of behaviour in Japanese culture (ibid: 300). Finally, Liu et al (2008) found 
parallel development in Chinese and North American children, in contrast to greater 
internal (primarily socio-economic) variation in both cultures. It is important to note 
that in all of the above cases the tests conducted used the elicited response paradigm, 
and it appears that there is significantly less variation when non-verbal paradigms are 
used (see e.g. Barrett et al 2013), which are plausibly less vulnerable to cultural or 
linguistic interference. Lavelle (2016) presents further discussion of this data, and 
argues that there are a number of distinct ways in which the developmental delay in 
explicit false belief understanding found in some cultures can be accounted for. 
Nonetheless, it does seem to be true that children across all cultures do eventually 
pass the false belief task, and even if culture does have an impact on social cognitive 
mechanisms, it does not seem to be an especially pronounced one.  In the rest of this 
chapter I will focus primarily on variation in explicit folk psychological discourse.    
2.2.2	–	Anthropology	
The primary source of evidence against folk psychological universality comes from 
the anthropological study of other cultures’ folk theories of minds, sometimes 
referred to as ‘ethnopsychology’ (see e.g. Howard 1985, White 1992). Lillard (1998) 
provides an overview of such evidence, broken up into four main categories (which 
she notes are not necessarily mutually exclusive): 
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• Attraction to Magic – some cultures allow for the mind to interact with the 
world in ways which scientific psychology would deem ‘supernatural’, e.g. 
extrasensory perception or spiritual influence. 
• Differing Conceptual Distinctions – some cultures categorise aspects of 
cognition in different ways, e.g. distinguishing senses or attitudes that other 
cultures might not recognise. 
• Denial of the Negative – some cultures refuse to openly acknowledge 
negative emotions or feelings, e.g. anger or sadness. 
• Different Values – some cultures place differing emphasis on aspects of 
cognition, e.g. internal states vs. external behaviour.  
(Adapted from Lillard 1998: 23-4) 
	
I am most interested in the second (and to some extent the fourth) of these 
categories. Unless we are to contemplate a radical shift in the naturalistic 
understanding of cognition, the first must remain a mere curiosity (at least so far as 
scientific psychology is concerned). The third does not seem to speak to anything 
particularly fundamental – whilst some cultures might refuse to speak of certain 
mental states, presumably they still experience something akin to anger or sadness 
(recall our own Victorian ancestors’ attitude towards open displays of emotion).  
Differences of emphasis, in particular between internal/external factors, could 
be seen as contributing to some extent to the current dominant approach in cognitive 
science.  What Lillard calls the “European-American” model places heavy emphasis 
on internal states, demonstrated by the “large and varied vocabulary [that] EAs use to 
refer to emotions and other mental processes”. In contrast, other cultures have a far 
more limited vocabulary in this area, and in some cases do not even talk about the 
mind, let alone its content (see Lillard 1998: 12-13). Whilst this might simply reflect 
the influence that post-Cartesian philosophy and psychology has had on European-
American culture, it is not inconceivable that this culture has in turn influenced 
scientific developments, leading experimentation and theorising towards what might 
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broadly be considered a “representational” (or propositional) paradigm that focuses 
on the interaction of internal states rather than a more general description of 
behaviour.  
An extreme version of this can be found in the so-called “opacity of mind” 
doctrine attributed to some Pacific island cultures (see Robbins & Rumsey 2008). 
These cultures are reported to make no explicit reference to the mental states of 
others, which is regarded as a taboo subject. Whilst the practical implications of this 
have been somewhat overstated in the past, and whilst the people from these cultures 
undoubtedly have some awareness that other people may have internal mental lives, 
it is still interesting to imagine what a philosophy of mind (or perhaps we should say 
a philosophy of behaviour) could look like under such circumstances. 
Of especial interest are the divergent conceptual distinctions that we find 
across different cultures.  If we accept that our study of the mind and brain is likely 
going to be shaped by the concepts available to us, then it makes sense to pay 
attention to potential alternative conceptual schemes. This is not to say that these 
alternatives will necessarily be superior, but at the very least they will highlight the 
contingent nature of our own concepts. I consider some examples of this based on 
lexical variance in the next section, but we can also identify conceptual distinctions 
that are embodied in broader cultural practices, such as whether a distinction 
between intentional and unintentional action is recognised or given moral weight (cf. 
Barrett et al 2016). 
 More recently, a collection of short position papers from an interdisciplinary 
conference titled “Toward An Anthropological Theory of Mind” (Luhrmann 2011) 
gives a flavour of the kinds of cultural variation that can be found in folk 
psychological discourse. A particularly interesting example is the observation that 
“the philosophically important ‘believe’ (tz’ok-es) is only fully appropriate in Mopan 
[a Yucatan Mayan language] usage if the ‘believer’ also ‘obeys’ what s/he is told” 
(Danziger 2011: 52). Interpreted from within the WEIRD folk psychological 
framework, this would seem to reflect a greater level of commitment than we usually 
ascribe to belief. At least according to the standard philosophical account, there is 
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nothing inconsistent about acting contrary to one’s beliefs, for example if you 
believe that something is morally wrong but do it anyway. Tz’ok-es is perhaps closer 
to what we mean by religious belief, i.e. a belief that strongly commits you to certain 
future behaviours, and which no longer applies to you if you stop behaving in those 
ways. It certainly has a distinct functional profile, and direct translation between 
believe and tz’ok-es could lead to terminological confusion. Similarly, Matthews 
(2013) notes that there is “considerable evidence of cross-cultural variation in the 
role played by propositional attitudes in commonsense psychological explanations” 
(ibid: 110), citing Vinden (1996) in support of his claim that “central Peru’s Junín 
Quechuan culture [….] reportedly makes little or no use of propositional attitude 
attributions” (ibid). He goes on to discuss how such cultures seem to describe 
behaviour in terms of contextual factors, rather than by attributing mental states. 
 What evidence like this suggests is that the explicit, personal level content of 
folk psychological discourse might not be quite so universal as has been previously 
assumed. Even if states similar to the propositional attitudes of WEIRD folk 
psychology can be identified, they might be emphasised or applied in sufficiently 
different ways to make straightforward one-to-one translation problematic. At the 
very least it raises the possibility that our own folk psychological taxonomy is just as 
liable to subtle differences in emphasis, which should lead us to be wary of using it 
as the sole basis for our scientific taxonomy. 
2.2.3	–	Comparative	Linguistics		
Another interesting source of evidence for folk psychological variation comes from 
studies of linguistic variation in concepts referring to the mind. Although such 
evidence is by no means conclusive, it can give us at least an initial indication of 
alternative folk psychological conceptions of the mind. The Hausa of Nigeria only 
distinguish (lexically) between two sensory channels: gani (sight) and ji (hearing, 
tasting, smelling, touching, intuition, and knowing), rather than the five senses 
typically identified in the European-American folk taxonomy (Ritchie 1991; cf. 
Lillard 1998: 19). Whilst it is contextually apparent which sense they are referring to, 
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they clearly place less emphasis on the distinctions between the senses other than 
sight. 
 In Japanese there is no simple distinction between the mental and the non-
mental, as is normally assumed in philosophical interpretations of folk psychology, 
but rather a number of different concepts including kokoro, hara, ki, seishin, and mi, 
none of which clearly refer either to the mind or the body alone. Lillard summarises 
these different concepts: 
 
Kokoro, sometimes translated as "heart, feeling, spirit, intention, will, 
mind" is best translated as "the embodied mind" (p. 63), according to 
Lebra, in part because it has a strong emotional component that is usually 
not considered part of the more rationalistic EA [European-American] 
mind concept. For EAs, minds interpret events and thereby give rise to 
emotions, but their primary force is in cognition. Rather than being 
placed within a thinking head, kokoro is located in the heart and has 
strong links to blood and genes. Moving along a continuum from kokoro 
toward ethereal or spiritual selves are the terms hara, "the vital center of 
the body-mind"; "inner state" or ki, which "circulates throughout a 
person's body-mind" (p. 64); and seishin, which is even more closely 
linked to spirit. At the other end of the spectrum, mi refers to the body, 
but it is a body permeated with mind, combining "spirit and body, 
mentation and sensation, the conscious and unconscious . . . not a fixed 
entity but a 'relational unity' which emerges out of involvement with 
other (persons or things)" (p. 65). This is clearly different form the 
EASSM of mind, not simply a difference in emphasis. These distinctions 
fit into an entirely different conceptual landscape. (Lillard 1998: 12; 
references to Lebra 1993) 
 
 Whilst it could be argued that these novel distinctions reflect cultural 
idiosyncrasies rather than any fundamental variation in folk psychological discourse, 
the very fact that these divergent conceptual taxonomies are possible should at least 
lead us to question the necessity of our own folk psychological distinctions. If 
contemporary analytic philosophy of mind had developed in a culture with the 
conceptual distinctions present in Japanese language, would it be so focused on 
distinguishing the mental from the non-mental, or would it even make sense to talk 
of a mind-body problem? 
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 Focusing on a more specific folk psychological domain, Wierzbicka has 
argued that a language’s emotion terms “constitute a folk taxonomy, not an 
objective, culture-free analytical framework” (1986: 584), and as such we should not 
base our scientific study of emotions on categories drawn from natural language. She 
gives two illustrative examples: 
 
Polish does not have a word corresponding exactly to the English word 
disgust.  What if the psychologists working on the "fundamental human 
emotions" happened to be native speakers of Polish rather than English? 
Would it still have occurred to them to include "disgust" on their list? 
And Australian Aboriginal language Gidjingali does not seem to 
distinguish lexically "fear" from "shame," subsuming feelings kindred to 
those identified by the English words fear and shame under one lexical 
item (Hiatt 1978: 185). If the researchers happened to be native speakers 
of Gidjingali rather than English, would it still have occurred to them to 
claim that fear and shame are both fundamental human emotions, 
discrete and clearly separated from each other? (Wierzbicka 1986: 584) 
	
	 I will discuss Wierzbicka’s proposed solution, the creation of a “natural 
semantic metalanguage”, in my final chapter on cognitive ontology revision, but I 
introduce her work here in order to give an indication of the kind of folk 
psychological variation that I think problematizes the universality assumption. If our 
philosophical and scientific taxonomies are artificially limited by the concepts 
available in our language, then the apparent falsehood of the universality assumption 
(at least with regard to explicit folk psychological discourse) could have serious 
theoretical implications.11   
                                                
11 I am aware that all of the evidence discussed in this section raises the spectre of the now 
controversial Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Whilst I have no particular sympathy for the strongest versions 
of this hypothesis, there has been some interesting progress made towards rehabilitating weaker and 
more plausible versions of linguistic relativity (see e.g. Regier & Kay 2009), and I do find it plausible 
that linguistic variations in folk psychological discourse might at least be indicative of distinct cultural 
schemas for understanding other minds. This is not to say that the members of these cultures perceive 
the world differently, or that this linguistic variation has a strong impact on basic social cognitive 
mechanisms, but rather that when it comes to the explicit expression of how one understands other 
minds, it seems natural to think that this expression might be mediated through a socio-cultural lens of 
which language is just one small part. Whether these linguistic differences are in fact the cause of the 
cultural variation, or whether they are simply caused by it, seems to me to be a moot point that ignores 
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2.2.4	–	Experimental	Philosophy		
A more recent source of evidence against the universality assumption comes from 
so-called ‘experimental philosophy’, which aims to test philosophical intuitions 
across a wide range of diverse populations. In this section I will discuss some recent 
work in experimental philosophy that has focused on variation in folk psychological 
intuitions. Experimental philosophy is a somewhat controversial area of research – in 
the next section I will consider and then respond to some criticisms of this approach, 
which may also be relevant to my more general argument against the universality 
assumption. 
 Systma (2014) presents a collection of recent work on experimental 
philosophy of mind, which he describes as being in the business of testing people’s 
intuitions about attributions of phenomenal states, “like feeling pains, seeing colours, 
hearings sounds, and so on” (ibid: 3), rather than attributions of mental states such as 
belief and desire. Whilst this is a somewhat idiosyncratic definition, as regular 
philosophy of mind is certainly concerned with both phenomenal and non-
phenomenal mental states, it does help distinguish experimental philosophy of mind 
from other areas of experimental philosophy on the one hand, and cross-cultural 
psychology or social cognition on the other. I will therefore focus on intuitions about 
attributions of phenomenal states in this section, although I see no reason why 
experimental philosophy of mind should not also concern itself with attributions of 
non-phenomenal mental states.  
 Two of the papers in Systma’s collection focus on Block’s (1978) Chinese 
nation thought experiment, which asks us to imagine that the entire population of 
China have been connected together in such a way as to approximate the functional 
organisation of a human brain, and then questions whether China would thus be 
endowed with mental states. Block’s intuition is that it would not, and therefore that 
functionalism is false, but Nado (2014) notes that this intuition may not be universal. 
                                                                                                                                     
the complex and recursive interactions between language, culture, and cognition. It is entirely possible 
that language is at once shaped by cultural influences and also involved in shaping the culture that it is 
part of.  
 
 
73 
Knobe & Prinz (2008) found that whilst their subjects intuitively hesitated to 
attribute phenomenal states to group entities (such as the Chinese nation), they were 
more comfortable attributing non-phenomenal mental states to groups, and as such 
might be willing to grant that the Chinese nation can think, but not that it can feel. 
Huebner et al (2010) found that subjects in Hong Kong were less hesitant to ascribe 
phenomenal states to groups, so there may also be cultural variation in intuitions 
about Chinese nation style cases. If this is the case then it may be problematic for 
Block to base a philosophical argument upon the strength of his own intuitions alone 
(although see below for possible responses to this line of argument). 
 Buckwalter & Phelan (2014) present evidence that folk intuitions generally 
allow that disembodied agents (such as ghosts and spirits) can undergo phenomenal 
experience; supposedly disproving a common philosophical claim that having the 
right sort of body is a necessary condition for mentality (Block’s intuition that the 
Chinese nation cannot have mental states seems to be a version of this claim). Once 
again, the fact that folk intuitions diverge from those of philosophers in these cases 
might lead us to question the role of intuition in philosophical argumentation. 
However in this case one could accuse the folk of engaging in the kind of magical 
thinking that Lillard discusses – given that our naturalistic philosophical ontology 
does not include ghosts and spirits, one could question whether we ought to respect 
intuitions about such entities.  
 The rest of the volume continues in much the same way. Reuter et al (2014) 
present evidence that the everyday concept of pain does allow for pain 
hallucinations, contrary to a common philosophical position that pain hallucinations 
are conceptually impossible. Tierney et al (2014) argue that folk intuitions support a 
pluralism about personal identity, and Machery (2014) demonstrates that native 
English speakers “are willing to endorse a surprising range of seemingly 
contradictory sentences” (Systma 2014: 8), which he uses to support his 
heterogeneity thesis about psychological concepts (see 5.3.1 for further discussion of 
Machery’s concept eliminativism). The details of these papers are not especially 
important for my current purposes – what matters is that folk intuitions about the 
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mind seem to frequently differ from those that philosophers appeal to in their 
arguments, and furthermore often differ between populations or samples.12 This 
being the case, the implicit commitment to folk psychological universality that I 
identified in 2.1 starts to look increasingly unsustainable, and rejecting this 
assumption may have serious implications for both philosophy and cognitive science. 
In the next section (2.3) I will consider how a proponent of the universality 
assumption might respond to this evidence, before finally discussing what the 
rejection of the universality assumption entails (in 2.4).  
2.3	–	Accounting	For	The	Evidence	
The evidence that I presented in the previous section indicates that there is at least 
some cultural variation in explicit folk psychological discourse, even if the sub-
personal mechanisms responsible for social cognition may turn out to be universal. 
In the next section I will argue that this variation gives us good reason to be cautious 
of relying too heavily on our own folk psychological intuitions, but first I will 
consider some possible alternative responses. 
 Machery (forthcoming) presents a comprehensive overview of several 
common criticisms of experimental philosophy, some of which can be generalised to 
apply to the approach that I am taking in this chapter (Nado 2014 presents a similar 
list of responses). The first response is to simply criticise the methodology of 
experimental philosophers (Machery forthcoming: 235-44). In 2.3.1 I will consider 
one particular methodological issue that is especially relevant here, which is the 
problems that occur when attempting to translate technical terms. The second 
response is to claim that the intuitions of experts (such as philosophers) should be 
given more credence than those of the general public (ibid: 244-261) – I consider 
                                                
12 We should note that some of this variation is not cross-cultural in the geographic sense, but rather 
reflective of variation between different parts of the same (geographical) culture, i.e. variation 
between typically upper-middle class and well-educated philosophers on the one hand, and the rest of 
the ‘folk’ on the other. Nonetheless, as Lillard (1998) notes explicitly, this ‘academic’ culture from 
which most of our scientific and philosophical intuitions are drawn is certainly distinct enough that we 
should at least question the universal applicability of those intuitions (cf. Henrich, Heine & 
Norenzayan 2010).  
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how this applies to the universality assumption 2.3.2. Another interesting suggestion 
he raises is that we could reform our use of intuitions (ibid: 273-5) – I will consider 
something like this in 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. The remaining responses are all more specific 
to experimental philosophy, and to the method of cases in particular, but I will also 
consider some themes that emerge here, especially regarding the possibility that 
some kinds of intuitions might survive even if others prove to be unsuitable.  The 
further issues Machery mentions are that results from experimental philosophy: 
might not generalise (ibid: 241-66); might reflect fallibility rather than unreliability 
(ibid: 266-73); might mischaracterise the role of intuitions (ibid: 275-8); and might 
overgeneralise (ibid: 278-84). Each of these may also apply to evidence of variation 
in folk psychology, but I will not respond to them directly here. 
2.3.1	–	Translation	Errors	
Problems can arise when we translate concepts in order to test their use in other 
cultures. We can end up drawing unwarranted conclusions based on a bad 
translation, although the very fact that translation is difficult might suggest that the 
concept in question is not entirely universal. Wierzbicka relates how, where a 
language lacks a term for a particularly complex emotion, the speakers of that 
language will sometimes come up with a more long-winded way of expressing that 
emotion (1986: 587). Similarly, even if a certain language lacked a term for some 
mental state that we typically take to be basic, it might turn out that speakers of that 
language have a more circuitous way of expressing the same concept. Simple 
transliteration of a language’s folk psychological concepts will be liable to miss such 
subtlety. Lillard is also sympathetic to this issue, noting that despite the Hausa word 
ji referring to any sense other than sight, “one can generally tell from context 
whether something is smelled or tasted” (1998: 19). The linguistic variation marks a 
difference in emphasis rather than a full-blown conceptual shift. Indeed, given the 
physical similarity of people from different cultures (we all have the same basic 
sense organs) it would be extremely surprising to find a culture that could not 
distinguish smell and taste, even in the absence of a lexical distinction. 
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 Nonetheless, even if it were the case that two terms could be translated so as 
to refer to the same concept (given a sufficiently refined translation process) the very 
fact that this translation process is non-trivial might give us reason to think that the 
universality assumption is unsustainable, or at least that the inference from 
universality thesis to acceptability of folk concepts is ill-advised. Consider that the 
difficulty of translating between certain folk psychological terms is partly due to the 
additional contextual information that is needed in order to make sense of how the 
term is being used in each particular case. So whilst within a certain context the term 
ji unambiguously refers to either smell or taste, it becomes ambiguous the instant one 
removes it from this context. And the scientific or philosophically application of 
these terms is precisely one where they are likely to have been stripped of context, 
rendering them unhelpfully vague or indeterminate. Consider a science of the senses 
that used the term ji – without further clarification, such as writing “ji (distal 
chemical)”, it would be impossible to tell how this term was being used each time it 
was written. Note this is not just a problem with non-WEIRD languages – as we will 
see in chapter 4, there are many cases where the folk psychological terms used in 
European-American philosophy and cognitive science are just as vague. So whilst 
cases of translation error might seem to support a version of the universality 
assumption against charges of cross-cultural variation, they nonetheless highlight the 
potential for terminological and conceptual misunderstandings. In chapter 6 I will 
argue that the easiest way to avoid such misunderstandings is to adopt a novel, non-
folk psychological taxonomy. 
2.3.2	–	Expert	Intuitions		
Hales (2006) has argued that the intuitions of the experts in any given field should be 
granted greater credence, and Williamson (2007) has explicitly claimed that 
philosophers’ intuitions about thought experiments should be expected to be more 
reliable than those of the general public. This certainly seems reasonable for some 
disciplines – for example, you should probably trust a trained civil engineer’s 
intuitions about the safety of a bridge, or a trained neurosurgeon’s intuitions about 
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the weird blob on your brain scan. Similarly, trained philosophers may have a better 
grasp of philosophical concepts, and more experience of applying those concepts to 
thought experiments (Machery forthcoming: 246-7). If this were true then the 
evidence from experimental philosophy might merely be a demonstration of the 
training required in order to do good philosophy, just as evidence of variation in 
intuitions about bridge safety might just be a demonstration that most people don’t 
know anything about bridges.   
  However, the analogy between scientific expertise and philosophical 
expertise does not seem entirely clear. An engineer’s intuitions about the safety of a 
bridge can ultimately be verified by investigating the bridge itself, as can a 
neurosurgeon’s intuitions about your brain. Philosopher’s intuitions, on the other 
hand, cannot be independently verified, and may just reflect the accepted ‘truths’ of 
the tradition they have been educated within (cf. Weinberg et al 2010). Furthermore, 
there is evidence of substantial disagreement and biasing effects between 
philosophers (Nado 2014; Machery forthcoming: 255-61), which we would not 
expect in the case of scientific intuitions – indeed, if we found such disagreement or 
biasing we would probably discount those intuitions in favour of more substantial 
empirical investigation.  
 Even granting that the expertise argument may hold for some cases in 
experimental philosophy, it is not at all clear how it is meant to work for folk 
psychological intuitions. What I am interested in are not intuitions about abstract 
thought experiments in philosophy of mind, but rather everyday intuitions about real-
world minds. Here the best candidates for experts are not the philosophers or the 
psychologists, but just the folk themselves. We are all (relatively) competent 
predictors of each other’s behaviours, at least under normal conditions, and there is 
no evidence that philosophers or psychologists are any better in this regard. Indeed, it 
is precisely the everyday, ‘manifest’ image of behaviour that folk psychology is 
supposed to describe, not just a particular theory of behaviour that is restricted to the 
educated intelligentsia. Of course, when a philosopher or psychologist applies 
themselves to technical issues in cognitive science they may do better than a random 
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member of the public, but this is distinct from saying that this expertise crosses over 
into their everyday intuitions about other people’s minds. It seems fair to say that we 
all enjoy an equal level of expertise when it comes to everyday folk psychology (or 
at least, that philosopher and psychologists are certainly no better, on average, than 
anyone else).   
2.3.3	–	Conceptual	Convergence		
Even if folk psychological intuitions appear to exhibit cultural variation, we might be 
able to explain this away as either an interpretive failure or an irrelevant cultural 
gloss. Stich suggests something along these lines when he considers the possibility 
that philosophy might be focusing too heavily on belief and desire, potentially at the 
expense of other culture’s folk theories of mind (1983: 217). He suggests that what 
many theorists do at this point is simply to redefine ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ such that 
they cover any potential propositional attitude, but notes that this may just distort the 
terms so far that they cease to bear any resemblance to their folk usage (ibid: 218). A 
similar strategy is implicit in Lewis’ proposal that we can extract a folk theory of 
mind by operationalizing “folk psychological platitudes” (Lewis 1972; see 1.1.3) – 
presumably this operationalization could include a function that averages out cultural 
variation? In chapter 6 I will consider the possibility of using cultural universals as 
the basis for a revised cognitive ontology, drawing on a suggestion made by Turner 
(2012), but for now I will just note that a strategy of this kind might be able to 
account for at least some of the apparent variation. 
 A related group of responses to the evidence from cross-cultural research 
suggests that even if some intuitions (i.e. those directly targeted by the research) are 
problematic, we should not apply our scepticism to intuitions in general. 
Alternatively, another version of this response says that we could try to improve the 
process of eliciting intuitions so as to make it more reliable, perhaps by standardising 
the context and manner in which thought experiments are presented. However, the 
problem with this suggestion is that we have no real sense of what would constitute a 
‘standard’ format for thought experiments – perhaps the way that thought 
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experiments are presented in undergraduate tutorials is actually very unusual and 
elicits strange intuitions? The problem is even worse when it comes to folk 
psychological intuitions, which are surely most valid when they occur within their 
original cultural context. 
2.3.4	–	The	Disambiguation	Strategy	
One common response to evidence of variation in intuitions is to argue that the 
populations whose intuitions vary might just differ in their understanding of the 
questions being asked or the concepts being deployed. For instance, Sosa (2009) has 
argued that the apparent variations in Gettier case intuitions demonstrated by 
Weinberg et al (2001) might just be evidence of two distinct ways of interpreting the 
term ‘knowledge’, rather than actual variation in intuitions. The thought here is that 
if you were able to get both samples to agree on a single interpretation of 
‘knowledge’, then their intuitions would turn out to be the same. A similar argument 
could be made concerning the variation in intuitions about attributions of 
phenomenal states to groups – perhaps people from Hong Kong just have a different 
understanding of what it means to be conscious than people from the UK? Sosa’s 
suggestion is that we just embrace a terminological pluralism, and accept that there 
are different ways of using technical terms such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘consciousness’. 
 I am actually very sympathetic to this suggestion, but I think it demonstrates 
an important consequence of acknowledging cultural variation, rather than a 
refutation of it. It might turn out that cultural variation in the application of 
philosophical concepts can reveal to us ways in which our own understanding of 
those concepts was limited. So perhaps it turns out that disambiguating 
consciousness so as to distinguish between group consciousness and individual 
consciousness is a useful technical innovation (see Irvine 2013 for other ways in 
which consciousness might be disambiguated). In chapter 4 I will explore this 
‘disambiguation strategy’ in more detail, and apply it to several distinct case studies 
drawn from both philosophy and cognitive science. Cultural variation may provide 
an initial motivation for adopting this strategy, but I will argue that the strategy has 
 
 
80 
independent value as an approach to resolving the theoretical ambiguities that can 
occur when we adopt imprecise folk psychological concepts. 
 Another version of this strategy would be to argue that folk psychological 
variation might just be evidence of actual variation in cognitive processes. Variation 
in folk intuitions about how the mind works could reflect actual variation in how the 
minds works – we could all possess the exact same intuition forming processes, but 
if the subject of those intuitions, i.e. other minds, were different, then we would 
naturally reach different conclusions about those minds for epistemically sound 
reasons. I think this is a valid concern, and one that has potentially serious 
implications for our scientific study of the mind, but it is important to distinguish a 
couple of distinct ways in which it could play out. The first would be to claim that 
there is innate (i.e. genetically coded) variation between different human 
populations, and that this results in variation in how our minds work. Whilst it is 
possible that this could be the case, we do not yet have any clear understanding of 
the genetic basis of cognition, and given the relative genetic homogeneity of human 
populations it seems unlikely that this could account for all behavioural variation. 
The second, more plausible interpretation of this argument is that there are cultural 
and environmental factors that lead to variation in the expression of cognitive 
processes. For example, there is some evidence that visual illusions based on straight 
edges and corners (e.g. the Müller-Lyer illusion) only affect subjects from cultures 
where rectangular buildings are the norm (Segall et al 1966; Ahluwalia 1978), which 
might lead to divergent folk psychological intuitions based on genuinely divergent 
cognitive processing. Someone from one of these cultures would presumably make 
different predictions about the behaviour of subjects exposed to illusions of this kind. 
Another interesting way in which culture could affect the mind is via so-called 
‘mindshaping’ mechanisms, where folk psychological discourse itself has a recursive 
effect on how we think and behave. Such mechanisms will be the topic of the next 
chapter, but for now I will simply say that either way this plays out, variation in folk 
psychological discourse will still have important implications for how we use folk 
psychological concepts in philosophy and cognitive science. 
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2.3.5	–	Uncovering	Hidden	Universals	
Both Wierzbicka and Lillard express a hope that despite all of the variation, some 
universal aspects of folk psychology might yet be uncovered. If this were possible 
then it might give us some clues as to the genuine structure of cognition – or 
alternatively, it might just indicate that there are some innate (or commonly 
occurring) folk psychological principles that are nonetheless wrong. Regardless of 
the latter possibility, finding any universals at all would surely put us in a better 
place (qua constructing an accurate scientific and philosophical lexicon) than simply 
continuing to follow our (culturally and linguistically biased) folk psychological 
instincts. 
 Lillard proposes looking for universals in three places: the literature on 
primate theory of mind, the developmental literature, and the ethnopsychological 
literature (1998: 26). If we can identify mindreading mechanisms that we share with 
our closest relatives, then presumably they evolved long enough ago to be common 
to all modern humans. Similarly, if an aspect of folk psychology develops before 
cultural influences can really set in, then we might have reason to think that it is 
universal. Finally, we can try and identify features common to all folk psychologies, 
or perhaps try and ‘average out’ the differences in order to find more-or-less 
universal features.  
 As Lillard recognises, each of these suggestions comes with some associated 
difficulties. Aside from the obvious practical issues that arise when working with 
animals, children, or cultures very different to ones own, there is an additional risk 
that any evidence of universality that is uncovered will be tainted by the researcher’s 
pre-existing folk psychological intuitions. This is most apparent when working with 
other cultures, where an ethnographer’s instincts and native language might shape 
the way that they interpret their subjects. Attempts to conduct cross-cultural versions 
of basic social cognition experiments often run into similar trouble. Povinelli & 
Vonk (2003) have even argued that comparative research is not able to escape the 
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touch of lexical bias, criticising the use of anthropocentric mental state attributions 
when describing the behaviour of non-human primates. 
 Lillard suggests a partial solution to these problems, that “researchers should 
give carefully constructed, culturally sensitive tests [of folk psychological 
intuitions]” (1998: 27). This would certainly help to give a clearer picture of the 
scale of folk psychological variation, but it would not overcome the basic problem 
identified by Wierzbicka, i.e. that the language we express our theories with is itself 
liable to shape those theories.  It is also less obviously applicable to primate research, 
although better experimental design is certainly to be encouraged there as well. 
 Wierzbicka’s ‘Natural Semantic Metalanguage’ (NSM) superficially 
resembles Lillard’s third proposal, in the sense that it is an attempt to ‘boil down’ 
cultural differences in order to find a basic, universal core shared by all cultures. It is 
far more ambitious, however, aiming to apply not just to folk psychology, but also to 
natural language more generally. The strategy, Wierzbicka writes, “is based on the 
assumption that the shared core of human thought is reflected in the shared core of 
all languages and can be identified through empirical linguistic investigations” 
(2005: 259).  Through such investigation she claims to have discovered the set of 
basic ‘conceptual primes’ that are shared by all languages and cultures. 
 I will not assess Wierzbicka’s project here,13 but regardless of its success or 
failure her approach is useful in that it draws attention to the conceptual 
contingencies of natural language, and attempts to provide a neutral platform on 
which to discuss such contingencies. Moving forward, we will need something like 
this in order to discuss the shortcomings of folk psychology in relation to 
contemporary scientific psychology.  
 There is another possibility that neither Wierzbicka nor Lillard consider. This 
is Turner’s (2012) suggestion that we should construct an entirely new conceptual 
lexicon, drawing not only on ethnographic and linguistic research but also on data 
from neuroscience and cognitive psychology. The aim of such a lexicon would be to 
                                                
13 Although see Drobnak (2009) for some criticisms of her approach. I will return to this topic in 
6.2.2. 
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systematize the mentalistic terminology used in scientific psychology so as to ensure 
precision in experimental design and theory construction. I will return to this project 
in chapter 6, where I will examine various proposals and argue for what I think is the 
best approach: a synthesis of neuroimaging and conceptual analysis that will allow us 
to ‘bootstrap’ our way towards a more accurate cognitive ontology. 
2.4	–	Life	After	Universality	
In section 2.2 I reviewed four distinct sources of evidence against the universality 
assumption: social cognition, anthropology, comparative linguistics, and 
experimental philosophy. Each of these suggests that there is sufficient evidence of 
variation in folk psychological discourse to at the very least render the universality 
assumption somewhat suspect. In 2.3 I considered various arguments that either 
claim that the use of such evidence is invalid, or try to account for it in ways that 
would not rule out the universality assumption. Whilst some of these arguments have 
merit, I think that ultimately we should still reject the universality assumption, at 
least in its strongest form. In the rest of this chapter I will consider the implication of 
accepting that there is genuine variation in folk psychological discourse. I will argue 
that folk psychological variation partially undermines appeals to intuition in 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and should lead us to exercise more 
caution when adopting common-sense ‘mental’ concepts such as belief and desire. 
The evidence of variation in explicit intuitions but not underlying mechanisms also 
provides incidental support for a two-systems approach to social cognition, which 
can help provide a motivated account of why we should keep these two phenomena 
(social cognition and folk psychology) distinct. Finally I will consider one reason 
why we might want to reject the ‘no folk psychological miracles’ argument even if 
folk psychological discourse did turn out to be universal. This will lead us neatly on 
to the next chapter, which will discuss how folk psychology can have a recursive 
impact on our minds and behaviour.  
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2.4.1	–	Intellectual	Humility		
It seems fairly apparent that once we have accepted the evidence of variation in folk 
psychological intuitions, and rejected any argument for the superiority of our own 
intuitions, we should consequently exercise some humility when it comes to the use 
of intuitions as theoretical tools. The exact implications of this humility require some 
further unpacking, however. 
 Machery (forthcoming) considers three distinct ways in which we should be 
cautious about our use of philosophical intuitions: unreliability, dogmatism, and 
parochialism. If our intuitions are unreliable then we should be cautious of treating 
them as precise evidence, if they are dogmatic then we should be cautious as treating 
them as anything other than a restatement of the tradition that we have been educated 
in, and if they are parochial then we should be cautious about treating them as 
anything other than cultural idiosyncrasies. He takes the evidence from experimental 
philosophy to demonstrate that all three of these hold for philosophical intuitions, 
and that as a result “that we should suspend judgment in response to most 
philosophical cases” (ibid: 17).  
  With regard to folk psychological intuitions I have only really so far 
demonstrated that they are parochial, and that we should take care when generalising 
from our own intuitions to those of other cultures. What about dogmatism and 
unreliability? I think that the extreme focus on beliefs and desires in contemporary 
philosophy of mind might be a consequence of dogmatism. In undergraduate 
philosophy classes these tend to dominate the discussion, and coupled with Fodor’s 
language of thought hypothesis they lead many to conclude that the only possible 
implementation of a computational theory of mind would be one that operated over 
beliefs and desires. In chapter 4 I will consider some cases where the focus on belief 
and desire has clouded philosophical and scientific discussion. 
 That folk psychological intuitions are unreliable might be demonstrated by 
considering the now well-established evidence of the impact that framing effects, 
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implicit biases 14  and the like can have on our intuitive judgements (see e.g. 
Brownstein 2016, Machery forthcoming). Given how widespread these appear to be, 
it would be unsurprising to find that they have an impact on folk psychological 
intuitions as well, which could lead us to make different judgements in different 
contexts (this would be an interesting avenue for future empirical research). If this 
were the case then we might want to adopt a general scepticism with regard to the 
reliability of folk psychological judgements.   
2.4.2	–	Two	Systems	Revisited	
If folk psychology does turn out to provide an unreliable guide to the actual structure 
of cognition, then it might seem miraculous that we are able to achieve so much 
apparent success in our day-to-day social interactions (recall the ‘no folk 
psychological miracles’ argument discussed in 2.1.4). This is a common response to 
any attempt to revise or eliminate folk psychology, and it is somewhat plausible. 
However there is an easy way around it, which I have already indicated in my earlier 
distinction between social cognitive mechanisms and folk psychological discourse. 
Provided that we can give a principled story about the distinction between the two, 
then it is plausible that the former might enjoy predictive success and serve to guide 
social interaction without the latter conforming at all to how the mind actually works.  
 Luckily, a principled story of how to distinguish these two phenomena 
doesn’t just exist, but is currently enjoying a fair amount of support in the empirical 
literature on social cognition. This is to adopt some version of a two systems theory 
of social cognition, where one system operates fast and implicitly in order to guide 
moment-to-moment social interaction, whilst the other operates slowly and 
explicitly, and might be responsible for what we actually say about other minds, even 
if that turns out to be false. I discussed various proposals along these lines in 1.3.2, 
but I briefly rehearse them here for convenience.  
                                                
14 The reliability and relevance of Implicit Attitude Tests has recently been questioned, but insofar as 
these are only one source of evidence for the existence of unconscious biases I take it that we should 
still exercise caution towards folk psychological intuitions.  
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 The basic idea is that there is one system that rapidly processes the behaviour 
of others in terms of subdoxastic states such as “engagements” (Doherty 2011) or 
“registrations and encounterings” (Apperly & Butterfill 2009), alongside a second 
system that conducts a slower analysis in more familiar, folk psychological terms. 
These kinds of account were initially motivated by the discrepancy between 
developmental trajectories for explicit and implicit false belief tasks (discussed in the 
previous chapter). If the system that handles explicit reasoning develops slower than 
the implicit system, we might expect to see this kind of result. Typically the two 
systems are both taken to have the same target, but coupled with the mindshaping 
literature that I discuss in the next section and in chapter 3 I think they might allow 
us to account for a divergence between social cognitive mechanisms and folk 
psychological discourse. For most everyday situations the first, implicit system 
suffices, whilst the second system is only called upon for more complex or unusual 
situations, and will also be responsive to social and cultural factors that we might not 
normally think of as being about the mind itself. Cultural variation, then, would be a 
feature of system two but not (necessarily) of system one. 
2.4.3	–	A	Self-Fulfilling	Prophecy	
Before moving on I want to discuss one final way in which we might undermine both 
the universality assumption and the no folk psychological miracles argument. This is 
the possibility, discussed in more detail in the next chapter, that it might be a mistake 
to think of folk psychology as being primarily in the business of reading minds – 
rather it might be better understood as a tool for shaping minds. Without going into 
too much detail here, the basic idea is that explicit folk psychological discourse 
might serve as a normative constraint on behaviour (both our own and that of other 
people), thus shaping the very minds that it purports to be describing. Even if folk 
psychological were universal, it still might not serve as an accurate guide to 
underlying cognitive mechanisms. Viewing folk psychology as a tool for shaping 
minds also allows us to neatly account for how folk psychological discourse could be 
predictively successful even if it does not track such mechanisms directly. By 
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shaping the cultural and social factors that constrain behaviour, folk psychology can 
create a ‘niche’ for itself where it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, successfully 
predicting behaviour not by being independently accurate, but simply by contributing 
to the very existence of that behaviour in the first place. A more in depth discussion 
of these possibilities is the topic of my next chapter. 
2.5	–	The	Myth	of	a	Universal	Folk	Psychology	
This chapter has identified an assumption that folk psychology is universal, which is 
used to license the application of folk psychological concepts to the scientific study 
of cognition. This assumption was challenged on the basis that there is in fact 
evidence of significant variation in folk psychology, both across and within cultures. 
I considered various ways of responding to this evidence, and concluded that none of 
them are able to fully rescue the universality assumption, at least in its strongest 
form. So we are forced to face up to the fact that our own folk psychological 
assumptions are likely determined at least partially by cultural or linguistic factors, 
rather than by epistemic factors that would legitimate their role as a guide to the 
development of scientific concepts. By itself this does not rule out the use of folk 
psychological concepts in cognitive science, but it should at least begin to make us 
question our reliance on such concepts.  
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Chapter	3	–	Folk	Psychology	as	a	Regulative	Practice	
In this chapter I will provide an account of the regulative role of folk psychology, 
drawing heavily on previous work by McGeer (2007), Zawidzki (2013), and 
Andrews (2015). This account will serve as the basis for an explanation of how folk 
psychology can continue to have predictive and explanatory success despite often 
being wrong about the underlying cognitive mechanisms. In the chapters that follow 
I will argue for the latter claim, that folk psychology is in fact often wrong about the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms, and consider what impact this might have on 
philosophy and cognitive science. For now I simply wish to defend myself against 
claims that folk psychology must be accurate given its predictive and explanatory 
success (see Fodor 1987 for the best example of this kind of claim). I will argue that 
the predictive and explanatory success of folk psychology can be explained, at least 
in part, by appealing to the ways in which folk psychology actively regulates and 
constrains our behaviour. 
 I will start in section 3.1 by introducing four distinct ways in which folk 
psychology might be thought of as ‘successful’ – these are related to the four 
components of folk psychological discourse that I identified in 1.3. I will then move 
on (in section 3.2) to consider the regulative role of folk psychology in more detail – 
here I will follow Zawidzki’s (2013) account of ‘mindshaping’. In section 3.3 I will 
relate this approach to more general work on cognitive niche construction (e.g. Clark 
2006, 2008; Sterelny 2007, 2015), and argue that the regulative role of folk 
psychology qualifies as a kind of social-cognitive niche. Finally, in section 3.4 I will 
use this account of the regulative role of folk psychology in order to demonstrate 
how folk psychology can exhibit explanatory and predictive success without always 
being epistemically successful, where epistemic success is understood as 
successfully identifying underlying cognitive scientific mechanisms.  
 One thing that is worth noting before we proceed is that whilst previous 
discussions of the regulative role of folk psychology have tended to focus primarily 
on mental state attribution, I am assuming that folk psychology is a somewhat 
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broader practice (see chapter 1, especially section 1.3). So if folk psychology is able 
to operate in a regulative mode, it could do this in a number of ways, including 
mental state attributions, behavioural predictions, trait attributions, and the creation 
of narratives and schemas. This broader understanding of the regulative role of folk 
psychology is not entirely novel: Zawidzki, for example, emphasises the importance 
of behavioural predictions, and Andrews invokes something like a narrative when 
she describes how post-hoc explanations commit us to certain future behaviours. 
Nonetheless, the framework I describe here is novel in the sense that it brings all of 
this together for the first time, positing a single, unified role for folk psychology as a 
regulative practice.  
3.1	–	Four	Kinds	of	Success	
The success of folk psychology has traditionally been used to license an inference to 
the reality of the entities that it apparently posits. In the previous chapter I argued 
that evidence of cultural variation in folk psychological discourse undermines this 
inference, but my argument leaves the success of folk psychology unexplained. The 
primary aim of this chapter is to explain away the success of folk psychology without 
conceding that it accurately describes subpersonal mechanisms.  
 It is sometimes unclear exactly what people mean when they say that folk 
psychology is successful. In this section I will consider four distinct roles played by 
folk psychological discourse, and assess to what extent folk psychology can be said 
to ‘succeed’ in each of these roles. The roles in question correspond roughly to the 
four components of folk psychological discourse that I identified in 1.3; the 
predictive role corresponds to behaviour reading, the epistemic role corresponds to 
mental state attribution, the explanatory role corresponds to narrative competency, 
and the regulative role corresponds to normative constraints. The main focus of this 
chapter is on the regulative role, but I introduce the others here by way of contrast, 
and in order to illustrate the influence that the regulative role has on the success of 
each other role. 
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3.1.1	–	The	Predictive	Role	
The most basic way that folk psychology could be successful is by accurately 
predicting the behaviour of other people. In this role folk psychology is able to serve 
a useful pragmatic function, without necessarily being committed to any particular 
account of the hidden causes of the behaviour that it predicts. This is usually the kind 
of success that is appealed to when folk psychology is described as indispensable, 
although the assumption is typically that predictive success will rely on successful 
mental state attribution. Nonetheless, there are a number of different ways in which 
folk psychology could be predictively successful. One is indeed via the deployment 
of accurate mental state attribution, as is normally assumed, but this is certainly not 
the only way. Consider an everyday case: I am walking down the street and I see a 
smartly dressed person crouch down next to a bin and pick up a cigarette butt. I can 
predict with a fair degree of confidence that what they will do next is stand back up 
and drop it in to the bin. Whilst I could have made this prediction by attributing 
mental states and referring to an implicit theory of mind, it is also possible that I am 
just picking up on previously identified behavioural regularities, or perhaps explicitly 
situating this person’s actions in a non-mentalistic narrative with which I am 
familiar. In any case successful behavioural predictions alone do not commit one to 
any further claims about the structure of cognition.  
3.1.2	–	The	Epistemic	Role	
Another way in which folk psychology could be considered to be successful is if it 
gave an accurate description of how minds actually work. This is the kind of success 
that most people seem to have in mind when they cite the success of folk psychology 
as a reason for using it as the basis for scientific theories of cognition. If folk 
psychology was successful in this sense, then of course we would be justified in 
using it as the basis for our scientific theories, but by itself this argument is 
somewhat tautologous. Without some independent means of verifying the epistemic 
success of folk psychology, we can only justify using it as the basis for our scientific 
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theories once we have already established that the mind and brain actually do work 
in the ways described by folk psychology.  
 The direction of fit between folk psychology and how the mind actually 
works is important here. If folk psychology were correct because it accurately tracks 
how the mind works, then it would be a good guide to cognitive scientific discovery. 
However, if folk psychology were correct because it shapes the mind to fit the 
descriptions it provides, then it would only be a good guide to cognitive scientific 
discovery in those cases where it was able to shape the minds in question. The worry 
here is that the epistemic success of folk psychology might not generalise outside of 
those cases where there is a direct relationship between the folk psychologiser and 
the subject of their folk psychologising.  
 Historically this inferential move from the predictive success of folk 
psychology to the epistemic success of folk psychology was licensed by the (often 
implicit) ‘no folk psychological miracles’ argument that I discussed in the previous 
chapter (2.1.4). However, as I also established in that chapter, the argument is 
insecure given the apparent variation in folk psychological intuitions across cultures. 
It could be the case that some parts of folk psychology will turn out to accurately 
map on to actual cognitive mechanisms, but as we have no reliable way of 
identifying which these good parts are ahead of time, we should not rely on folk 
psychology for the identification of cognitive mechanisms. 
3.1.3	–	The	Explanatory	Role	
The epistemic success that I described above is distinct from another important way 
in which folk psychology might be thought of as successful: its role as a provider of 
personal level explanations, rather than behavioural predictions or sub-personal 
models. To see how this role is distinct, recall the example of observing someone 
pick up a cigarette butt and predicting that they will put it in the bin. In addition to 
making this prediction I might want to explain why they did what they did. One kind 
of explanation would be to describe a sub-personal mechanism that caused their 
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behaviour, but as I suggested above (and in the previous chapter), we have no reason 
to think that folk psychology is especially good at giving explanations of this kind.  
 However there is another kind of explanation, perhaps equally important, that 
folk psychology is very successful at. I could explain the behaviour of this person by 
saying that they picked up the cigarette butt because it was the right thing to do, or 
because they hate litter, and so on. Explanations of this kind take place in what 
Sellars calls “the space of reasons” (1963: 169), and are sometimes called normative 
or rational explanations. They are distinct from sub-personal or causal explanations 
because they don’t just describe why, in physical or mechanistic terms, the person 
behaved as they did, but they also provide a reason for this behaviour. Personal level 
reasons have a kind of explanatory traction that mechanistic reasons lack, especially 
when it comes to situating our behaviour in a wider socio-normative framework. 
Explanations of this kind are typically what people are after when they ask why 
someone did something, at least outside of the scientific context. Answering such 
why questions in terms of neurochemistry or physical causation somewhat misses the 
point, and is a domain in which folk psychology is almost indisputably superior to 
scientific psychology.   
3.1.4	–	The	Regulative	Role		
There is a final, often neglected sense in which folk psychology can be successful: as 
a regulative practice, quite distinct from its success (or lack thereof) in each of the 
above three senses (although success in this regard can contribute to predictive and 
explanatory success, and vice versa). It is this regulative role that I will focus on in 
the present chapter. 
 The idea of folk psychology as a regulative practice has historical precursors 
in the work of Sellars, Davidson, and Dennett. Sellars’ ‘myth of Jones’ implies, 
whether or not he himself intended it to, that the creation of internal mental states is a 
result of their external (linguistic) labelling, and Davidson picks up on this theme in 
his work when he argues that giving reasons for actions can in turn regulate future 
actions (1985). In his presentation of the intentional stance, Dennett (1987) indicates 
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that the predictive success of the stance is due partly to the fact that it also 
determines the limits of which actions are deemed rational. For both Davidson and 
Dennett, it is the presence of norms of rational behaviour that allows folk psychology 
to fulfil a regulative role. Below (and in the next section) I discuss how subsequent 
researchers have unpacked this idea and developed it in more detail. 
 McGeer (2007) was the first to discuss the regulative role of folk psychology 
in the context of contemporary social cognition.15 She describes what she calls the 
“normative core” (ibid: 140-5) of folk psychology, which she thinks is implicitly 
present even in more standard accounts. This is the idea that there are some basic 
norms of rationality without which it would be impossible to apply folk 
psychological models across individuals. For example, if I predicted somebody’s 
behaviour on the basis of attributions of certain beliefs and desires, I have to also 
assume that they connect these up in the right way, and are motivated to act so as to 
bring about whatever it is that they desire. Appeals to rationality of this kind are 
normative in the sense that there is a ‘correct’ way of acting, given a certain set of 
beliefs and desires, even if ‘correct’ in this case does not mean ‘morally correct’. 
Without this basic normative core it is hard to imagine folk psychology ever 
developing beyond mere behaviourism, as in order to transcend predictions based on 
simple observations of inputs and outputs it is necessary to appeal to some broader 
set of rules that guides behaviour. 
 Zawidzki’s recent formulation of the regulatory role of folk psychology as 
“mindshaping” (2008, 2013; cf. Mameli 2001) is explicitly inspired by Dennett’s 
work. I will discuss it in more detail in the next section, but the basic idea is that we 
should re-orientate research in social cognition towards what he calls ‘the 
mindshaping as linchpin hypothesis’, which places the regulative role of folk 
psychology at the heart of social cognition (rather than the epistemic role, which he 
refers to as mindreading). He presents evidence for the primacy of mindshaping over 
                                                
15 A version of this proposal can be found in Mameli (2001), who coined the term “mindshaping” that 
was eventually taken up by Zawidzki, but McGeer was the first to address the idea systematically.  
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mindreading, based primarily on work in evolutionary and developmental 
psychology.  
 Matthews (2013), whilst focusing primarily on belief and other propositional 
attitudes, offers a brief account of the regulative dimension of folk psychology. He 
describes how “commonsense propositional attitude psychology may be predictively 
and explanatorily powerful […] through a process of enculturation [….] that ensures 
the predictive and explanatory efficacy of our culture’s commonsense psychology” 
(ibid: 111). It is not entirely clear whether what he has in mind here is that 
commonsense psychology and culture might both have a shared cultural base, or that 
commonsense psychology might itself constitute that cultural base, but either way it 
seems that he is indicating the same kind of mechanism that I have in mind in this 
chapter. 
 Andrews (2015) has presented a more recent analysis of the regulative role of 
folk psychology, focusing on the connection between regulation and explanation. 
She argues that folk psychological explanations are also regulative, as they typically 
involve social interactions that invoke certain norms. For example, explaining why 
one was late to work in terms of forgetting to turn on an alarm involves presenting 
oneself as a certain kind of person, and perhaps committing oneself to not behaving 
in this way in the future (these are also the kinds of examples that McGeer and 
Davidson are concerned with). She describes the relationship between prediction, 
explanation, and regulation as a “tight spiral […] that modifies itself each time 
coordination breaks down” (ibid: 57), which captures the sense in which I think the 
regulative role of folk psychology contributes to its success in the other roles. 
Andrews also draws a connection between these kinds of looping effects and those 
described by Hacking, which I will return to in chapter 5.  
 Each of these approaches contributes to what I am calling the regulative role 
of folk psychology, the role in which it is able to guide behaviour by shaping the 
socio-normative framework within which we live our lives. At its simplest this 
framework merely requires that we maintain internal coherency in our actions, so 
that once we have committed ourselves to believing something, we ought to act in 
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such a way that is consistent with believing that thing. At the more complex end we 
are forced to give full explanations for our behaviour, on pain of seeming irrational, 
or in some cases even immoral. And once an explanation has been given it creates a 
new narrative that we must maintain consistency with. In this way folk psychology is 
able to create the very systems that it describes, at once predicting and making true 
that very same prediction. In the rest of this chapter I will discuss in more detail the 
mechanisms that enable this regulative role, and consider the implications that it has 
for our understanding of folk psychological discourse.  
3.2	–	Varieties	of	Mindshaping	
In this section I will examine the regulative role of folk psychology in more detail, 
following the template set by Zawidzki’s taxonomy of the “varieties of 
mindshaping”, which include “imitation, pedagogy, norm cognition and 
enforcement, and language based regulative frameworks” (2013: 29). I will describe 
each in more detail below, and explain how they relate to my understanding of folk 
psychological discourse. 
 Prior to describing each variety of mindshaping, Zawidzki formulates a 
general definition of the phenomenon. Mindshaping is defined in terms of three 
components and a mapping relation: a model, a target, a mechanism, and the sense in 
which the target is intended to match the model. The mechanism’s function is to 
shape the target to match the model (in the relevant respects). The target is a mind of 
some kind, be it the shaper’s own or someone else’s. The model may be another 
mind, some representation in the mind of the shaper, or even something more 
abstract like an idealized set of behaviours or a fictional character. The sense in 
which the target is intended to match the model might be more or less precise, 
depending on the mechanism in question. Note that these terms are all intended to be 
used in a very general sense, and need not necessarily imply any intentionality or 
agency on behalf of either the target or the model.  (Adapted from Zawidzki 2013: 
31-2.) 
 To give a paradigmatic example, mindshaping might occur when an agent 
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(X) issues a command to a conspecific (C). That command serves as a mechanism 
for shaping C’s mind, taking advantage of cognitive processes that X might not even 
be aware of. A verbal command is issued by X, the words are processed by C, and C 
consequently feels a social pressure to conform to X’s command. In this case C is the 
target, the model is whatever behaviour X wants C to perform, and the details of that 
model being the sense in which C’s behaviour should match X’s command. In this 
example both parties are explicitly aware of what is going, but other cases of 
mindshaping can be much more subtle, and can even be self-directed, i.e. the target, 
model, and mechanism can all be contained within the same agent. I will now 
consider several distinct mechanisms by which mindshaping might be achieved.  
3.2.1	–	Imitation	
Both human and non-human primates, as well as some species of birds such as 
crows, engage in relatively sophisticated imitation that qualifies as a kind of 
mindshaping. For example, human infants are known to imitate the facial 
expressions and verbalisations of their caregivers, and chimpanzees are able to 
quickly imitate novel problem solving behaviours. In both of these cases the target 
system is the infant or chimpanzee themselves, the mechanism is whatever cognitive 
system enables imitation, the matching relation is whatever degree of accuracy they 
are able to copy the behaviour, and the model is either the caregiver or the problem-
solver, respectively.  
 One proposed mechanism for imitation is the mirror-neuron system, which 
consists of motor neurons that activate not only when performing an action, but also 
when observing a similar action. Whilst the evidence for the existence of such a 
system in humans is somewhat controversial (see 1.2.2), it could potentially serve as 
a basic mechanism for imitation by connecting observed behaviours with potential 
actions. Zawidzki summarises imitation thus:  
 
In imitation, the targets are the imitator’s mind or behavioral 
dispositions; the model is another concrete, nonfictional individual; the 
mechanism is some pattern of activity in the imitator’s nervous system, 
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possibly involving mirror neurons; and the respects in which the target is 
shaped to match the model correspond to properties of model behavior to 
which imitation mechanisms (e.g., mirror neurons) are sensitive. 
(Zawidzki 2013: 42) 
 
 Zawidzki distinguishes between non-human imitation, which appears to 
always be extrinsically motivated (i.e., the imitation is always a means to an end), 
and human imitation, which can be intrinsically motivated (2013: 35). This leads 
human imitators to sometimes copy irrelevant behaviour, resulting in a more liberal 
mapping relation than in non-human imitators. In one study (Horner & Whiten 
2005), the performance of young chimpanzees and human infants was compared on 
learning to open a simple puzzle box, which was either transparent (allowing the 
participant to directly observe the mechanism) or opaque. In each case the participant 
observed an experimenter solving the puzzle, but also performing an irrelevant 
additional step. In the opaque condition (where it was not obvious that this step was 
irrelevant), both humans and chimpanzees performed both steps. However, in the 
transparent condition the chimpanzees performed only the relevant step, whilst the 
human infants continued to perform both steps, perhaps indicating an intrinsic 
motivation for imitation. Human children also routinely over-imitate their adult 
caregivers, copying not only functionally relevant features of the behaviour in 
question, but also irrelevant features such as the speed or style in which an action is 
carried out. 
 The human capacity for intrinsically motivated imitation might go some way 
towards explaining the predictive success of folk psychological discourse. If we 
frequently (and perhaps unwittingly) imitate even non-functional features of each 
other’s behaviour, we will tend towards behavioural conformity, which constrains 
the range of possible predictions. Zawidzki also emphasises that both human and 
non-human imitation does not seem to require sophisticated mindreading, as it 
primarily involves the imitation of behaviours rather than mental states (i.e. the 
imitator need not have any understanding of why their target is doing what they are 
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doing). Thus behavioural predictions that rely on imitation-based conformity could 
succeed regardless of the epistemic status of folk psychology. 
 For example, I can predict that once I yawn, many other people in the same 
room as me will also begin yawning, without possessing any knowledge or 
understanding (whether implicit or explicit) of the cognitive mechanism responsible 
for ‘contagious yawning’. This is because I am sensitive to a behavioural regularity 
that is the result of low-level imitation. The point here is that my sensitivity to the 
regularity itself is sufficient for me to successfully predict this behaviour, without 
requiring that I understand how the regularity comes about. So low-level imitation 
can enable basic behavioural predictions without invoking high-level mindreading of 
any kind. 
3.2.2	–	Pedagogy	
Another interesting kind of mindshaping is pedagogy, i.e. any explicit transmission 
of skills or knowledge from one agent to another. Unlike imitation, the mechanisms 
involved in pedagogy span both the learner and the instructor, who in some cases 
may also be the target.  
 For many readers, the most familiar example of pedagogy will be classroom 
instruction of some kind, but as Zawidzki notes, this “is probably a relatively recent 
and atypical form of pedagogy” (2013: 43). For much of human history it is more 
likely that pedagogy was primarily a small-scale affair, with novice learners 
observing the behaviour of experts practising their craft (cf. Sterelny 2007, 2012). 
This suggests a more gradual progression from imitation to pedagogy, with many 
forms of pedagogy essentially consisting of structured imitation. The connection 
between imitation and pedagogy is also strengthened by the observation that human 
infants also tend to overgeneralise in pedagogical situations, such as when they apply 
specific grammatical rules to cases where they should not apply.  
 For my purposes one especially interesting kind of pedagogy would be that 
which involves the explicit teaching of folk psychological behaviours and concepts. 
For example, we could imagine a society in which children are taught the basics of 
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belief-desire psychology at school, 16  and so interpret each other’s behaviours 
according to this framework, regardless of how accurate it actually is. Much like in 
Sellars’ myth of Jones, the explicit adoption of this interpretive framework could 
lead to people’s behaviours eventually conforming to it, even it were not originally 
true (or even if it never came to reflect the underlying mechanisms driving that 
behaviour). More plausibly, consider the kinds of narrative explanation that I 
described in 1.3.4. Infants typically learn such narratives from their caregivers, and 
are likely to conform to the roles and structures that they describe. So narratives 
serve a dual function, both regulating our own behaviour whilst also allowing us to 
explain the behaviour of others (see 3.2.4). 
3.2.3	–	Norm	Cognition	and	Enforcement	
The most important kinds of mindshaping, at least so far as this chapter is concerned, 
are those that explicitly facilitate behavioural conformity, and thus enable folk 
psychology to achieve greater predictive and explanatory success than imitation and 
pedagogy would alone. Zawidzki distinguishes two classes of mindshaping 
mechanisms of this kind: one unconscious and automatic, and the other more 
explicit. He also discusses the regulative role of language, which I will cover in the 
next section. Whilst these mechanisms are related to imitation and pedagogy, they 
differ in that their primary function is to regulate social behaviour rather than 
achieving some other non-social benefit (such as learning a non-social skill like 
fishing). 
 An example of an unconscious and automatic mindshaping mechanism is the 
so-called “chameleon effect”, reported in classic studies by Chartrand & Bargh 
(1999; discussed by Zawidzki 2013: 50-3). In these studies subjects collaborated 
with confederates on a simple task, whilst the confederates performed several non-
functional body movements, such as crossing their arms or smiling.  The subjects 
frequently mimicked these movements, despite being seemingly unaware of doing 
                                                
16  In a dystopian future where Fodor rules supreme and the Churchlands have been driven 
underground. 
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so. Whilst perhaps not strictly folk psychological, the cognitive mechanisms behind 
such effects (and related priming effects) might serve as the basis for the regulation 
of behaviour. Chartrand & Bargh suggest that the chameleon effect acts “as a kind of 
natural ‘social glue’ that produces empathic understanding and even greater liking 
between people” (1999: 897), which could enable more complex social cognitive 
phenomena such as joint attention and co-operation. 
 More explicit or intentional forms of social norm enforcement include a wide 
range of behaviours, but Zawidzki focuses on those that involve some form of 
punishment. People are generally willing to exert a fair amount of effort (at no 
immediate benefit to themselves) to punish others who break certain norms, such as 
fair resource distribution (see e.g. Henrich 2009; Henrich et al 2005, 2006, 2010; 
discussed by Zawidzki 2013: 53-4). More informally, we may think of social norms 
such as good manners, as well as various moral norms, as being enforced by costly 
punishment of some form or another. In terms of folk psychological regulation, 
enforcement of the norms of rationality described by Davidson and Dennett would 
tend to result in more homogenous, and thus more easily predicted, behaviour.  
 To give a simple example, consider what happens when a fire alarm goes off 
in a building. Most people will leave the building immediately, unless they are either 
unaware of the meaning of the alarm, unable to hear it, or else aware that the alarm is 
tested every Thursday morning, and so should be ignored. If we saw someone sitting 
in their office whilst everyone else was leaving, we would be concerned about their 
wellbeing, and if they persisted in not leaving even after we had knocked on their 
door and caught their attention, we might begin to think a number of different things 
about them: perhaps they have a death wish, or perhaps they are stubborn and stupid, 
or perhaps they are simply completely irrational. In each case we might have reason 
to shun or censure them on future occasions, as their failure to conform to 
established behavioural norms potentially puts other people in danger. So over time 
we should expect everyone to conform to the ‘fire alarm norm’, making behaviour 
relatively easy to predict whenever a fire alarm goes off. 
 
 
102
3.2.4	–	Language	Based	Regulative	Frameworks	
Finally, mindshaping can be achieved via explicit linguistic narratives, which can 
serve on one hand to regulate the range of possible behaviours, and on the other hand 
to make sense of the behaviour of others within a familiar framework. Zawidzki 
notes that the focus of previous work on the role of narratives in social cognition has 
been primarily in the latter direction (see e.g. Hutto 2008), but argues that the former 
role is also very important (Zawidzki 2013: 57-61). As Zawidzki puts it, narratives 
not only help us make sense of behaviour, but they also “help constitute the minds 
that such knowledge enables us to track.” (ibid: 57). They do this through what 
Zawidzki describes as “self-constituting narratives”, which are narrative roles that 
become internalized by an individual and govern their behaviour. For example, a 
person might internalise a narrative about the importance of individual striving for 
success, leading to them conceiving of themselves as a strong, individualist loner, 
and thus behaving as such. Someone else who was familiar with this kind of 
narrative might be able to pick up on behaviour cues that, with the help of the 
narrative, would allow them to predict this individual’s behaviour. (Andrews 2015 
describes this process in more detail.)	
3.3	–	Folk	Psychology	as	a	Cognitive	Niche	
In this section I will argue that a useful way of characterising the regulative role of 
folk psychology is as a form of cognitive niche construction (cf. Clark 2006, 2008; 
Sterelny 2007, 2015). The varieties of mindshaping that I described in the previous 
section each contribute to the creation of a ‘folk psychological niche’ that regulates 
human behaviour and functions, amongst other things, in order to make it easier to 
predict and explain.17  
                                                
17 In The Cultural Construction of Belief (unpublished draft), Matthews will make a similar claim,  
“that our commonsense psychology is a culture-specific niche construction that serves a primarily 
normative/regulative role” (see http://www.robertjmatthews.org/work-in-progress.html). I am not yet 
sure what the details of his account will be, and in what ways (if any) it will differ from mine. 
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3.3.1	–	Cognitive	Niche	Construction	
The idea of a cognitive niche is based on earlier work on niche construction in 
ecology (see e.g. Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman 1999, 2001; Odling-Smee, 
Laland, & Feldman 2003). An ecological niche is simply the environment within 
which an organism lives, usually with the implication that it is to some extent 
adapted to that environment. Niche construction is the phenomenon of an organism 
modifying its environment in order to make that environment more suitable for it or 
its conspecifics. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the construction of dams 
by beavers, which creates a (relatively) safe environment within which they can live 
and raise their young. Other examples include the regulation of soil chemistry by 
earthworms, tool use in primates and some corvids, and, of course, the multitudinous 
ways in which humans structure their environments.  
 Human niche construction, perhaps uniquely, involves not only physical 
artefacts and environmental changes, but also abstract cultural ‘tools’, such as 
language, (arguably) morality, and, as I will argue, folk psychological discourse 
(which is itself part constituted by linguistic practices). Language is especially 
important here, and is perhaps essential for the kinds of cognitive niche construction 
that seem to be uniquely human. As Clark puts it, “language (and material symbols 
more generally) [provide] a new kind of thought-enabling cognitive niche” (2006: 
370), which opens up novel problem solving strategies and accelerates human 
cultural evolution. Clark (and others) have focused primarily on the cognitive niche 
constructed by the internalisation of natural language, but in the next section I will 
suggest that another way language contributes to niche construction is via the 
mindshaping mechanisms that I described previously. Zawidzki (2013: 128) also 
makes this connection, and indicates that human cognitive niche construction might 
differ from other kinds of niche construction in that humans can purposefully choose 
how they shape their environments.  
 Consider an example that Clark gives, of how advanced number cognition 
might be facilitated by the creation of linguistic labels (‘one’, ‘fifty-four’, etc.) that 
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allow us to categorise and simplify the numerical domain. He cites research where a 
chimpanzee, Sheba, was taught to use numerals that enabled her to succeed in a 
counter-intuitive task where picking the larger pile of food would actually result in 
her being given less food. Without the numerical labels she was unable to pass this 
task, and would continually pick the larger pile, but once a numerical label was 
attached to each pile she was able to make sense of what was going on, and pick the 
smaller pile. Thus it seems that the numerical symbols helped simplify the task 
domain, creating a cognitive niche that facilitated more adaptive behaviour. (Drawn 
from Clark 2006: 371, originally study by Boysen et al 1996).   
 Clark hypothesises that human language might operate in much the same way 
as numerical symbols did for the chimpanzee, simplifying an otherwise 
overwhelmingly complex environment by attaching labels to especially relevant 
features. Something similar, I want to suggest, could be the case for folk psychology. 
3.3.2	–	The	Folk	Psychological	Niche	
In the previous section I described how some animals, including humans, are able to 
construct their own environmental niches that contribute positively to their welfare. 
One particularly interesting kind of niche construction involves the creation of 
cognitive niches, i.e. environments that contribute positively to cognition. Folk 
psychological discourse, I will now claim, constitutes a cognitive niche that 
contributes to its own predictive and explanatory success. It does this by regulating 
the behaviour of conspecifics (and oneself), and by creating a socio-normative 
framework within which rationalistic explanations can be given. 
 Each of the mindshaping mechanisms that I described earlier in this chapter 
contribute to the construction of the folk psychological niche. Imitation and 
pedagogy both tend to normalise behaviour by transferring certain behavioural 
patterns between individuals. For example, if everyone is taught how to make a cup 
of tea in a particular fashion, then tea-making behaviour will consequently become 
easier to predict. Similarly, both linguistic and non-linguistic norm enforcement also 
regulate behaviour, by ‘punishing’ atypical behaviour, either literally or via social 
 
 
105 
mechanisms such as exclusion or ostracisation. More constructively, the transmission 
and propagation of narratives creates a framework within which to situate and 
explain behaviour (cf. Andrews 2015).  
 Let us focus for a moment on the particular example of pedagogy. Both 
formal classroom instruction and the master-apprentice scenario described by 
Sterelny (2012) involve the regulation of behaviour by reinforcing whatever 
behaviour is being taught. Whilst the reinforcement mechanisms might differ across 
cases, and be more or less successful, the end result that is aimed at is producing 
students who can replicate the behaviour being taught – which might simply be 
repeating facts, or might be a more complex skill such as woodwork or fishing. In 
each case, provided that we are situated in the same pedagogical framework, it will 
become easier to predict the student’s behaviour when they are engaged in the 
relevant practice. So provided that I was taught in the same school of fishing as you, 
it should be fairly easy for me to predict the order that you prepare your tackle, and 
so on. Whilst there will inevitably be exceptions to these behavioural regularities, 
they will not be the norm, and over time will be corrected by social pressures (or in 
the case of exceptions that prove to be more successful than the norm, they may end 
up spreading and becoming the new norm). Teaching someone to fish not only 
provides them with a useful skill, but also contributes (in a small way) to the creation 
of a stable folk psychological niche, in the sense that we will now be better equipped 
to predict what the student will do when they pick up a fishing rod (and so on). 
 Of course, pedagogy (and imitation) is only one part of the picture. Perhaps 
the most interesting mindshaping tool for the purposes of folk psychological niche 
construction is the regulative role played by folk psychological attributions 
themselves. The very act of ascribing a belief or desire to another (or to oneself) 
creates a social pressure to conform to this ascription, as otherwise one would 
undermine either one’s own or someone else’s rationality. In this way folk 
psychological discourse can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the seemingly 
epistemic claims it makes sometimes end up creating the very behaviours that they 
predicted. There is a further question here about whether or not this means they 
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actually are accurate, but at the very least the creation of a cognitive niche can help 
explain the predictive and explanatory success of folk psychological discourse.  
 In a sense this is just an elaboration on “the game of giving and asking for 
reasons”, initially described by Sellars (1963) and later elaborated on by Brandom 
(1994). By attributing mental states to one another, we create a ‘space of reasons’ 
that constitutes a kind of cognitive niche within which we can expect people to 
behave in certain systematic and relatively easy to predict ways. For example, if I tell 
you that the meeting tomorrow is cancelled, I can expect you not to turn up for it, 
based on the norms of rationality that are partly constituted by this cognitive niche. 
Our explicit commitment to these norms could facilitate systematic predictions, even 
if the underlying cognitive architecture was unchanged.  
3.4	–	Failing	With	Style	
In this final section I will describe how folk psychology can often give a strictly false 
account of how the mind works (at least in terms of cognitive scientific 
mechanisms), whilst nonetheless remaining a successful predictive and explanatory 
practice. It does this by cultivating a cognitive niche, as described in the previous 
section, which regulates behaviours and thus mitigates the computational 
intractability of behavioural predictions. This creates a socio-normative ‘space of 
reasons’ within which explanations of behaviour can be given with relative ease. 
Finally, the niche also contributes to whatever epistemic success folk psychology 
does have, via shaping cognitive mechanisms themselves and thus becoming a sort 
of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
3.4.1	–	Epistemic	Failure	(and	Occasional	Success)	
In the second half of this thesis I will argue that folk psychology often fails at the 
epistemic role, at least so far as the fine grained structure of sub-personal 
mechanisms are concerned. I will briefly rehearse these arguments here, but 
motivating this claim is not the main aim of this chapter. By claiming that folk 
psychology fails in the epistemic role, I do not mean to say that it never gets 
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anything right, or even that it is a ‘false’ theory in the sense meant by the 
Churchlands, but rather that it does not provide a reliable guide to the sub-personal 
structure of cognition. Even if it is occasionally successful at describing the sub-
personal mechanisms responsible for cognition, we have no good reason to think that 
this is typically the case, and as such it should not be relied upon as a guide to 
scientific discovery. As I will argue in the remainder of this section, failure of this 
kind is perfectly compatible with folk psychology succeeding at (personal level) 
prediction and explanation. 
 Previously, in chapter 2, I have argued that evidence of cultural variation in 
folk psychological intuitions gives us an initial reason to be sceptical of the epistemic 
value of folk psychology. This is because an implicit assumption that folk 
psychology is universal has historically been used to license the use of folk 
psychological intuitions as a guide to actual cognitive structures. Once this 
assumption has been proved false, this usage is no longer so obviously valid.  
 In chapter 4 I will present several case studies from philosophy and cognitive 
science, each of which demonstrates a way in which folk psychological concepts fail 
to capture the complexity of cognitive scientific explanation. Typically what is 
needed in these cases is a disambiguation between different senses of a single folk 
concept, or sometimes a recognition that the distinctions made by folk psychology do 
not straightforwardly map on to the functional structure of actual cognitive systems. 
 Finally, in chapter 5 I will challenge the status of folk psychological kinds as 
genuine natural kinds, and argue that folk psychological discourse fails to provide 
genuinely projectable predicates. This is partially motivated by the evidence from 
chapters 2 and 4 – folk psychological kinds are culturally variable, and also cross-cut 
relevant functional and structural distinctions in cognitive science. However, folk 
psychological kinds may constitute culturally mediated ‘human kinds’, via the 
mindshaping mechanisms explored in this chapter. I will return to this topic in 3.4.4, 
and again in 5.2.4. 
 It is important to note that regulative success could also contribute to the 
occasions when folk psychology is able to correctly identify sub-personal 
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mechanisms. The varieties of mindshaping described in 3.2 not only shape 
behaviour, but sometimes also shape the cognitive mechanisms responsible for that 
behaviour. Presumably all behaviour involves a cognitive mechanism at some stage, 
but what I am especially interested in here are those cognitive mechanisms that come 
to closely resemble the folk psychological attributions that purport to identify them. 
This requires us to distinguish between two ways in which different kinds of 
mindshaping could operate. One way would be to make only surface level changes to 
the content of people’s cognition, for example by propagating certain ethical or 
rational norms. Another way would be to actually change the sub-personal 
mechanisms involved in cognition, which we might think is the outcome of certain 
kinds of pedagogy. In the latter case, but not the former, mindshaping could result in 
cognitive mechanisms that conform to the descriptions given by folk psychological 
discourse. When this occurs folk psychology will be epistemically successful, but in 
virtue of it shaping the mechanisms it identifies, rather than being especially good at 
identifying those mechanisms independently. I will return to this topic in chapter 5, 
where I discuss the self-constituting nature of folk psychological kinds.  
 What I want to suggest is that folk psychological discourse may be 
potentially flawed as an epistemic tool for learning about the sub-personal structure 
of cognition, even if from time to time it does get something right. However, this 
does not mean that it should be eliminated (or even revised outside of scientific 
contexts). Rather, what I take it to mean is simply that conceiving of folk psychology 
as serving this epistemic role was a mistake in the first place, and that we would do 
better to focus on the predictive, explanatory, and regulative roles of folk 
psychology.  
3.4.2	–	Regulative	Success	
As I described in the previous sections, folk psychological discourse exerts a 
remarkable range of regulative and normative pressures on our behaviour and 
cognition, via a class of mechanisms described by Zawidzki as ‘mindshaping’ (in 
contrast to the epistemic role implied by ‘mindreading’). One simple example of this 
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is the kind of pressure that one might feel to conform to rational implications of 
previously expressed beliefs. So if you are (publicly) committed to the belief that 
Edinburgh is north of Paris, then you might feel pressure to head south rather than 
north if you tell someone that you are travelling from Edinburgh to Paris – unless 
you are able to provide some additional explanation for your actions, such as that 
you are catching a flight from Aberdeen. This pressure need not necessarily be 
public, either – even becoming aware of one’s own folk psychological commitments 
might be sufficient to rationally constrain one’s own actions. 
 This is only one small way in which folk psychology can exert a regulative 
influence (see section 3.2 for more detail). Zawidzki gives many other examples, 
including imitation, pedagogy, and more explicit norm enforcement (such as ethical 
discourse). If we accept that these all count as cases of folk psychological regulation, 
then it certainly seems that folk psychology is successful in this role. However, it is 
important to note that what counts as ‘success’ here is going to be somewhat 
contextual – formal pedagogy has institutionalised measures of success in the form 
of grades, assessments, etc., whilst what counts as the successful enforcement of 
norms of rationality might be somewhat more open to interpretation. In the above 
example I noted that one possible response to contravening a rational norm is to offer 
an alternative explanation of one’s actions. Andrews (2015) makes this point as well, 
but goes on to argue that giving an alternative explanation nonetheless entails further 
commitments – once you have established that you are heading north to go the 
airport, your future behaviour can be expected to involve attempting to get on to a 
plane, and so on. When this game of giving rational explanations breaks down (either 
with regard to the behaviour or the explanation) we tend to resort to attributions of 
mental illness or other cognitive disturbances. These serve almost as a ‘trump card’ 
explanation that can account for any behaviour at all, although the extent to which 
they are genuinely explanatory (rather than just excusing one from giving 
explanations) could be challenged.  
 In any case, folk psychology certainly seems to succeed in the regulative role 
in many everyday situations. It is this success, I want to suggest, that can account not 
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only for the explanatory and predictive success of folk psychology, but also many 
apparent cases of epistemic success. When folk psychology is epistemically 
successful, I argue, this is typically not due to any particular competency it has at 
identifying sub-personal mechanisms, but rather due to the influence that the 
regulative role sometimes plays in the formation of sub-personal mechanisms. 
Essentially, in certain cases folk psychology can act as a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
making it no miracle that (in these cases) it correctly identifies the mechanisms 
involved.  
3.4.3	–	Explanatory	and	Predictive	Success	
Regulative success can also help explain the predictive and explanatory success of 
folk psychology. The creation of a homogeneous behavioural environment 
contributes to predictive success, and the enforcement of rational norms supports a 
certain kind of explanatory practice. This helps us to account for how folk 
psychology can exhibit predictive and explanatory success without necessarily 
exhibiting epistemic success, thus further undermining the ‘no folk psychological 
miracles’ argument outlined in the previous chapter. I will now discuss the 
contribution made by regulative success to predictive and explanatory success in 
more detail. 
 Zawidzki (2013: chapter 3) describes how the complexity of human 
behaviour provides a problem for the view that folk psychology primarily consists of 
mindreading (what I call the epistemic role): 
 
Because any observable behavior is compatible with any finite set of 
propositional attitudes, accurate propositional attitude attribution that is 
timely enough to make a difference to behavioral prediction in dynamic, 
quotidian contexts appears to be computationally intractable. (Zawidzki 
2013: 65) 
 
The same problem applies to behavioural predictions. Any observable behaviour is 
compatible with many future possible actions, and even if it was theoretical possible 
to predict which action would come next, it might be practically impossible to 
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actually make that prediction quickly enough for it to be useful. Furthermore, both 
future behaviours and mental states seem to be routinely underdetermined by current 
behaviour observations, as described by Dennett (1987) – although Dennett goes on 
to argue that this indeterminacy may simply be a feature of cognition, not just a 
problem with folk psychology. Based purely on observation, both epistemic and 
predictive successes seem impossible. 
 If Zawidzki is right, then human behaviour is by default simply too 
heterogeneous for predictive success. However, we are clearly able to predict each 
other’s behaviours with a relatively high rate of success, at least under normal 
circumstances. The trick, according to Zawidzki, is that folk psychology acts in the 
regulative role so as to constrain human behaviour and make it relatively 
homogenous and easy to predict. It does this via the various mindshaping 
mechanisms described in the previous section, such as basic imitation serving to 
homogenize behaviours, and pedagogy and norm enforcement teaching people which 
kind of behaviours are appropriate in what kind of situations. So long as people are 
working under the same set of folk psychological norms, otherwise intractable 
predictions should become relatively easy to make. 
 What about explanatory success? Andrews (2015) describes how folk 
psychological regulation can contribute to this by creating looping effects where the 
giving of folk psychological explanations serves to create future constraints on 
behaviour, and where those constraints consequently limit the kinds of explanations 
that can be given. She describes a ‘folk psychological spiral’ that also includes 
predictive success, which becomes interwoven with explanation and regulation. This 
picture of folk psychology allows us to separate predictive, explanatory, and 
regulative success from epistemic failure, and gives a principled foundation on which 
to build a non-epistemic account of folk psychology. Andrews give a helpful 
example of how this kind of explanatory constraint could work in practice: 
 
The folk psychology spiral works dynamically in our more complicated 
social interactions. Suppose Ernie and Bert are trying to decide where to 
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go on holiday, and Ernie is lobbying for a trip to Bali. Bert is not 
convinced that it is a good idea, but Ernie predicts that Bert will love 
Bali, because he enjoys the arts and the outdoors and monkeys and 
tropical fruit. Bert is persuaded, but says to Ernie, “You’d better be right 
about this!” They arrive in Bali and Ernie’s prediction is born out—Bert 
has a great time. That reinforces Ernie’s belief in Bert’s preferences, and 
also creates added pressure for Bert to live up to them—Ernie says, “See, 
I told you you’d love Bali!” 
  But if Ernie’s prediction fails, and Bert doesn’t enjoy Bali, 
Ernie (wanting to preserve the relationship) will seek to figure out why. 
Maybe Bert hates the tropical heat more than he likes the outdoors, 
monkeys, fruit, and arts. That explanation leads Ernie to form additional 
expectations about Bert’s preferences, and so Ernie might book an air-
conditioned hotel. Ernie would expect Bert to be happier with the air-
conditioning, and this expectation creates a pressure for Bert to 
appreciate the air-conditioned room, to express thanks to Ernie for 
considering his needs, and so forth. (Andrews 2015: 57-8) 
 
 So in giving an explanation of why Bert didn’t enjoy the holiday, Ernie 
creates future pressures on Bert to behave in certain ways, further constraining the 
space of possible behaviours. This in turn will lead to further cases of prediction and 
explanation, forming what Andrews describes as a ‘folk psychological spiral’ of 
prediction, explanation, and regulation, all of which contributes to future predictive 
success. 
3.5	–	The	Regulative	Role	of	Folk	Psychology	
In this chapter I have considered four distinct roles that folk psychology might 
succeed or fail at. In the predictive role folk psychology simply predicts future 
behaviour based on past behavioural observations. In the epistemic role folk 
psychology aims to describe the actual mechanisms and processes that enable 
cognition. In the explanatory role folk psychology provides (often post-hoc) 
explanations for peoples’ behaviours. Finally, in the regulative role that is the focus 
of this chapter it is able to exert a regulative influence on behaviour by establishing 
social, rational, and ethical norms. I then argued that success in the regulative role 
enables success in the predictive role, explanatory role, and to some extent the 
epistemic role. This explains how folk psychology can function as a successful social 
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practice despite often failing to identify genuine sub-personal mechanisms, thus 
further undermining the ‘no folk psychological miracles’ argument presented in the 
previous chapter.  
 In the second half of this thesis I will present further evidence that folk 
psychological discourse is not suitable for technical work in philosophy and 
cognitive science (chapter 4), consider the status of folk psychological kinds as 
natural kinds (chapter 5), and discuss how we might go about replacing folk 
psychological concepts in cognitive science (chapter 6). First, though, I will briefly 
pause to recap the positive account of folk psychology presented in the first half of 
this thesis, describe how it all fits together, and consider both how it differs from 
more traditional accounts, and how it relates to other alternative accounts. 
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Interlude:	The	Positive	Account	of	Folk	Psychology	
So far in this thesis I have presented an overview of different uses of the term folk 
psychology (chapter 1), described how folk psychology appears to vary across 
cultures and what the implications of this variance might be (chapter 2), and 
considered how folk psychology might sometimes be able to operate in a ‘regulative 
role’, exhibiting an active influence on our future behaviour (chapter 3). In this 
section I will try to present more clearly the positive account of folk psychology that 
I see as emerging from these reflections. This positive account has important 
antecedents, perhaps most obviously in Dennett’s work on the ‘intentional stance’ 
(see his 1987), but also in other works such as Schwitzgebel’s dispositional account 
of belief (2002), and Andrews’ call for a “pluralistic folk psychology” (2008). At the 
end of the section I will discuss how my account builds upon and advances these 
previous proposals. 
 At the heart of my account is the proposal that we should distinguish between 
implicit social cognitive mechanisms on the one hand, and explicit folk 
psychologising on the other – and the thought that once we have done so, many 
further puzzling features of the general phenomenon referred to as ‘folk psychology’ 
can be explained. The most important of these for my purposes is that we can make 
sense of how the explicit content of folk psychology could fail to match up with our 
scientific understanding of cognition, whilst nonetheless still managing to track 
important and interesting features of human behaviour. The way to do this, I think, is 
to see explicit folk psychological attributions as descriptions of traits or dispositions 
of whole people, rather than as attempts to pick out discrete mental states, processes, 
or mechanisms. So when I say that someone believes something, I am saying that 
they will act in ways that rationally accord with believing that thing, rather than 
trying to say anything at all about the cognitive mechanisms that cause them to act in 
that way. Attributions of belief, for example, need not be committed to the actual 
existence of any belief-like state, but can be ‘true’ merely in virtue of someone 
behaving as though they believed that thing.  
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  At the same time, it may not be the case that implicit social cognitive 
mechanisms actually attribute beliefs at all. They might track far simpler behavioural 
regularities that suffice for making many of the social predictions that we require on 
a day-to-day basis, whilst falling back on explicit folk psychology for explanations 
or predictions of more complex or unusual behaviour. Making this distinction means 
that we can assess the success or failure of explicit folk psychological attributions 
separately from more basic social cognitive competency, and can help to make sense 
of the evidence of cross-cultural variation that I discussed in chapter 2. Furthermore, 
the regulative mechanisms that I discussed in chapter 3 (which can operate both 
implicitly and explicitly) help to explain how folk psychology could successfully 
pick out traits or dispositions without successfully identifying discrete cognitive 
states. The idea is that whilst behavioural prediction can only get us so far, it will be 
able to get us further if we are able to shape the systems that we are predicting, i.e. 
human cognitive systems, so as to make their behaviour more regular. So by shaping 
our social cognitive environment we are able to create a ‘niche’ of sorts, within 
which behavioural and otherwise non-mentalistic strategies can successfully predict 
and explain a lot of human behaviour.   
 In the second half of this thesis I will go on to assess the status of folk 
psychological concepts in scientific psychology and cognitive science, and the 
picture of folk psychology outlined above will allow me to do so without worrying 
about whether the failure of folk psychological concepts in this regard would have to 
lead to their eventual elimination. Even if it turns out that there is nothing like a 
discrete belief state anywhere in the brain, folk psychology can quite happily carry 
on referring to beliefs as character traits or dispositions, and so on for any other folk 
psychological concept (see Botterill & Carruthers 1999 for a similar response to 
eliminativist arguments).  
 The idea that folk psychology should be interpreted as describing coarse-
grained behavioural states rather than fine-grained mental states has an obvious 
antecedent in Dennett’s intentional stance. Dennett characterised three distinct 
‘stances’ we could adopt when explaining or predicting the behaviour of a system. 
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The physical stance looks at the actual physical structure of a system, the design 
stance looks at the intentions of a designer (or imagined designer) of a system, and 
the intentional stance treats that system as though it has its own intentions, and uses 
these to predict its behaviour. Importantly for Dennett, we can adopt the intentional 
stance towards systems whose actual mental states we know nothing about, or even 
towards a system that we would not normally treat as mental (such as a 
thermometer). Dennett can be interpreted as either saying that we should be 
instrumentalists about folk psychological attributions, or that such attributions 
actually apply to the behaviour of whole systems, rather than parts of those systems. 
In a sense what I am doing in this thesis is adopting that latter interpretation, and 
trying to see how far we can take it (and what implications, if any, it has for 
experimental cognitive science). 
 The idea that folk psychological concepts should be characterised as 
dispositional can be found in Schwitzgebel (2002), although he focuses only on 
belief. Schwitzgebel argues that belief should be characterised in terms of 
behavioural, cognitive, and phenomenal dispositions, i.e. dispositions to behave in 
certain ways, dispositions to think certain things, and dispositions to have certain 
experiences. He supports this argument by describing a number of cases where 
beliefs do not seem to have the discrete, determinate nature required of mental states 
as classically understood. Whilst I have focused primarily on behavioural 
dispositions, I am sympathetic to Schwitzgebel’s approach, and seek to extend this 
kind of analysis to folk psychology more generally.  
 Finally, Andrews (2008) outlines a pluralistic attitude towards folk 
psychology, where trait attribution can play some role in prediction and explanation, 
alongside the more traditional mental state attribution. Trait attribution is the 
attribution of personality traits, such as being greedy or brave, to whole people, as 
opposed to the attribution of discrete mental states such as belief and desire. I agree 
with Andrews that trait attribution is an important and often ignored component of 
folk psychological discourse, and coupled with the dispositional account of mental 
state attribution described above I think her pluralistic approach has a lot in common 
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with my own account. Andrews also spends some time identifying and criticising the 
emphasis that mainstream philosophy of mind has historically placed on 
propositional attitude attribution. She focuses primarily on the implications her 
approach has for social cognition, but I have tried to apply my account to folk 
psychology more generally. In the following chapters I expand this analysis to the 
use of folk psychological concepts in cognitive scientific discourse.	
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Chapter	4	–	Folk	Concepts	in	Cognitive	Scientific	Discourse	
In this chapter I will present several cases where the application of folk 
psychological concepts to issues in philosophy and cognitive science appears to lead 
to practical difficulties and/or theoretical confusions. In each case I will suggest that 
a strategy of conceptual disambiguation, in which the folk psychological concepts 
are refined and made fit for purpose, can alleviate these problems. I will first 
introduce the idea of what I call ‘cognitive scientific discourse’, i.e. the discourse 
within which cognitive science offers explanations and predictions, and contrast this 
with the folk psychological discourse that was the topic of the previous three 
chapters. I will then consider four cases where the two discourses seem to come into 
conflict, and where I think either refining or abandoning folk psychological concepts 
will help us to make progress. In doing so I will draw on the positive account of folk 
psychology that I have presented in the first half of this thesis, which will allow me 
to argue that in each of these cases it is not simply that folk psychology has given us 
a false picture of how the mind works, but rather that the concepts it provides should 
never have been applied to fine-grained cognitive scientific descriptions in the first 
place.  
 The four cases that I will consider are: 1) the false belief task in social 
cognition, 2) the scientific taxonomisation of sensory modalities, 3) the extended 
cognition debate, and 4) the emerging predictive processing paradigm. Each case 
study is individually intended to illustrate a particular example of how folk 
psychological concepts might fail us, and taken together they give a general sense of 
the kinds of problems that might arise. My aim in this chapter is not to conclusively 
prove that folk psychology is unsuitable as a source of scientific concepts, but rather 
to give an initial indication why I think the technical use of folk psychological 
concepts might be problematic. In each case I will develop a version of what I call 
the disambiguation strategy, which revolves around either distinguishing different 
senses in which a folk psychological concept might be applied, or else coming up 
with new concepts that better capture the phenomenon being described.  
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 In the next chapter I will consider more generally the status of folk 
psychological concepts as natural kinds, and argue that folk psychological kinds do 
not typically qualify as cognitive scientific kinds. Finally, in chapter 6 I will examine 
recent debates about cognitive ontology, and propose a novel methodology for 
developing new cognitive scientific concepts, whilst retaining a positive role for folk 
psychology as an initial source of basic, unrefined concepts. 
 What do I mean by cognitive scientific discourse? Chapter 1 introduced the 
idea of folk psychological discourse, which I used to refer to the broad set of folk 
knowledge and social practices that people deploy every day to understand and 
explain each other’s behaviours. My intention in referring to folk psychology as a 
‘discourse’ was to capture the sense in which it goes far beyond mental state 
attribution, and includes further activities and practices such as behavioural 
predictions, narrative competency, and socio-normative regulation. Similarly, by 
referring to a cognitive scientific ‘discourse’, I want to indicate that the use of folk 
concepts in cognitive science goes beyond the explicit use of terms such as ‘belief’ 
and ‘desire’ in academic articles, but also includes more subtle effects such as the 
influence that a researcher’s own folk psychological intuitions could have over 
theoretical and experimental design, or the lingering implications that a word drawn 
from the folk psychological lexicon carries, even after it has been given a rigorous 
and technical definition. So my analysis of folk concepts in cognitive scientific 
discourse will require a certain amount of reading between the lines, so to speak, as 
there may still be an influence of some kind even when scientists seem to be aware 
of the inadequacies of folk psychological concepts and are careful with the terms that 
they use. 
 I should also comment briefly on the level of detail (or lack of it) that will be 
necessary for these case studies. Where relevant I will describe the technical details 
of a theory or experiment, but in general my aim is not to get bogged down in 
specifics, but rather to give a general sense of the kinds of issues that I see arising 
when folk psychological concepts are misapplied in cognitive scientific discourse. In 
some cases it may well turn out that the use of a certain folk concept was more 
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suitable than I first imagined, but I am confident that the general structure of the 
problems that I identify in this chapter will continue to apply in the majority of cases, 
including cases that I don’t discuss here.    
4.1	–	The	false	belief	task	and	the	puzzle	of	retrogressive	development	
The false belief task in social cognition was initially developed to test when infants 
(and non-human primates) first become aware that other people have minds. Initially 
it was thought that this capacity, generally known as a ‘theory of other minds’, first 
appears around the age of four or five, but recent research pioneered by Baillargeon 
and colleagues has demonstrated that children at least as young as 15 months can 
pass a non-verbal version of the task. In this section I will present both verbal and 
non-verbal false belief tasks, and consider some attempts to explain the apparently 
puzzling development of false belief attributions, before arguing that one way of 
resolving this puzzle is to simply disambiguate between (at least) two senses of the 
folk psychological ‘belief’ concept. 
4.1.1	–	Verbal	and	non-verbal	false	belief	tasks	
The original false belief task was conducted by Wimmer & Perner (1983), and later 
developed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith (1985), whose version is best known 
today. The experiment consisted of a child being presented with a pair of dolls 
(‘Sally’ and ‘Anne’) playing with some toys. Sally places her toy in a box and then 
leaves the scene. Whilst she is gone, Anne moves the toy and hides it in another box. 
Then Sally returns, and the experimenter asks the child where Sally will look for her 
toy. The correct answer is that she will look where she originally hid it, but prior to 
around the age of 4 children tend to answer incorrectly, stating that Sally will look 
where the toy actually is, rather than where she last saw it. The received 
interpretation of this experiment is that it demonstrates that prior to acquiring a 
theory of mind at age 4, children are unable to attribute false beliefs to others. The 
experiment has been replicated many times since, and in many different formats, 
with fairly consistent results. (See sections 1.2.1 and 2.2.1 for further discussion.) 
 
 
122
 A 2005 study conducted by Onisihi & Baillargeon presented infants with a 
non-verbal version of the false belief task, and was able to elicit apparently positive 
results from children as young as 15 months. The non-verbal false belief task makes 
use of the violation-of-expectation method (see e.g. Baillargeon 2004), which uses 
infant looking time as a proxy for what they expect to see. Infants tend to look longer 
at events that surprise them, and so we can use surprise as an indicator of what the 
infant expected (or did not expect) to see. In the study conducted by Onishi & 
Baillargeon infants were first familiarised with a scene where an actor moves a toy 
watermelon between two differently coloured boxes. Once this scene, and variations 
on it, was no longer of interest to the infant, the actor hid the watermelon in one box, 
and then disappeared behind a screen. Whilst they were hidden the melon moved 
from one box to the other, and then the experimenter returned and looked for the 
melon in either the box where they had hidden it, or the box where it actually was.18 
If the infant is consistently surprised in the condition where the actor searches in a 
way that contradicts their apparent belief, then the infant is said to pass the test, as 
they seem to demonstrate some awareness of the actor’s beliefs (both true and false). 
Infants appear to be able to pass this non-verbal version of the false belief task by at 
least the age of 15 months. Several variations on this study have since been 
performed, and the age at which infants can pass versions of this test is has been 
pushed lower (see e.g. Southgate et al 2007, Surian et al 2007, Southgate & Vernetti 
2014). 
 What is strange about these two studies is that children appear to be sensitive 
to false beliefs at the age of 15 months, but then lose this sensitivity once they begin 
to talk, until they regain it at around the age of 4 or 5. Retrogressive development of 
this kind has been observed in other domains; such as number cognition (see Hood 
2004 for an overview), but in this case it has yet to be adequately explained. Is it 
possible that children do actually have a theory of other minds before the age of 4 or 
                                                
18 There was also a control condition where the melon had not moved. 
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5? Or should we instead question whether the non-verbal false belief task is in fact 
evidence of a theory of mind? 
4.1.2	–Accounting	for	retrogressive	development	
Since Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) first published their findings, there have been 
numerous attempts to explain the apparently retrogressive development of theory of 
mind between 15 months and 5 years of age. Here I will consider three of those 
attempts, before suggesting in the next sub-section that what at least two of these 
proposals have in common is a proposal to disambiguate the concept of ‘belief’.  The 
first two proposals that I will consider broadly map on to two more general 
approaches in social cognition (nativist and empiricist), whilst the third posits the 
existence of two distinct systems for social cognitive processing (and can be given 
both a nativist and an empiricist interpretation).  
 The nativist approach to theory of mind holds that we are born with an innate 
‘mindreading’ module that develops along a set trajectory (cf. Carruthers 2006). 
According to one popular version of this approach the puzzle outlined above is 
caused by interference resulting from the increased cognitive load required for 
simultaneous linguistic and social cognitive processing (Carruthers 2013; cf. Newton 
& de Villiers 2007). The idea here is that one key difference between verbal and non-
verbal false belief tasks is that in the former the subject needs to not only keep track 
of (false) beliefs, but also make sense of the verbal instructions that are given to them 
by the experimenter. This is particularly difficult for young children who are still 
learning how to speak, and so until the age of 4 or 5 their attempts to understand the 
instructions interfere with their ability to pass the task.  
 The alternative empiricist approach to theory of mind, championed by 
Gopnik & Wellman (see their 1992), proposes that children learn about the minds of 
others via an almost scientific process of observation and experimentation. 
According to this approach the non-verbal false belief task calls for a different kind 
of capacity than the verbal task, requiring only a basic behavioural understanding of 
where an object last was in relation to a person, rather than a fully mentalistic 
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understanding of their beliefs and desires (Wellman 2014). They would therefore 
deny that pre-verbal infants are in fact able to pass a version of the false-belief task, 
instead describing the non-verbal task as evidence of a more basic behavioural 
capacity. The apparently retrogressive development is thus explained by 
differentiating between the attribution of false beliefs and the tracking of behavioural 
regularities. 
 A more recent approach that has been developed partly in response to the 
non-verbal false belief task is Apperly & Butterfill’s ‘two systems’ theory (2009; 
Butterfill & Apperly 2013). This is similar to the empiricist approach in that it claims 
that the two tasks are solved in different ways, but it goes further by positing the 
existence of two distinct systems that are involved in social cognition. The first of 
these (‘system 1’) tracks what they call “registrations” and “encounterings”, i.e. 
subdoxastic states that are still sufficient to pass the non-verbal false belief task, 
whilst the second (‘system 2’) operates more like the full blown theory of mind 
posited by traditional accounts. This two systems account is able to account for the 
apparent puzzle caused by Onishi & Baillergeon’s findings by claiming that system 
2, which is required in order to solve the verbal false belief task, does not come 
online until the age of 4 or 5. Prior to this infants must rely on their system 1 
capacities, which they lack explicit access to, therefore rendering them unable to give 
verbal reports about false beliefs.  
 It is worth noting that in recent research all of the above approaches have 
come close to some sort of reconciliation.  Both the nativist and the empiricist 
approaches accept that some combination of inherited and acquired capacities are 
involved in social cognition, and the two systems account looks, from at least some 
angles, very much like a more fine-grained version of the modular nativist account. 
A unified account of the false belief task might incorporate aspects of all three 
approaches by positing two modular systems that become active at different stages of 
development, perhaps requiring empirical stimulus in order to develop properly. 
Probably none of the original theorists would be entirely happy with this 
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compromise, but it could allow for an explanation of the experimental data that is at 
least somewhat acceptable from every theoretical perspective. 
4.1.3	–	Disambiguating	‘belief’	
Here I am not so much interested in which of these accounts is correct, but rather 
what they have in common, which is, at least in the case of the second two, a 
proposal to disambiguate our folk concept of ‘belief’. Both the empiricist 
characterisation of a basic understanding of where someone will look and the two-
systems theory of ‘registrations’ and ‘encounterings’ do away with the attribution of 
belief as a prerequisite for passing the non-verbal false belief task. A belief, 
understood in something like the folk sense, is a fairly rich concept which includes 
the potential for inferential reasoning, whilst a registration simply indicates 
knowledge of where an object was last seen, and carries no further conceptual 
baggage. Distinguishing between beliefs and some more basic kind of attribution 
opens the door to a fragmentation of the folk psychological concept of ‘belief’, 
which turns out to simply be too coarse grained to capture the distinction between 
verbal vs. non-verbal false belief tasks. Alternatively, we could say that solving this 
problem requires coming up with an entirely new concept, rather than distinguishing 
between different kinds of belief, but the point remains the same: where once we 
referred to both cases in the same way, we must now disambiguate between two 
distinct concepts. 
 Carruthers, on the other hand, continues to insist that Onishi & Baillergeon’s 
study simply demonstrates that 15-month old infants must have an understanding of 
belief (Carruthers 2009, forthcoming).19 Carruthers’ position, according to Hutto 
(2016: 8), “risks systematically confounding descriptions of what is being done with 
substantial accounts of how agents manage to do what they do”. Whilst both verbal 
                                                
19 Although it is important to note that Carruthers has a notoriously thin notion of belief, one that is 
perhaps closer to Apperly & Butterfill’s ‘registration’, potentially making his insistence on this point 
somewhat more understandable. Nonetheless, his continual usage of the folk term ‘belief’ to refer to 
whatever is picked out by this thin notion is likely to invoke misleading associations, especially as he 
seems to think that this thin notion will eventually develop into a full blown concept of belief.   
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and pre-verbal infants seem to be able to accomplish versions of the same task, we 
must not assume that the way in which they accomplish these tasks is also the same. 
Attaching the label ‘belief’ to both cases makes it harder to question this assumption.  
 The issue here seems to be the way in which the rich folk notion of belief has 
been used to define the problem space. Characterising the non-verbal task as a 
species of false belief task, rather than as a more general social cognition task, 
already invites researchers to conceive of it as a fairly cognitively demanding task, 
and implicitly rejects the possibility of an infant ‘solving’ the task without tracking 
or attributing false beliefs. Once this conceptual baggage is discarded some space is 
opened up for reconceiving the task in different ways, such as in terms of 
registrations and encounterings. This is not to say that any of these alternative 
conceptions are necessarily correct, but rather that by revising our use of the term 
‘belief’ we can consider theoretical possibilities that might otherwise have been hard 
to make sense of. The more general point here is that our use of pre-theoretical 
concepts, such as belief, might sometimes make it hard to imagine other ways of 
categorising phenomena.   
4.2	–	Taxonomising	sensory	modalities	
I was brought up being told that people have five senses: sight, smell, taste, hearing, 
and touch. However, it’s not at all clear how well these senses match up to biological 
reality, or even if this common knowledge is a stable intuition, rather than merely an 
artefact of our culture or language. In this section I will consider both of these 
questions, and argue that sensory taxonomisation is another case where our folk 
intuitions lead us astray. First I will consider the status of the folk taxonomy itself, 
and suggest that even this is ambiguous once you take into account the way that 
senses are taxonomised in other cultures. Then I will turn to scientific 
taxonomisation, and present evidence against a simple distinction between five 
senses. Finally I will consider two distinct strategies for reconciling our intuitions 
about the senses with these empirical findings, and suggest that a combination of the 
two strategies provides the best way to move forward. 
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4.2.1	–	Folk	intuitions	about	the	senses	
Where does the idea that we have five senses come from? MacPherson (2011) traces 
it back to Aristotle’s De Anima, in which the necessity of there being only five 
senses is argued for on the basis of Aristotle’s understanding of the material 
elements. Nudds (2004: 35) has claimed that it is “obvious” that we have five senses, 
on the basis that our folk taxonomy is simply not the kind of thing that can be 
disproven. He goes on to argue that any attempt to give an alternative account of the 
senses would be simple “changing the subject” (ibid). However, this argument only 
goes through if the folk taxonomy does in fact consist of only five senses, and it is 
not at all obvious that this is the case. 
 In chapter 2 I presented evidence for there being cross-cultural variation in 
folk psychological intuitions, and this evidence extends to folk intuitions about the 
senses. For instance, the Hausa of Nigeria refer lexically only to gani (sight) and ji, 
which is a multimodal sense capturing anything other than sight, as well as emotional 
understanding and intellectual knowledge (Ritchie 1991: 194). The term ji is in fact 
more dominant in Hausa descriptions of sensory experience, and although context 
determines to some extent which modality is being referred to, the distinction is 
certainly less clear-cut than that which we in English make between sound, smell, 
taste, and touch (not to mention knowing or understanding). 
 Another, perhaps more intellectually sophisticated example is the inclusion in 
Buddhist philosophy of a sixth, inward looking sense (Hamilton 2001: 53). This is 
perhaps comparable to what, in Anglo-American philosophy, is referred to as 
‘introspection’. Whilst it might seem odd to categorise an internal process as a sense, 
this is exactly what happens with kinesthesis or proprioception (the sense of where 
one’s own body parts are), which is a common addition to the typical sensory 
taxonomy (see e.g. Heil 2011: 151). 
 The details of these examples are not important, but it means that Nudds’ 
assertion that there are “obviously” only five senses cannot be quite right, or at least 
must be relativized to a specific culture. Nudds does qualify his claim by proposing 
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that the senses might be social, rather than natural kinds, but even if this is so it 
remains the case that folk intuitions may not be a good starting point for a scientific 
study of whatever it is that our sense organs do. I will return to the question of folk 
kinds and natural kinds in the next chapter, but for now I turn to the scientific study 
of the senses. 
4.2.2	–	Scientific	taxonomisation	of	the	senses	
If anything, the scientific and philosophical taxonomisation of the senses is even 
more complicated than the folk taxonomy outline above. Macpherson (2011) 
suggests that taxonomies can be built according to four main sets of criteria: 
representational format, phenomenal character, sense organ, and proximal stimulus. 
When it comes to the traditional fives senses these criteria more or less match up; 
sight has a distinct representational format (2½d image), phenomenal character 
(visual experience), sense organ (eye), and proximal stimulus (light), as does 
hearing, etc.20 
 However, research throughout the 20th century has cast doubt on whether this 
traditional taxonomy genuinely accounts for the full range or complexity of human 
(and non-human) sensory modalities.  Research of this kind can point in one of three 
directions: either suggesting that two previously distinct modalities should be 
considered one and the same, or suggesting that an existing modality should sub-
divided, or even that a completely new modality should be added.  
 An example of the first direction is the discovery of the close connections 
between our senses of taste and smell. If one has a blocked nose it is common to 
experience a dampened sense of taste, and there are well-understood mechanisms 
that are responsible for this effect (primarily those involved in retronasal olfaction, 
see below). Is taste, then, merely a subset of our sense of smell, or it is a distinct 
sense that is simply very reliant on the sense of smell? The folk taxonomy does not 
give us any clear answers to this question. 
                                                
20 Taste and smell might be an exception here – it is debatable whether or not they genuinely rely on 
different sense organs, and they both respond to essentially the same proximal stimulus. 
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 This influence goes in the second direction too: contemporary research 
typically distinguishes two senses of smell, one of which occurs in the nose 
(orthonasal), and the other of which is the result of odorants in the mouth 
(retronasal), and typically contributes to what we commonly describe as taste (Rozin 
1982). Should we say therefore that the retronasal sense is a component of taste 
(despite it having more in common with smell-mechanisms), or should we 
distinguish three chemical senses, two in the mouth and one in the nose, or should 
we perhaps just collapse all three into a single chemical sense? It doesn’t seem like 
there is going to be a clear empirical answer here; rather it is a more conceptual 
question about how we think mechanisms or kinds ought to be individuated. I will 
return to this question in the next chapter, where I consider the status of folk 
psychological kinds as natural kinds.   
 Finally, consider the many potential candidates for additional senses beyond 
the traditional five. Proprioception or kinesthesia is our sense of where our own body 
parts are, and is commonly considered an additional sense, distinct from touch. Then 
there is our sense of balance, governed primarily by the vestibular system in the 
inner ear, but also influenced by what we can see (if, indeed, we can see). Beyond 
these there are additional senses that humans may acquire either through practice 
(echolocation, see Thaler & Goodale 2016) or via the means of sensory substitution 
devices (magnetic, e.g. Nagel et al 2005; infrared, e.g. Thomson et al 2013). Sensory 
substitution devices can also be used to create ‘mongrel’ senses, for instance by 
connecting light receptive sensors to a headset, allowing one to ‘hear’ colours 
(Montandon 2004: 32-4). How should we taxonomise additional senses of this kind? 
 As should be clear, there is no real scientific consensus on how the senses 
should be taxonomised, and not much hope of one being reached anytime soon. The 
folk psychological taxonomisation, which seems to carve things up differently to 
contemporary cognitive science, could be seen as no worse than the scientific 
taxonomy in this regard. If there is no agreed upon scientific taxonomy, then perhaps 
the folk taxonomy could provide some stability or guidance. In the next section I will 
consider two strategies to deal with this state of affairs, and suggest that the two 
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strategies can be fruitfully combined. Using this combined strategy, I will argue that 
our competing scientific taxonomies can be reconciled once we distinguish between 
explanations and systems. 
4.2.3	–	Explanatory	pluralism	and	systemic	disambiguation	
An increasingly popular response to the apparent mess that is the taxonomy of the 
senses is to adopt some form of pluralism, wherein there are multiple, non-competing 
ways of carving up the sensory modalities. Fulkerson (2014) argues that our division 
of the senses depends on the explanatory project that we are engaged in. For 
example, the human thermoceptive system consists of receptors in the skin that 
detect changes in temperature. It contributes to our sense of touch, our 
proprioceptive/kinaesthetic sense, and also our nocioceptive system. Should it be 
classed as a separate sense, a sub-system that contributes to these senses, or 
something else entirely? According to Fulkerson, the answer depends on the 
explanatory project that we are engaged in. If we are interested in how humans detect 
distal objects, then we can treat the system as part of our sense of touch, whilst if we 
are more interested in purely physiological processes, then it is better treated as part 
of the nocioceptive or thermoregulatory systems.  
 Insofar as it accurately describes explanatory practice I agree with this 
account, but I think it misses something important. By breaking down the various 
ways in which the thermoceptive systems interacts with other sensory systems, 
Fulkerson has actually successfully disambiguated a distinct sensory subsystem. In 
effect we can be explanatory pluralists whilst acknowledging the objective existence 
of distinct subsystems, such as that which Fulkerson describes. The important point 
here is that we should keep the functional categorisation of physiological systems 
distinct from the role that they play in both folk psychological and scientific 
explanations.  If our taxonomisation of the senses is aimed primarily at explanatory 
adequacy, then we should be pluralist about what kind of senses there are. However, 
if we wish to be more (physiologically) precise, we can disambiguate discrete 
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subsystems (such as the thermoceptive system) and describe in detail how they 
interact with one another.  
 In practice the kinds of explanations given by folk psychology and scientific 
psychology typically have different aims in mind. For example, whilst for everyday 
purposes it makes sense to distinguish between taste (proximal) and smell (distal), 
for scientific purposes we might be more interested in distinguishing between smells 
that enter through the nose (orthonasal) and smells that enter through the mouth 
(retronasal). Rather than making a definitive statement about what smell ‘actually is’, 
we might want to adopt a pluralist attitude where what we mean by smell depends on 
the explanatory project that we are currently engaged in. Nonetheless, in both cases 
we should be able to agree on the underlying physiological mechanisms that are 
involved in picking up and processing chemical traces from the air. So it is possible 
to individuate sensory mechanisms without saying anything conclusive about the 
status of the pre-existing folk psychological concepts. I will return to this question of 
mechanistic individuation towards the end of chapter 6.   
 There is a parallel here with the individuation of concrete computational 
states and processes, which I have elsewhere argued can be achieved by referring 
only to the physical structures involved (see Dewhurst 2016). This leaves the 
semantic content of the computational states somewhat indeterminate, but only 
because such content is a feature of our explanatory practices, not of the system 
itself. Similarly, the individuation of ‘folk’ senses such as taste and smell might be 
best thought of as a feature of folk psychological discourse, not of our sensory 
apparatus itself. This is not to say that the physiological facts of the matter have no 
role to play in the folk individuation of sense – on the contrary, they tightly delimit 
the range of possible explanatory interpretations, but there is nonetheless some 
interpretative work that must take place before a folk psychological explanation can 
be given.     
 The empirical and philosophical issues surrounding the taxonomisation of the 
senses are far more complicated than I have made them out to be here, but hopefully 
I have been able to give a taste of the issues that arise when we conflate folk 
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intuitions with scientifically respectable evidence. The strategy that I have outlined 
here, coupling explanatory pluralism with systemic disambiguation, is one that I will 
return in later sections, and which will be a central theme of chapter 6  
4.3	–	Extended	functionalism	and	conceptual	disambiguation	
Clark & Chalmers initial (1998) presentation of the extended mind hypothesis 
focused on the case of Otto, a man with Alzheimer’s whose extreme reliance on his 
notebook is taken to be sufficient for cognitive extension. More specifically, they 
present it as an example of an extended belief, as Otto comes to believe that MOMA 
is on 53rd Street by referring frequently to an entry in his diary. Since the very 
beginning then, arguments for the extended mind have typically focused on the 
extension of folk psychologically construed mental states. In this section I will 
explore the implications of this focus and argue that the main lesson to be learnt from 
the extended mind hypothesis is that our folk concepts of the mind are simply too 
imprecise to be useful for technical work in philosophy and cognitive science. Once 
we move away from folk psychological concepts, many of the disagreements 
surrounding cognitive extension simply dissolve.  
4.3.1	–	Summary	of	HEC	
The hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) rests on an idea most neatly expressed 
by the so-called parity principle:  
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in 
recognising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is 
(so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 29) 
 
This principle is intended to allow for a neutral assessment of what constitutes a 
cognitive process – we simply have to imagine that a given external process is taking 
place inside the head, and decide whether we would consider it genuinely cognitive. 
If so, then to deny it cognitive status when it is located outside of the head would 
betray an unwarranted “skin-based prejudice” (Clark 2005: 7). 
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 Clark & Chalmers illustrate the strength of this principle with the case of 
Otto, a man with Alzheimer’s who is heavily reliant on a notebook that he carries 
with him wherever he goes. He uses this notebook to recall the way to the Museum 
of Modern Art (MOMA, on 53rd Street) in much the same way as his friend Inga uses 
her own neural memory. According to the parity principle this means that Otto’s 
notebook constitutes a case of extended cognition, as he forms a belief about the 
location of MOMA in a way that would count as cognitive if it had gone on inside 
his head. (This summary ignores some important complications and caveats that I 
will return to in the next section.) 
 In later presentations HEC became more explicitly linked with functionalism 
(Wheeler 2010), and the parity principle was reframed as the complementarity 
principle, which emphasises the divergent forms that cognitive extension can take 
(Sutton 2010: 193). Wheeler presents an explicit defence of “extended 
functionalism”, arguing that just as traditional functionalism provides a principled 
basis for non-neural cognition, it can also be applied in order to provide a principled 
basis for non-brain bound cognition (2010: 247-9). Functionalism’s commitment to 
the multiple realisability of mental states leads quite naturally to the thought that 
cognitive processes might be realised in distal instantiations. Coupled with a 
relatively coarse-grained functional analysis of mental states, we find the hypothesis 
of extended cognition falls quite naturally out of traditional functionalism. After 
considering some classic criticisms of HEC, I will turn to a more specific attack on 
extended functionalism, i.e. the variety of cognitive extension that relies on a 
functionalist theory of mind.21  
4.3.2	–	Classic	criticisms	
In this section I will rehearse two of the most famous criticisms of HEC: Adams & 
Aizawa’s “coupling-constitution fallacy” and Rupert’s “hypothesis of embedded 
                                                
21 A functionalist theory of mind is simply one that defines mental states according to their functions, 
rather than according to their physical structure or according to some other criteria (cf. Levin 2016). 
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cognition”. I introduce these criticisms here as they highlight how the extended 
cognition debate has focused on assessing whether or not mental states, understood 
in the folk psychological sense, can be attributed to objects beyond the boundary of 
brain and body. Later on I will suggest that both criticisms can be dissolved if we 
move away from coarse-grained folk psychological characterisations of cognition – 
although in the process cognitive extension, in the classical sense, may also be 
dissolved. 
 The coupling-constitution fallacy, according to Adams & Aizawa, is the 
mistaken inference from the claim that something is tightly coupled with a cognitive 
system to the claim that it is constitutive of that system (2010: 68; cf. Adams & 
Aizawa 2001). They argue that when Clark & Chalmers claim that Otto’s notebook 
is partially constitutive of his cognitive system, all we should really conclude is that 
it is tightly coupled with that system. Adams & Aizawa go on to propose several 
criteria that might qualify to demarcate cognitive from non-cognitive systems, 
including intrinsic intentionality (ibid: 69-73) and distinct patterns of causal 
processing (ibid: 73-9).  
 The most common response given to these arguments by defenders of HEC is 
that Adams & Aizawa are simply begging the question. By proposing a “mark of the 
cognitive” that excludes HEC, they are guaranteeing that the argument will be over 
before it has even begun. Instead what is needed is some principled definition of 
mind or cognition that everyone can agree on. Later on in this section I will suggest 
that our folk intuitions about the mind are simply too vague for this purpose, as they 
can easily be construed so as to favour either side of the debate (see Clark & Prinz, 
ms., for discussion). For example, Adams & Aizawa could claim that the folk 
concept of the mind is inherently representational, citing intuitions about the ‘minds 
eye’, etc., whilst detractors might deny this claim, appealing to more embodied 
intuitions about the mental. 
 Rupert takes a different approach when he formulates his alternative 
hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC), which can account for everything that 
HEC does without positing literal cognitive extension (see Rupert 2004: 395-7). The 
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hypothesis is essentially identical to HEC, except that whenever HEC refers to some 
feature of the environment being constitutive of cognition, HEMC instead refers to 
that feature as making a causal contribution to internal cognitive processing, in the 
same way that a temporary buttress might make a causal contribution to the 
structural integrity of a wall without being constitutive of that wall. Thus HEMC 
seems able to acknowledge the important contribution that the environment makes to 
cognitive processing without thereby allowing that the environment itself is part of 
the cognitive system. Rupert argues that as HEMC is a more conservative 
hypothesis, we should favour it – all else being equal. Rupert considers two 
responses, but here I will discuss only the second, which focuses on the role of 
natural kinds in cognitive scientific explanation. 
 Clark & Chalmers claim that attributing extended beliefs to Otto helps to pick 
out something “more akin to a natural kind”, which makes the notion of belief more 
useful in cognitive scientific explanation (1998: 14). They support this claim by 
appealing to the functional similarities between how Otto and Inga use their 
respectively external and internal ‘memories’, arguing that “an opponent has to show 
that Otto's and Inga's cases differ in some important and relevant respect” (ibid.), 
before going on to deny that there are any such respects.  
 Rupert identifies this kind of strategy as attempting to demonstrate that HEC 
“provides the most empirically powerful framework for research in cognitive 
science” (2004: 407). He argues that for a specific example (memory) this does not 
seem to be true. Internal and extended memories appear to constitute separate kinds, 
he argues, as they encode information in different ways and have distinct functional 
profiles in terms of error rate, recall speed, and so on. Positing a single weakly 
defined kind, “generic memory”, does not seem to serve any explanatory purpose 
(ibid). At this point the argument seems to stall somewhat, due perhaps to some 
confusion around what exactly cognitive scientific kinds are supposed to look like. In 
the next chapter I will consider the relationship folk psychological and cognitive 
scientific kinds in more detail, but for the time being I will move on to the main 
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argument that I wish to focus on in this chapter, Sprevak’s reductio ad absurdum of 
what he calls ‘extended functionalism’.   
4.3.3	–	Sprevak’s	extended	functionalism		
We have seen how some of the initial responses to HEC were meant to work. 
Sprevak (2009) argues that not only are these responses unsuccessful, but also that 
the common functionalist framework that both proponents and detractors of HEC 
tend to be committed to in fact entails a radical and unconstrained form of cognitive 
extension. He takes this to be a reason to reject the classical functionalist account of 
cognition, but in the remainder of this section I will argue that this apparent 
entailment actually highlights several weaknesses of the folk psychological 
conceptual taxonomy. First I will rehearse Sprevak’s argument that functionalism 
entails radical extension. 
 A primary motivation for functionalism is multiple realisability – the intuition 
that provided they fulfil the correct functional role, a mental state should be 
realisable in any physical instantiation (Bickle 2016). This is sometimes expressed as 
the ‘Martian intuition’, i.e. the intuition that a silicon-based Martian should be 
capable of realising the same mental states as carbon-based Earthlings. In order to 
preserve the Martian intuition our functional definitions of mental states must be 
coarse-grained enough to allow for some incidental variety in how cognitive systems 
function (Sprevak 2009: 11-2). For instance, it could turn out that Martians process 
information in a way that leads them to draw different inferences to us, but we might 
nonetheless want to attribute beliefs to them. 
 Sprevak’s main claim is that any form of functionalism that is coarse-grained 
enough to preserve multiple realisability will lead to unconstrained cognitive 
extension. For any potential case of cognitive extension we can imagine a Martian 
whose internal cognitive system functions in the same way as the proposed extended 
system. The parity principle forces us to say either that the system in question is not 
genuinely cognitive, or that this is a case of extended cognition (Sprevak 2009: 12-
3). 
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 For example, in the classic case of Otto and his notebook (see Clark & 
Chalmers 1998: 33-7), we could imagine a Martian whose internal (semantic) 
memory consists of fleshy pages and an ink-jet with which it notes down 
information. It must actively engage an inward-facing eyeball (along with a tentacle 
to turn the pages) whenever it wishes to retrieve information from this memory store. 
Both Otto and this Martian are (by stipulation) functionally identical with Inga, who 
possesses neurotypical human memory. Either we must deny that this Martian has 
beliefs matching the contents of his internal flesh-book, or admit that Otto has 
extended beliefs matching the contents of his notebook. Thus, coarse-grained 
functionalism entails cognitive extension. (Elaborated from Sprevak 2009: 12-13.) 
 HEC is typically limited to relatively moderate and local cases of extension 
(such as Otto's diary), but according to Sprevak's argument functionalism entails far 
more radical cases. Each constraint that has been proposed for HEC is vulnerable to 
a tailor-made Martian case (Sprevak 2009: 16-20). For example, if we were to 
exclude Otto’s diary on the basis that it is extremely vulnerable to tampering by 
people other than Otto, then Sprevak could simply propose the existence of a Martian 
whose (biological, internal) memory contains a user-interface that can be accessed 
and edited by anyone who wishes. Either we deny that this Martian is truly cognitive, 
which would breach coarse-grained multiple realisability, or we accept unconstrained 
extension in the parallel human case. So it seems that functionalism, at least of the 
coarse-grained variety, unavoidably invites unrestrained cognitive extension.  
4.3.4	–	Fine-grained	functionalism	and	folk	psychological	ambiguity	
Whilst Sprevak considers the possibility of adopting a finer-grained functionalism in 
order to avoid radical extension, he argues that any version of functionalism that 
preserves the Martian intuition will inevitably result in extension (2009: 8). In one 
sense this might be correct, but I think there is a way of adjusting the grain that at the 
very least makes for a more palatable conclusion, even if it does not avoid extension 
entirely. 
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 In fact, the problem is not so much the grain of our version of functionalism, 
but rather the way in which functional roles are assigned to candidate mental states. 
Sprevak addresses this as well, claiming that empirically motivated 
“psychofunctionalism”, which individuates mental states according to our best 
understanding of cognitive science, will prove just as vulnerable to radical extension 
as traditional folk psychological functionalism (2009: 9). I will now try and 
demonstrate that this is not the case, and that a carefully formulated 
psychofunctionalism can avoid many of the issues that Sprevak raises. The end result 
that I am aiming for is that, in most cases, we should be able to leave the everyday 
folk usage much as it is, and introduce a novel term or concept to more accurately 
describe the apparently strange cases. Below I present an illustrative example before 
moving on to the extended cases presented by Sprevak. 
  A common example of a functionally defined mental state is ‘pain’, which 
Sprevak describes as a state that produces anxiety along with typical behavioural 
responses (2009: 10). This kind of description would normally be thought to 
accurately capture folk psychological intuitions about pain, but consider the 
following case: a subject claims to enjoy being pricked by a needle, whilst in all 
other respects exhibiting the usual physical responses associated with pain (flinching, 
etc). What kind of mental state should we say that they are in? If pain requires 
anxiety, then it would seem that they are not in pain, yet they profess quite sincerely 
to “enjoy pain”. It seems that our basic functional definition of pain, as guided by our 
folk psychological intuitions, is unable to capture this case.  
 A simple solution is to disambiguate between pain-as-a-physiological-
response (sometimes called nocioception) and pain-as-suffering (what we might 
classically think of as pain). Once we adopt this distinction, it turns out that our 
subject does not enjoy pain as such (i.e. pain-as-suffering), but rather enjoys the 
sensations associated with nocioception (i.e. pain-as-a-physiological-repsonse). 
Similarly, we could imagine a Martian whose physiological responses to harmful 
stimuli are entirely distinct from out own, yet nonetheless professes to suffer from 
anxiety when pricked with a needle (cf. Lewis 1980). A functional analysis of our 
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folk psychological concept ‘pain’ is simply not precise enough to allow for an 
adequate description of these kinds of cases, but by adopting a distinction between 
pain and nocioception, we can better make sense of what is going on. The Martian 
clearly suffers, and so is in pain, even if it does not undergo anything resembling 
human nocioception.   
 Morton (2007) makes a similar point with regard to folk psychology more 
generally, and advocates focusing on particular capacities and functions in order to 
get a clearer picture of what is going on in each case. It is this kind of strategy that I 
think we should pursue in response to Sprevak’s argument by asking, in each case, 
precisely what it is that is extended. In a sense this amounts to tightening the grain 
setting on our brand of functionalism, but if treated with enough subtlety I think this 
can be done without undermining multiple realisability. Rather than excluding 
mentality from physiologically distinct Martians, we will end up clarifying the many 
different ways in which superficially similar cognitive tasks can be executed. 
Importantly, it will turn out that the Martians in each case presented by Sprevak have 
the same capacities as we do, but that these capacities are distinct from the more 
familiar folk psychological capacities that Sprevak equates them with. The inevitable 
victim of this process will be our folk psychological intuitions, which break down 
under the philosophical pressure of the HEC debate. 
 In order to illustrate how I foresee this strategy playing out, I will run through 
the three examples of radical extension that Sprevak proposes. Each case hinges on 
how we interpret an ambiguous folk psychological concept, and by distinguishing 
between different kinds of extended cognitive process we can constrain the most 
counterintuitive cases of extension. Note that I am not advocating a change to the 
folk usage of these terms, but rather the introduction of novel technical distinctions. 
Such distinctions need only concern practicing cognitive scientists, and philosophers 
with an interest in cognitive science.  
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Case 1 – Flesh Pages 
We can imagine a Martian born with internal flesh-pages that bear ink-marks 
encoding innate beliefs. These are functionally identical to the ink-marks in the 
encyclopaedia that I was given when I was born. As such, we are forced to say that I 
have innate knowledge of everything written in any book that I have access to, 
regardless of whether or not I have ever examined them (Sprevak 2009: 20-1).  
 Here I would suggest that we disambiguate between innate and acquired 
beliefs (or knowledge, depending on how you want to interpret the situation).22 
Innate beliefs, such as those inscribed upon internal or external ink-marks that 
someone is either born with or given at birth (I take it that these are functionally 
identical in all relevant respects), can quite readily be extended, as they require no 
explicit commitment. Acquired beliefs, however, require deliberate epistemic action, 
such as choosing to write something down or otherwise learning something new 
about the world. If an acquired belief is to count as a case of extended cognition it 
must be deliberately created, excluding the Martian’s flesh-pages (and my own 
external book-pages), but including Otto’s notebook. There is still extension in this 
case, but it is much less radical than Sprevak makes it out to be. 
 This distinction is superficially similar to the more conventional distinction 
between occurent and dispositional beliefs (see Schwitzgebel 2015: sec. 2.1). You 
might think that innate beliefs are simply dispositional, whilst acquired beliefs are 
occurent, but this is not quite right. Beliefs of both kinds could be either innate or 
acquired.  
 Consider Otto’s notebook – when he writes down that MOMA is on 53rd 
street he makes a deliberate epistemic action, and acquires, momentarily, an occurent 
belief about the location of MOMA. Due to his Alzheimers, he then forgets this 
almost instantly, but according to HEC he retains an (extended) dispositional belief 
                                                
22 Note that this distinction is intended as a novel philosophical characterisation of these cases, not as 
an elucidation of the folk concept of belief. Nothing in the folk concept makes this distinction, and 
indeed many folk might be hesitant to admit that the Martian, or even Otto, truly believes anything 
written either on their flesh-pages or in their notebook. Nonetheless, by making this distinction we can 
describe in more detail the exact consequences of Sprevak’s argument. 
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about the location of MOMA, which will once again become occurent whenever he 
looks in his notebook.   
 Now consider a Martian who is born with a set of internal flesh-pages 
containing information about the location of MOMA. According to Sprevak’s 
argument this Martian possesses a dispositional belief about the location of MOMA, 
which will become occurent whenever the Martian chooses to look at those pages. 
However, what I went to say is that this belief, even after the Martian looks at it, 
remains importantly distinct from both Otto and Inga’s beliefs. Whilst their methods 
of storage are distinct, both Otto and Inga have deliberately come to acquire this 
belief, whilst the Martian was just born with it, and until he looks at it will not 
necessarily have ever explicitly endorsed it. So we can make a distinction between 
innate and acquired beliefs, and thus limit the quality of the cognitive spread that is 
implied by functionalism, even if we cannot limit the quantity.  
 
Case 2 – The Mayan Calendar 
We can imagine a Martian born with a Mayan calendar faculty, functionally identical 
to a program that I can run on my computer. Neither the Martian nor I have ever 
accessed this faculty/program, but nonetheless we both possess the ability to 
calculate the precise date of the Mayan calendar, should we ever wish to (Sprevak 
2009: 21-2). If the Martian’s faculty is considered to be cognitive, then it seems that 
my own access to this computer program must also be considered cognitive (and 
thus, constitutes a case of extended cognition). 
 Here I would suggest that we make a similar move to the previous case, and 
distinguish between an innate and acquired faculty. The Mayan calendar faculty is 
more akin to a low-level innate faculty like my own circadian rhythm (or a 
generative grammar), as I was simply born with it and have never explicitly engaged 
with it in any way. Perhaps it is this kind of faculty, rather than more explicit 
acquired faculties such as riding a bike or doing algebra, that can be readily extended 
into artifacts such as computers. Again, this is still somewhat counterintuitive, but 
less radical than it first appeared.  
 
 
142
 
Case 3 – The Supercomputer 
Finally, we can imagine a Martian equipped with an internal supercomputer, 
allowing him to calculate faster than the most amazing mathematical savant. I could 
also be equipped with an identical (albeit external) supercomputer, in which case my 
own (extended) arithmetic would be superior to that of a mathematical savant 
(Sprevak 2009: 22). 
 There are two things to say about this case. Firstly, these calculations might 
be performed in a relatively distinct fashion to the way in which a mathematical 
savant calculates, allowing us to disambiguate between ‘digital’ and ‘savant’ 
arithmetic (cf. Adams & Aizawa 2010: 75-6). Alternatively, if it turns out that the 
calculations were performed identically, and that I had sufficiently reliable access to 
the supercomputer (i.e. sufficient to allow me to outperform the savant in every 
possible circumstance), we might just have to admit that this is a genuine case of 
extended cognition. I take it that Sprevak’s argument relies on demonstrating the 
existence of a practically limitless number of ‘absurd’ extension cases, such that 
allowing the occasional case through should not by itself rule against functionalism.  
4.3.5	–	Disambiguating	the	folk	taxonomy	
Our folk psychological intuitions about specific kinds of mental states are not the 
only potential victims of the strategy that I advocated in the previous section. It turns 
out that the concept of ‘mind’ itself begins to look increasingly precarious when we 
take this route, and even the sharp distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive 
states and processes can be called into question.  
 Just as folk psychological concepts suffer from a degree of ambiguity, 
cognition itself is not clearly defined. Despite general agreement with regard to 
neurotypical human subjects, the precise criteria that a state or process must meet in 
order to qualify as cognitive vary considerably from theorist to theorist (Hurley 
2010: 106). For instance, it is only relatively recently that unconscious processes 
have been admitted into the domain of the cognitive (Clark & Prinz, ms.), and there 
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is considerable contemporary disagreement about whether or not “intrinsic 
intentionality” is required for cognition (see e.g. Adams & Aizawa 2005, Clark 
2010). 
 In each of the above cases it seems plausible to say that something is 
extended, in the sense that we are able to replicate externally a process that the 
Martian carries out internally, but it is not at all clear that whatever is extended must 
necessarily be cognitive (cf. Coleman 2011). Couldn’t we just as easily have a 
‘hypothesis of internalised non-cognition’, where in each case it turns out that 
whatever capacity the Martian possesses is not genuinely cognitive? There just 
doesn’t seem to be any pre-theoretical fact of the matter about how we should define 
cognition, and in the absence of such a definition it seems better perhaps to follow 
Sprevak in admitting that “[m]ental systems do not form a natural kind” (2009: 29). 
 There remains a distinction to be made, between extended and non-extended 
systems, but whether or not we describe these as cognitive systems seems to be fairly 
irrelevant in practice. Consider Otto and his notebook – as Sprevak demonstrates, 
functionalism seems committed to saying that Otto is part of an external system that 
is identical to the Martian’s internal system. Does Otto have an extended mind? One 
response is to point out fine-grained functional distinctions between Otto and Inga 
that appear to rule out this possibility (see Adams & Aizawa 2001: 55-6), but it is 
quite open to the defender of HEC to reject these as irrelevant to cognition, and there 
seems to be no clear reason to favour one side or the other. Our intuitive concept of 
‘mind’ might just be another ill-defined folk psychological concept that by itself is 
unable to adjudicate these debates.  
 Ross & Ladyman (2010) argue that we should take issues of this kind as 
evidence that cognitive science is not yet “mature”, and that there will be no fact of 
the matter about HEC until it is. One feature of a mature science, according to Quine 
(1969), is that it is able to provide accurate definitions of the putative natural kinds 
that form its domain. In the case of cognitive science, these have classically been 
assumed to be folk psychological kinds, but what I hope to have suggested here is 
that folk psychological kinds are simply not up to the job that will be demanded of 
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them by a mature cognitive science. In the next chapter I will approach this question 
of natural kinds and folk kinds more rigorously. 
 In each case presented above the apparent puzzle was resolved by making 
more precise conceptual distinctions that are not captured by the folk psychological 
taxonomy. The distinction made in cases 1 and 2, above, is in fact not entirely 
dissimilar to that which is commonly made between “know-that” (i.e. propositional 
knowledge) and “know-how” (i.e. procedural knowledge). This is especially 
apparent in the Mayan calendar case, where I suggested that the capacity that the 
Martian is born with is something more akin to my innate capacity to keep track of 
time than it is to my learnt capacity to calculate the date in the North Korean ‘Juche’ 
calendar. It is in the former sense that Sprevak does possess the capacity to calculate 
the Mayan calendar date, albeit via his interactions with a techno-cultural artefact. It 
may simply turn out that ‘knowledge’ does not unambiguously refer to a discrete set 
of states and processes, whether extended or not. Of course, it is also always open to 
us to use folk psychological concepts in a more circumscribed way, rather than 
rejecting them outright – in a sense this is exactly what I am suggesting we should do 
by adopting the disambiguation strategy. In practice there is not much difference 
between distinguishing two different kinds of belief on the one hand, and choosing to 
use ‘belief’ to refer to only one kind, and some other term to refer to the other. All 
that I ask is that we use these terms more precisely, and take care to specify exactly 
what technical sense we are using them in at any given moment. 
4.4	–	Alien	representations	and	opaque	contents23	
In this final section I will present and consider recent developments in hierarchical 
predictive coding, also known as the ‘Bayesian brain hypothesis’. This approach, I 
will argue, is committed to the existence of ‘alien’ mental states that do not 
correspond in any direct way with folk psychological attributions. Once again we are 
faced with an apparent disconnect between scientific and common sense 
                                                
23 Much of the material in this section is forthcoming as “Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain”, 
in Metzinger & Wiese (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing.  
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understandings of cognition. I will close with a short discussion of how best to 
reconcile the two, which will serve as an introduction to what is to come in chapters 
5 and 6.  
4.4.1	–	Predictive	processing	
My discussion will focus on Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy’s presentations of the 
Bayesian brain hypothesis, which are not entirely identical, but I will note when they 
differ. I will use the term predictive processing to refer to their versions of this 
hypothesis. Other versions of the Bayesian brain hypothesis exist (see Spratling 2016 
for an overview), and these differ from Clark and Hohwy’s in many important ways, 
but I will not be discussing them here. Below I present a very brief introduction to 
predictive processing (see Hohwy 2013 or Clark 2016 for a more detailed overview).  
 Both Hohwy and Clark endorse versions of the Bayesian approach to 
cognition. Speaking very generally, they claim that the brain’s primary function is to 
generate and test hypotheses about the external world, and that this process is 
constitutive of cognition. More specifically they focus on a version of the hypothesis 
known as predictive processing (or predictive coding24), which describes a particular 
way that Bayesian hypothesis testing could be implemented in the brain. I will now 
present a rough sketch of the cognitive architecture posited by predictive processing, 
focusing on the details that are most pertinent to my discussion of folk psychology. 
For a full overview see Hohwy (2013) or Clark (2016). 
 Predictive processing inverts conventional assumptions about the flow of 
information in the brain. Rather than starting with raw perceptual inputs that are 
gradually processed into refined models of the world, it begins with a rich, internally 
generated model that predicts incoming sensory data. These predictions are then 
compared with the actual data, and the model is updated accordingly. Overall the 
                                                
24  The terms ‘predictive processing’ and ‘predictive coding’ are often used more-or-less 
interchangeably in the philosophical literature, but strictly speaking the latter refers to a specific data 
compression technique whilst a former refers to the cognitive or computational architecture composed 
of iterated instances of that technique.  Hierarchical predictive coding is thus (roughly) equivalent to 
predictive processing, 
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system aims to minimise prediction error, which can be accomplished in two distinct 
ways. The model can be revised so as to more accurately predict incoming stimuli 
(passive inference), or the system can act on its environment in order to make its own 
predictions more accurate (active inference). Which kind of inference is performed 
(active or passive) will depend on higher-level predictions of the best way to reduce 
error in the current situation. Thus Clark summarises predictive processing as 
positing “core perception-attention-action loops in which internal models of the 
world and their associated precision expectations play key action driving roles” 
(Clark 2016: 71). By uniting action and perception in this way, predictive processing 
aims to provide a general account of cognition. 
 There are a few further features of predictive processing that are especially 
relevant to my discussion of folk psychology. Predictions can be regarded as more or 
less precise by the system, with the level of precision being taken into account when 
updating the predictions. For example, a less precise prediction will be expected to 
generate some error, and so may not need to be modified too much when an error 
signal is received. Changes in precision weighting can also drive the system to attend 
more or less to different sources of stimuli (Clark 2016: chapter 2). Finally, the 
predictive processing systems described by Hohwy and Clark are hierarchical; they 
consist of a nested hierarchy of precision/error units, with each level of the hierarchy 
predicting the current state of the unit below, which is then compared to the actual 
state of that unit and updated (in the next iteration) in response to any error signals 
that it receives. This hierarchy bottoms out in units that predict inputs received via 
sensory transduction, and tops out with a very abstract model, perhaps just predicting 
general causal laws or regularities. I will describe some further features of predictive 
processing in more detail as I go on to compare it with folk psychology. 
4.4.2	–	Predictive	processing	and	propositional	attitude	psychology	
Both Clark and Hohwy have suggested in informal discussion that predictive 
processing might be incompatible with the folk psychological conception of 
cognition. Clark has described the content of the predictions as “alien” and 
 
 
147 
“opaque” 25 , and Hohwy has acknowledged the challenge posed by predictive 
processing to “folk psychological notions of perception, belief, desire, decision (and 
much more)”.26 Clark has also written that predictive processing “may one day 
deliver a better understanding even of our own agent-level experience than that 
afforded by the basic framework of ‘folk psychology’” (Clark 2013: 17, repeated in 
Clark 2016: 82). I take it that what both of them have in mind when they refer to folk 
psychology is propositional attitude psychology. This is the interpretation of folk 
psychology that has traditionally been of most interest to philosophers, and as such it 
is a good place to begin my assessment of predictive processing and folk psychology. 
In this subsection section I will focus on belief and desire, although the issues raised 
here will generalize to other propositional attitudes. 
Belief 
According to the conventional account of propositional attitudes, a belief is a state 
consisting of a proposition coupled with a positive epistemic attitude, i.e. one that 
regards it as true, and a belief state will interact with other mental states so as to 
generate actions in accordance with the state of affairs captured by the proposition 
being true. It is sometimes said that beliefs have a ‘mind-to-world’ direction of fit – 
that is to say, a belief should be modified in response to how the world is, and not 
vice versa.  
 On the face of it this kind of mental state seems to fit nicely into the 
predictive processing story. It is natural to interpret predictions as beliefs about the 
world, albeit ones that are first generated and then tested, rather than being generated 
in response to sensory input. Indeed, some researchers have described predictions as 
beliefs, including Karl Friston (see e.g. Hobson & Friston 2014), Hohwy (2012), and 
                                                
25  Comment made during BPPA Masterclass on Action-Oriented Predictive Coding, University of 
Edinburgh, 26th-27th October 2013. 
26 From the comments section of a Brains Blog featured scholar post: 
http://philosophyofbrains.com/2014/06/22/is-prediction-error-minimization-all-there-is-to-the-
mind.asp.  
See also (Hohwy 2013: 2) for a description of how he thinks predictive processing might lead us to 
“radically reconceptualize who we are”. 
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occasionally Clark himself (2016: 129). Given that the term ‘belief’ is used in a 
technical sense in Bayesian theory, this might be excusable; however, simply 
equating predictions with beliefs in the everyday sense would be to ignore a crucial 
difference between folk psychological beliefs and the predictions invoked by the 
predictive processing story. The former are usually understood as determinate (you 
either believe something or you do not), 27  whereas the latter are inherently 
probabilistic. Rather than simply believing that it is raining, a predictive processing 
system will assign a level of probability to it raining, and act in accordance with this 
probability. As Clark puts it, 
 
Instead of simply representing ‘CAT ON MAT’, the probabilistic 
Bayesian brain will encode a conditional probability density function, 
reflecting the relative probability of this state of affairs (and any 
somewhat-supported alternatives) given the available information. (Clark 
2016: 41) 
  
As a consequence of this, adopting the predictive processing framework will require 
either an acceptance that the folk psychological concept of belief was never meant to 
pick out a certain kind of brain state, or an acceptance that (neural) beliefs are in fact 
probabilistic rather than determinate. I explore the first option elsewhere in this 
thesis, where I argue that it is a mistake to think that folk psychology has ever been 
in the business of describing the structure of cognition at the same level of detail as a 
cognitive scientific theory like predictive processing does. Something like the second 
option has been explored by Pettigrew (2015), who considers the epistemological 
implications of adopting a probabilistic notion of belief alongside the more 
conventional determinate notion. In the next chapter I will also consider the 
possibility that we should modify our understanding of ‘belief’ rather than 
eliminating it from our scientific ontology.  
                                                
27 Whilst there is some discussion of ‘degrees of belief’ within formal epistemology (see Huber  & 
Schmidt-Petri 2016 for an overview), this is quite distinct from how belief is usually understood 
within mainstream epistemology and philosophy of mind. Pettigrew (2015) discusses some of the 
implications of adopting a probabilistic notion of belief.  
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 The predictions involved in predictive processing may also be individuated at 
a much finer level of detail than folk psychological belief attributions usually allow 
for. Whilst a paradigmatic belief might be about whether or not it is raining, the 
content of the predictions at some levels of the hierarchy are more likely to be cashed 
out in terms of fine-grained details of the external world, predicting features such as 
edges and light gradients rather than the ‘middle sized dry goods’ that populate the 
folk ontology. Even at higher levels of the hierarchy, the content of the predictions 
are still somewhat unusual, as they incorporate multi-modal, emotional, bodily, and 
other contextual associations. Combined with the probabilistic nature that I described 
above, the predictions posited by predictive processing begin to look less like the 
everyday notion of a belief. Clark expresses something like this view himself when 
he writes that “the looping complexities” involved in predictive processing “will 
make it hard (perhaps impossible) adequately to capture the contents or the cognitive 
roles of many key inner states and processes using the terms and vocabularies of 
ordinary daily speech” (Clark 2016: 292).  
 However, Hohwy (2013: 60) describes how the relationship between a 
predictive processing system and a dynamically evolving world could give rise to 
higher-level regularities that might come to resemble something more like folk 
psychological contents. He gives the example of perceiving a partially occluded cat, 
but forming a prediction of a whole cat based on feedback from seeing different parts 
of this cat at different points in time as it moves behind the occluder. The content of 
the whole-cat prediction is relatively coarse-grained, but it would in turn predict 
lower-level perceptions of parts of cats that change over time. The system is thus 
able to account both for the diachronic appearance of rapidly changing parts of cats, 
and the more abstract notion of a whole cat who stands behind the occluder and is 
temporally extended. So, if Hohwy is correct, we might expect to see something 
resembling folk psychological states at the higher levels of a predictive processing 
hierarchy, even if these states are different to how we usually conceive of them (i.e., 
their content is non-linguistic, abstract, and probabilistic, rather than consisting of 
linguistic propositions with determinate content).  
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 Finally, it is important to recognise the dual nature of predictions. Predictions 
function both as representations of the world and of ways that the system can act in 
the world. Via the mechanism of active inference, predictions can be used to 
motivate and generate actions, a feature that is usually associated more with desires 
than beliefs. Clark likens this feature of high-level hypotheses to Millikan’s (1996) 
“pushmi-pullyu” representations, which have “both descriptive and imperative 
content” (Clark 2016: 187). At this point there is a sense in which beliefs, if they 
were to be identified with predictions, would begin to blur into what we might more 
naturally characterise as desires. Hohwy himself suggests that perception and belief 
might both be reconceived as a single notion of expectation (2013: 72), which could 
go some way towards reconciling predicting processing with propositional attitude 
psychology, although it would require that we adopt a revisionary approach towards 
folk psychology. Taken a step further this revisionary approach could also involve 
collapsing desire in with perception and belief, leaving us with a single kind of 
mental state that encompasses all aspects of cognitive processing.    
 Belief, understood as a positive epistemic attitude towards a proposition, does 
not straightforwardly fit in to the ontological framework of predictive processing. 
Whilst proponents of predictive processing have occasionally described predictions 
as beliefs, they have in mind something quite different to the traditional propositional 
attitude interpretation of folk psychology. Folk psychological beliefs are typically 
determinate and take linguistic propositions as their argument, whilst predictions are 
probabilistic and refer to a wide range of distinct contents, most of which are likely 
to be non-propositional. Nonetheless, it is plausible that we might find something 
closer to the folk psychological notion of belief at higher levels of the predictive 
processing hierarchy, where coarse-grained predictions about stable features of the 
environment are to be found.   
Desire 
Much like a belief, a desire consists of a proposition coupled with an attitude; only 
this time the attitude has a world-to-mind direction of fit, and will function 
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accordingly. If I desire that it is raining, I will not pick up my umbrella (as I would if 
I believed it was raining), but I might sigh deeply and complain about the heat, or 
invest in experimental cloud seeding technologies.28   
 As I mentioned above, the predictions posited by Clark and Hohwy’s 
versions of predictive processing are action-oriented. This means that as well as 
providing a model of the world, they also serve to motivate the system to act via the 
mechanism of active inference. In this latter capacity they seem to fulfil a role very 
much like that played by desires in the traditional account of folk psychology. They 
represent how the system would like the world to be, and coupled with beliefs about 
the current state of the world, they generate the appropriate actions to bring about 
this desired state of affairs. Understood in this way we might conclude that it is 
viable to adopt a mild revisionism, where it turns out that beliefs and desires are both 
instantiated by a single kind of state, an ‘action-oriented prediction’. 
 However, as Clark draws attention to, there is another sense in which 
predictive processing seems to do away with desire entirely. Friston, Mattout & 
Kilner write “crucially, active inference does not invoke any ‘desired consequences’” 
(2011: 157), which Clark interprets as “a world in which value functions, costs, 
reward signals, and perhaps even desires have been replaced by complex interacting 
expectations that inform perception and entrain action” (Clark 2016: 129, emphasis 
added). The key issue here is that predictive processing inverts the conventional 
ordering of action causation assumed by folk psychology. Rather than a desire 
generating behaviour that leads to an expected outcome, a prediction of an expected 
outcome is generated first, which then goes on to cause behaviour that brings about 
that outcome. Desire seems to be relegated to a phenomenal sensation associated 
                                                
28 There is another sense of desire that I will not be discussing in any detail in this section. Whilst the 
kind of desire that I have described here is inherently action involving, there is another kind of desire, 
which we might call ‘existential desire’, that might never cause any actions at all. I might desire world 
peace but believe it to be unattainable, and so not be at all motivated to actually try and bring about 
world peace. If predictive processing can account for desires of this second sort, I think it will have to 
be in terms of some much higher level process, taking into account predictions about predictions (i.e. 
hyper-priors). In this section I focus primarily on those low-level, immediate desires that are thought 
to be involved in our day-to-day actions, at least according to the traditional propositional attitude 
account.  
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with this sequence of events, and does not seem to play any causal or functional role 
in generating either the behaviour or the outcome.   
 Clark argues that there need not be any contradiction here. Instead of 
eliminating desire from our ontology, we can reconceive of it as a consequence of 
the interaction between predictions and the environment (Clark 2016: 129). Insofar 
as it allows us to recognise the differences between predictive processing and folk 
psychology without simply eliminating the latter, I would endorse something like 
this position, but first I want to mention a further issue that it raises. Reconceiving 
desire as a consequence rather than a cause of action has the potential for a deeply 
counterintuitive picture of personal level agency. Rather than being a distinct source 
of actions, agency (in the guise of active inference) turns out to be nothing more than 
a tool used by the system to minimise prediction errors.29 We do not do things 
because we want to do them; we feel like we want to do things because doing them 
will minimise prediction error. As Hohwy puts it, “[w]hat drives action is prediction 
error minimisation […] rather than what the agent wants to do“ (2013: 89). Hohwy 
presents this as a positive result, unifying perception and action under one single 
mechanism (Hohwy 2013: 76), but for many this will seem like a sleight of hand, 
akin to Dennett’s attempts to reconcile free will with a deterministic cognitive 
architecture (see his 1984, 2003). Perhaps this is just a symptom of a mistaken folk 
conception of agency, or perhaps it points towards confusion between two distinct 
modes of explanation – either way, the folk concept of desire would turn out not to 
be doing any significant work in our cognitive scientific explanations of action 
generation. 
 The folk psychological concept of desire as an action-motivating attitude is 
encompassed by the predictive processing notion of an action-oriented prediction, 
which via the mechanism of active inference is able to act on the world in order to 
make itself come true. Thus, predictive processing differs from the folk notion of 
desire in two crucial respects: firstly, beliefs and desires are implemented by a single 
                                                
29 Colombo (forthcoming) makes a similar point, in the context of challenging the empirical 
foundations of the Humean theory of motivation. 
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kind of state, an action-oriented prediction; secondly, desire is relegated to a 
secondary status, as it is prediction-error minimization, rather than any personal 
goals of the system, that drive action. Hohwy presents this as a positive result, 
offering the possibility of unifying perception and action under one single 
mechanism. I think instead that what it indicates is that the project of trying to 
naturalise folk psychology by identifying propositional attitudes with the theoretical 
posits of our best cognitive science is a mistaken one, as it misconstrues the aim and 
purpose of folk psychology. In the next section I will consider how a broader 
interpretation of folk psychology as a folk discourse fits with the predictive 
processing framework. 
4.4.3	–	Predictive	processing	and	folk	psychological	discourse	
We can also consider how well the predictive processing story aligns with folk 
psychological discourse in the general sense that I described in chapter 1. Friston & 
Frith (2015) have explored behaviour reading and prediction, understood in the 
context of Bayesian inference. They argue that predicting the behaviour of another 
requires synchrony between the two brains in question (that of the predictor and the 
predicted), allowing predictions to be made based entirely on the current state of 
one’s own brain. This sounds somewhat like the simulation theory in social cognition 
(see e.g. Goldman 2006), which claims that we understand other minds by analogy 
with our own mind, although Friston & Frith do not make this connection. Given that 
predictive processing can be interpreted as generating a simulation of the target 
domain, this similarity is perhaps unsurprising, although there’s also a sense in which 
the heavy emphasis on inference puts predictive processing closer to the theory-
theory (see Ravenscroft 2010: sec. 2.1), which posits a literal theory of how minds 
work as the main mechanism for social cognition. One possibility here is that 
adopting the predictive processing framework would contribute to the development 
of a hybrid theory that includes elements of both theory-theory and simulation 
theory. (See Quadt [forthcoming] for further discussion of predictive processing and 
social cognition.) 
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 Narratives and social norms both seem to fit very comfortably into the 
predictive processing framework. Clark writes that individuals may “actively 
constrain their own behaviours so as to make themselves more easily predictable by 
other agents” (2016: 286), a suggestion that fits very neatly into the mindshaping 
account of social cognition presented by Zawidzki (2013). Clark also suggests that 
personal narratives might “function as high-level elements in the models that 
structure our own self-predictions, and thus inform our own future actions and 
choices” (2016: 286). This is very close to the role envisioned for narratives in 
personal and social cognition by Hutto (2008), and thus entirely consistent with my 
broader characterisation of folk psychological discourse. Hohwy (2013: 163) 
describes how difficult even simple behavioural predictions can be, and suggests that 
a failure to take into account broader contextual features might help explain the 
social cognitive deficit found in people with autism. So understanding folk 
psychological discourse within the predictive processing framework might involve 
telling a story about how high-level predictions of behaviour will involve complex 
models spanning not only individual agents but also the social and cultural 
environments that contribute to their behaviour.    
 The predictive processing account of cognition might even be reliant upon 
folk psychological narratives and social interaction more generally. Clark has written 
elsewhere about the importance of niche construction and cognitive scaffolding for 
human cognition (2008, see section 3.3 of this thesis), and he devotes a chapter of his 
book on predictive processing to discussing these issues (2016: chapter 8). By 
conceiving of folk psychological discourse as a form of cognitive scaffolding we can 
retain an important space for it in our explanations of cognition, even if folk 
psychological explanations themselves are sometimes hard to reconcile with 
predictive processing. For example, by helping to regulate human behaviour via the 
enforcement of social norms, folk psychological discourse might serve as a form of 
active inference, changing the social environment so as to make it easier to predict. It 
also provides shared narratives that can help make sense of the behaviour of others, 
as well as exerting a regulative influence in their own right (see Andrews 2015). So 
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even if propositional attitude psychology turns out to be a bad model of the cognitive 
architecture required for predictive processing, it might continue to be pragmatically 
useful to conceive of people as the kinds of systems that have beliefs and desires. We 
are then left with the further question of whether the failure of folk psychological 
discourse to match up precisely to our current best theories of cognition gives us 
reason to eliminate it, or whether being pragmatically useful is enough to escape this 
fate. It is these questions that I turn to in the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
4.5	–	Failures	of	the	Folk	Ontology?	
In this chapter I have described a number of cases where folk psychological concepts 
and classifications seemingly fail to capture the complexity of our current best 
understanding of cognition. In each case I suggested that what is required is either a 
disambiguation of the folk concepts involved, or in some cases the opposite, when it 
turns out that folk psychology makes distinctions that are not recognised by cognitive 
science. In both cases though, what this amounts to is the adoption of a more 
carefully calibrated grain setting, of whatever sort that is required for detailed 
philosophical and scientific investigation. In section 4.1 this meant to distinguishing 
between the attribution of beliefs and the attribution of some more basic state such as 
a ‘registration’. In section 4.2 this meant distinguishing between sensory sub-systems 
such as orthonasal and retronasal olfaction. In section 4.3 this meant distinguishing 
between innate and acquired capacities, in order to delimit some of the unrestrained 
cognitive extension that Sprevak argues is implied by functionalism. Finally, in 
section 4.4 this meant distinguishing between discrete beliefs and desires, and a 
probabilistic ‘prediction’ that seems to do the work of both. 
 Are these examples of cases where the folk ontology has failed, and should 
therefore be eliminated? In the following chapters I will argue that this is not quite 
the case: the folk ontology should be eliminated from technical scientific usage, at 
least in its current form, but this does not mean that it has to be eliminated from folk 
usage. The reason for this is that it was simply a mistake to interpret folk psychology 
as being in the business of picking out fine-grained cognitive scientific states and 
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processes, as Fodor and the Churchlands did historically. Once we adopt a broader 
understanding of folk psychology as a folk discourse, which I presented in the first 
half of this thesis, we can begin to revise the technical usage of folk psychological 
concepts without having any (direct) impact on the everyday folk usage. Such 
technical revisions might themselves have a knock-on effect on everyday usage, in 
the same way that the popularisation of psychoanalysis had on the folk conception of 
consciousness (Richards 2000), but this is quite distinct from directly arbitrating folk 
usage itself.	
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Chapter	5	–	Folk	Kinds	and	Natural	Kinds		
In the last chapter I presented four case studies that provide some initial evidence for 
thinking that folk psychological concepts and categories might not capture the fine-
grained distinctions necessary for cognitive science, or in some cases the opposite, 
that they might posit distinctions that cognitive science does not recognise. One way 
to think about why this might be problematic is in terms of natural kinds – if folk 
psychology does not pick out natural (cognitive scientific) kinds, then we might have 
good reason to stop using folk psychological concepts and categories in cognitive 
science. On the other hand, it is not obvious that cognitive science is itself able to 
identify genuine natural kinds. If this were the case, then the question of folk 
psychological kinds would become somewhat moot.   
 The aim of this chapter is to assess which account of natural kinds, if any, is 
most suitable for the analysis of concepts in psychology and cognitive science, and 
subsequently to investigate whether folk psychological concepts pick out natural 
kinds. It will be argued that even under a fairly permissive account of natural kinds, 
folk psychological kinds do not typically qualify as cognitive scientific kinds, 
although they may qualify as kinds of a different sort when applied to whole persons 
rather than parts of a person. However, even in the latter case folk psychological 
kinds exhibit looping effects that may mean it is better to describe them as ‘human 
kinds’, rather than natural (or scientific) kinds. The upshot of this is that they are not 
ideally suited to application in (sub-personal) cognitive science. 
 At a first pass, a natural kind is simply any conceptual category that picks out 
‘objective’ features of the world, whatever those may be. In the most extreme case 
natural kinds can be contrasted with totally arbitrary categories, such as ‘all objects 
over 10 metres long’. Other than being over 10 metres long, which is stipulated in 
the definition, these objects lack any unifying features that tie them together. It is this 
lack of unifying features that makes the category unsuitable for scientific usage – 
given one instance of an object over 10 metres long we cannot make any reliable 
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predictions about other objects over 10 metres long (aside from those stemming from 
their being over 10 metres long).  
 Another way of putting this is to say that natural kinds must support inductive 
inference, i.e. we must be able to make somewhat reliable predictions about 
properties shared by members of the kind. An archetypal natural kind, such as gold, 
shares most of its properties across different instances, whilst other putative natural 
kinds such as species (or indeed, mental states) may be somewhat trickier to 
demarcate. 
 In section 1 I will briefly review several popular theories of natural kinds and 
assess how appropriate they are when it comes to kinds in psychology and cognitive 
science. In section 2 I will consider the relationship between folk kinds and scientific 
kinds in various different scientific disciplines, and argue that folk kinds are typically 
(although not always) revised or eliminated as a science matures. Folk psychological 
kinds in particular have proved more resilient to revision or elimination, perhaps due 
in part to the looping effects that I describe at the end of section 2. Nonetheless, in 
many cases they do not meet even the most liberal definition of a natural kind, as I 
will demonstrate in section 3. In section 4 I will wrap up by considering two further 
concerns: the implications of adopting a causal theory of reference, and the 
relationship between type identity theory and natural kinds essentialism. 
5.1	–	Natural	Kinds	and	Scientific	Psychology	
Philosophical discussion of natural kinds has a long history, going right back to 
Aristotle’s attempts to systematise taxonomical classification. In the early modern 
period both Hume and Locke were interested in natural kinds, as were Mill and 
others in the 19th century. More recently the literature on natural kinds has seen a 
revival, with a diverse range of topics spanning metaphysics, epistemology, 
philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. In this chapter I will be focusing 
mostly on issues in philosophy of science, as I am primarily interested in the role of 
natural kind terms for actual scientific practice, as opposed to more fundamental 
metaphysical and semantic issues to do with natural kinds. In this section I will 
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briefly present some of the more popular theories of natural kinds, and consider how 
they might be applied to kinds in psychology and cognitive science.   
5.1.1	–	Essentialist	Theories		
Essentialist theories posit an ‘essence’ of some kind as being the defining feature of 
kind membership. Classically this might have meant a literal essence distinct from 
the physical qualities of the kind, although modern essentialist theories need not be 
non-physicalist. Putnam’s famous claim that water is necessarily H2O is an 
essentialist claim (see his 1975), with the essence in this case being identified as the 
chemical structure of the water molecule. He denies that ‘water’ could refer to any 
other chemical molecule, even one with identical macro-structural properties. Kripke 
(1980) defends a similar position, where the reference of a kind term is fixed by an 
‘initial baptism’, and remains fixed regardless of any new discoveries about the kind. 
This can lead to counterintuitive implications, such as the referent of a kind 
eventually turning out to have none of the properties we initially thought it did, but it 
also allows for stability of reference across scientific theory change. At the end of 
this chapter I will discuss one implication that causal theories of reference might 
have for my analysis of folk psychology. This is that rather than revising our 
scientific usage of folk terms, we should instead interpret contrary scientific evidence 
as a demonstration that the folk kind in question simply had properties that we didn’t 
know it had. Nonetheless I will argue that even if this were the case, there is still 
good reason to avoid conflating folk psychological and cognitive scientific kinds. 
 Essentialist theories seem relatively well suited to identifying kinds in 
physics and chemistry,30 where we might expect to find stable sets of properties 
picked out by microstructural essences. It is less obvious that this will work in the 
special sciences, such as biology, where categories often lack stable or discrete 
definitions.31 Nonetheless, a category such as ‘dog’ does seem to be treated as a 
                                                
30 Although see Hendry (2006) for some doubts about the status of natural kinds in chemistry. 
31 Although see Devitt (2008) for a defence of a form of biological essentialism. 
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natural kind by biologists, in the sense that one can use species membership as a tool 
for predicting the likely characteristics and behaviours of an organism.  
 Similar concerns might apply to psychological kinds, which seem unlikely to 
exhibit the kind of unique microstructural properties that we find (perhaps) in 
physical and chemical kinds, or indeed any other unique, stable property that might 
serve to demarcate kind membership. For this reason it seems unlikely that an 
essentialist theory is going to be suitable for identifying kinds in psychology and 
cognitive science. (Although, as I will discuss at the end of this chapter, type identity 
theories could perhaps be construed as essentialist.) 
 The theories described above are philosophical theories about natural kinds, 
but there is another kind of essentialism that is worth mentioning in the context of 
this thesis: psychological essentialism. This is the (perhaps surprising) fact that 
children seem to be naturally drawn towards an intuitive version of essentialism 
when they begin conceptually categorising features of the world (see Gelman 2005 
for an overview). For example, children tend to make an early distinction between 
living and non-living things, attributing internal causes of behaviour to the former 
but not the latter (even when both are in fact inanimate, as in the case of stuffed 
toys). Research in this area suggests that the intuitive appeal of essentialism might 
continue into adult life, perhaps explaining some features of folk taxonomies (see 
e.g. Ahn et al 2001). Thus there is a tension between the descriptive project of 
identifying those categories that, on a day-to-day basis, we typically think of as 
natural, such as the categories of folk psychology or folk biology, and the 
prescriptive project of determining which, if any, of these categories are actually 
natural. This tension is especially problematic in psychology, where the kinds that 
we are studying might themselves be shaped by everyday acts of classification (see 
5.2.4). 
5.1.2	–	Cluster	Theories		
A more promising candidate for psychological and cognitive scientific kinds are 
cluster theories, which identify kinds with stable clusters of properties. To qualify for 
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kind membership an individual need only possess a sufficient number of these 
properties, allowing for variation in the members of a kind. According to these 
theories membership of kinds such as species depend on possessing some, but not 
all, of the properties associated with that kind. For example, even though the kind 
wolf might be thought to pick out furry, carnivorous mammal with four legs and a 
tail, we would still recognise wolves with three legs, or without a tail, or who 
occasionally ate cheese, as members of the kind.  Contrast this with an essentialist 
kind such as gold, which seems to unambiguously consist in being an object with the 
atomic number 79 – all and only those objects with atomic number 79 are gold.  
 Perhaps the most famous cluster theory is Boyd’s homeostatic property 
cluster (HPC) theory, which posits an additional requirement that we must identify a 
causal mechanism that explains the clustering of the properties associated with a kind 
(see e.g. Boyd 1991, 1999; Kornblith 1993: 35; Magnus 2012). This is required in 
order to avoid cases of coincidental clustering, such as the cluster of surface-level 
properties shared by gold and iron pyrite, and also to allow for the identification of 
kinds where clustering in insufficient, such as the cacti genus Opuntia, whose 
members include the superficially distinct prickly pears and chollas (see Dupré 1995: 
27-8). Other cluster theories include Millikans’ (1999) theory of kinds in the special 
sciences, and Dupré’s “promiscuous realism” (1996), described by Cooper (2013: 
953) as a “cluster style account”.  
 One feature that most of these account have in common is a recognition of 
the somewhat arbitrary nature of scientific classification, where what qualifies as a 
cluster is determined to some extent by the interests of the scientists investigating the 
phenomenon in question. For example, Dupré describes how the decision to restrict 
the term ‘fish’ to non-mammalian aquatic vertebrates had no real basis in the 
previous (theoretical and non-theoretical) uses of the term, and that in any case the 
creatures now referred to by the term really have no more in common with each 
other than they do with whales and dolphins (1995: 29-30). This is not to say that 
kind membership is entirely observer relative, but rather that there are multiple ways 
of carving up the world, none of which is necessarily epistemically privileged. 
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Nonetheless, once a classificatory project has been defined, there will be a fact of 
matter as to whether, for instance, whales are fish or not (Dupré 1999).   
 Accounts of this kind seem better suited to the messiness of classification in 
psychology and cognitive science. Rather than being forced to identify a mental state 
with an ‘essence’ (perhaps a distinct neural localisation, see 5.4.2), we can instead 
give a functional profile along the lines of “state x typically causes these behaviours, 
is caused by these events”, and so on. Going one step further, we could also aim to 
identify a mechanism that gives rise to the functional profile in question, such as a 
certain pattern of neural activation or, perhaps less strictly, a personal level account 
of how this state functions. Property cluster theories, therefore, might be a good fit 
for identifying cognitive scientific kinds.  
5.1.3	–	Scientific	Kinds	as	Classificatory	Programs		
In the last sub-section I suggested that property cluster theories might be a good 
match for kinds in psychology and cognitive science. However, a recent critique by 
Ereshefsky & Reydon (2015) raises some doubts in this regard. They argue that 
Boyd’s homeostatic property cluster theory actually fails to capture some scientific 
kinds, such as non-causal kinds, functional kinds, and heterostatic kinds. The second 
worry, that HPC might not adequately capture functional kinds, is especially 
concerning when it comes to kinds in psychology and cognitive science, which are 
often defined functionally. One reason why functional kinds might not qualify as 
natural kinds according to HPC is that they may not necessarily be caused by the 
same underlying mechanism. So whilst two instances of the putative functional kind 
might share many (or even all) of the properties in the cluster, the homeostatic 
mechanism responsible for the clustering might be distinct, and thus they would not 
qualify.  
 Consider a classic case from philosophy of mind: if pain is defined as 
aversion to a noxious stimuli, then we can imagine a situation where two organisms 
exhibit all the behaviours associated with pain, despite having radically different 
physiologies and neural architectures (cf. the discussion of Martian pain in section 
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4.3.4). Whilst we seem to have both intuitive and perhaps even scientific reasons for 
wanting to call these two behaviours instances of the same kind, under HPC this 
would be a case of incidental clustering without an underlying kind. A defender of 
HPC might wish to bite the bullet, and simply deny that these are two cases of the 
same phenomenon, but doing so might require rejecting a functionalist theory of 
mental states. I will return to this topic later in the chapter, when I discuss the 
relationship between essentialism and type identity theory (5.4.2).    
 Ereshefsky & Reydon’s proposed alternative to HPC is to conceive of natural 
kinds as being situated within “classificatory programs” that provide a framework 
within which to demarcate kinds. A classificatory program consists of sorting 
principles, which categorises kinds within that framework; motivating principles 
which justify the choice of sorting principles; and the set of classifications that the 
sorting principles allow. They illustrate this with the example of the “Biological 
Species Concept”: 
 
Its sorting principles tell us to sort organisms of populations that 
interbreed into the same species, to sort organisms of populations that do 
not interbreed into different species, and to sort organisms that reproduce 
asexually into no species. The motivating principle for the Biological 
Species Concept is the hypothesis that interbreeding and the existence of 
relatively closed gene pools cause the existence of stable and distinct 
evolutionary groups of organisms. (Ereshefsky & Reydon 2015: 979) 
  
 This can be contrasted with the “Phylo-Phenetic Species Concept”, which 
employs different sorting principles such as “genetic markers, overall genetic 
similarity, and phenetic traits”, and thus classifies species differently. The two 
classificatory programs have distinct motivations, and thus each might be better 
suited in different contexts and circumstances. There is no right answer about which 
to employ, say Ereshefsky & Reydon, aside from the more general scientific virtues 
of the theory within which they’re embedded. Once you’re within a program, 
however, there will be clear rules, given by the sorting principles, for deciding which 
species a token organism falls into.  
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 In the context of psychology and cognitive science, it might be useful to 
distinguish programs such as direct localization, which sort neural regions according 
to spatial proximity and fMRI activation, from programs that emphasize neural 
reuse, which focus more on functional connectivity across the whole brain. I will 
return to this topic in the next chapter, but for the time being will simply note that 
regardless of how successful it as a general theory of natural kinds, Ereshefsky & 
Reydon’s notion of classificatory programs seems like it might have some 
application to current debates about neural individuation. 
5.1.4	–	Pragmatic	Theories	
With both the property cluster theories and Ereshefsky & Reydon proposed 
alternative we have seen what might be called a ‘pragmatic turn’ in the philosophy of 
natural kinds. Ereshefsky & Reydon position themselves as charting “a middle 
course between a purely descriptive and an overly normative account of kinds” 
(2015). Classical accounts have aimed to circumscribe how science should carve up 
the world, whilst more recently there has been a turn towards simply describing how 
scientists do in fact carve up the world. As I hinted at earlier, my own interests fall 
more towards the descriptive, although there is a normative element in that I think 
some ways of carving up the world might be more useful to cognitive science than 
others. 
 I will now consider some explicitly pragmatic accounts that fall more towards 
the descriptive end of the spectrum suggested by Ereshefsky & Reydon. These 
accounts generally aim to identify the role natural kind terms actually play in 
scientific practice, and to demarcate kinds in line with that practice, rather than 
trying to prescribe how scientists should use kind terms. Examples include Wikforss 
(2010), who argues that natural kind terms are only special insofar as they support 
inductive generalisation, and do not have any privileged status over and above this; 
Brigandt (2011), who argues that the epistemic interests of scientists should come 
first when demarcating natural kinds and scientific concepts; Khalidi (2013), who 
argues for what he calls a “thoroughly naturalistic approach” to kind demarcation, 
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based on the classifications used by scientists themselves; and most recently Slater 
(2015), who argues for a “stable property cluster theory” that seeks only to identify 
which kinds best support our inferential practices, without giving any conclusive 
answer as to whether they are ‘natural’ or not.32 
 What all of these accounts have in common is that they place the interests and 
expertise of scientific communities above those of metaphysicians, and reject any a 
priori theorising about the status of natural kinds. One consequence of this 
commitment is that if a theory of natural kinds rules out the putative kinds of any 
particular science, this is a problem for the theory, not the science (Slater 2015 
makes this point explicit). So in the context of psychology and cognitive science, a 
pragmatic approach would first ask which kinds the scientists involved are working 
with, and then build a classificatory framework around that. Unfortunately, given the 
wide-ranging disagreement in the contemporary sciences of the mind, simply reading 
off a unified taxonomy is not really possible. Should we focus on fMRI voxels as the 
basic functional units, or connectivity patterns, or abstract mental states, or even 
single neurons? Compare this with biology, where even if there is some 
disagreement about how to classify species, there is at least agreement that a species 
concept of some sort is a useful kind to be discussing. Perhaps this points to 
psychology and cognitive science being immature, or disunified, or possibly even 
non-scientific, but whichever the case it makes applying a purely pragmatic account 
of psychological kinds somewhat tricky. 
 Nonetheless, we can look at the role played by various putative kind terms in 
more localised psychological theories or debates, and at the very least ask whether 
these correspond in any useful fashion to the kinds given by folk psychology. In the 
next section I will consider the general relationship between folk kinds and scientific 
kinds, before turning in section 3 to several case studies of apparent divergence 
between folk psychological kinds and scientific psychological kinds.  
                                                
32 Kendig (2015) gives a more recent overview of accounts of this kind. 
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5.2	–	Folk	Kinds	and	Scientific	Kinds	
It is generally acknowledged that scientific taxonomisation frequently begins with a 
folk ontology of some sort, before gradually developing a more refined scientific 
ontology. Ereshefsky & Reydon, for instance, state that they “assume that the kinds 
of science have been and are epistemically superior, on the average, to those posited 
by ordinary language or intuition (except in cases where ordinary kinds are found to 
be scientific ones)” (2015), which they do not take to be a controversial assumption 
(see also Khalidi 2013: 59). However, the relationship between a mature scientific 
ontology and related folk ontologies is not usually one of reduction or elimination, as 
has sometimes been assumed in the philosophy of cognitive science. Whilst there has 
sometimes been an assumption that mental states such as belief and desire, drawn 
from the folk ontology, ought to either be reducible to physical states of the cognitive 
scientific ontology, or else eliminated, we typically see no such assumption 
elsewhere in scientific discourse. In this section I will first illustrate this point with 
some examples from other scientific disciplines, before looking at the role played by 
folk kinds in psychology and cognitive science, and finally arguing that rather than 
attempting to either reduce or eliminate folk kinds, we should instead re-characterise 
them as ‘human kinds’ that describe characteristics of whole persons, and are 
brought into existence via the looping effects of folk psychological discourse. 
5.2.1	–	Folk	Kinds	in	Physics	and	Chemistry	
Of all the scientific disciplines, physics seems to have most thoroughly transcended 
the folk discourse. Many of the discoveries of 20th century physics are wildly 
counterintuitive, and even innocuous terms such as “weight” have technical 
definitions that are distinct from their everyday usage. However, despite Paul 
Churchland’s best efforts to the contrary (see his 1979), this has not had much of an 
impact on our day-to-day perceptions and descriptions of the world, which carry on 
much as though nothing has changed since the discovery that the world is round. On 
the other hand, it seems safe to say that when physicists refer to ‘strange’ and 
‘charm’ quarks, they are not risking any conflation with the folk use of those terms. 
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Physics, as what we might call a fully matured science, is almost entirely divorced 
from its associated folk discourse.  
 In chemistry the story is somewhat more complex. In many cases kinds 
drawn from prescientific folk chemistry, such as “gold” and “water”, have turned out 
to be fairly respectable scientific kinds. Perhaps the relatively transparent nature of 
the key properties of (macroscopic) chemical kinds has made them more 
straightforward to correctly categorise prior to scientific investigation. Just by 
picking up a lump of gold, or examining a sample of water, it is possible to learn a 
lot about the kind in question. This is not to say that chemistry has not moved 
beyond folk kinds (consider artificial elements which do not occur naturally on our 
planet), or that folk chemistry has always (or even often) been correct. The four 
elements of classical ‘chemistry’ turned out not to correspond at all to any natural 
categories, and they are now no longer recognised as fundamental elements in folk 
discourse.  
 An interesting case here is that of ‘jade’, which actually refers to two distinct 
compounds, jadeite and nephrite (Putnam 1975: 241). Hacking (2007) recounts the 
history of the term jade, highlighting the extremely contingent nature of kind 
reference, and uses it to argue against the causal theory of reference defended by 
Putnam and Kripke. The important point for my discussion is that this is a case 
where both the folk and scientific usage of kind term has been flexible and 
contextual, and where there is no clear right answer about whether jade should refer 
to jadeite, nephrite, or both. Hochstein (2016a) suggests that we should just accept 
that the jadeite/nephrite distinction matters more to some disciplines (such as 
geology) than it does to others (such as archaeology). Something similar may apply 
to the kinds picked out by folk psychological terminology, which are tightly coupled 
with the sorts of social, economic, and political interests that Hacking discusses in 
the case of jade (see 5.2.4).  
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5.2.2	–	Folk	Kinds	in	Biology	
Biological kinds, as I mentioned earlier, are somewhat messier than physical and 
chemical kinds, and the relationship between folk biology and scientific biology is 
similarly messier. Consider a well-known example of an apparently misguided folk 
kind: ‘fish’, including gilled fish, whales and dolphins, shellfish, along with anything 
else whose natural habitat is the sea. The standard story here is that whilst it was 
understandable for the folk to classify all of these creatures as one kind, it turns out 
that they were wrong to do so, as whales and dolphins are really mammals, not fish 
(mutatis mutandis for shellfish, etc.). However, as Dupré (1999) has convincingly 
argued, there is not really any clear scientific definition of fish, so the question of 
whether or not whales (etc.) are actually fish is something of a moot point, depending 
more on the whims of any given definition of ‘fish’ than on any objective matters of 
fact. The same goes for many other supposedly scientific biological categories that 
are derived from folk biology, such as ‘prickly pear’ or ‘lily’ (see Dupré 1981). His 
point is not that folk biological taxonomies are useless, but rather that there is 
frequently a mismatch between what is useful for everyday folk purposes and what is 
useful for scientific purposes. So when the folk classify all sea creatures as ‘fish’ 
they are identifying a useful projectable predicate, insofar as it allows them to make 
predictions that are relevant to their lives. Skills that allow one to hunt sharks 
probably apply similarly to hunting dolphins, and it might make sense to specialise 
as a fish-hunter, even if the creatures that fall under that category do not actually 
share any common ancestry. The same goes for many other folk biological 
classifications, and arguing about how or if these correspond to scientific 
classifications may just miss the point. 
 Ludwig (2015) has more recently made a similar point about the potential 
value of paying attention to cultural variation in folk biology, and argues that doing 
so undermines any simplistic picture of the relationship between folk kinds and 
scientific kinds. There is both convergence and divergence between folk taxonomies 
and scientific taxonomies, and focusing exclusively on one or the other risks 
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ignoring the complex web of factors that determines both kinds of taxonomisation. 
For instance, folk taxonomies sometimes end up reflecting the needs of the sorter 
(edible vs. inedible, for instance) over pre-existing natural categories, but in other 
circumstances can turn out to reveal genuine distinctions that scientific research was 
previously blind to. Whilst the Itza’ Maya classification of bats along with birds (cf. 
Atran 1998) might seem like an obvious case of a non-natural category, it actually 
reflects a locally important mechanism for seed-dispersal, which explains the 
clustering of certain types of plants in certain places in a way that might never have 
occurred to researchers otherwise (Ludwig 2015: 8).  For the Itza’ Maya, who are 
interested in this clustering, it makes sense to put birds and bats in the same category. 
 Ludwig argues that divergence between folk and scientific categories should 
not necessarily be taken as a reason to revise either taxonomy – rather the distinct 
needs of each taxonomical program should be respected, and the knowledge unique 
to each should be used to aid the other where appropriate. I think this is the right kind 
of conclusion to draw when we find divergence between folk psychology and 
scientific psychology, and in the next chapter I will argue that cultural variation in 
folk psychology can sometimes be a useful tool for revising our cognitive scientific 
ontology.   
5.2.3	–	Folk	Kinds	in	Psychology	and	Cognitive	Science	
If biology is messy, then psychology and cognitive science are messier still. As my 
earlier discussions of cultural variation in folk psychology (chapter 2) and the use of 
folk psychological terms in philosophy and cognitive science (chapter 4) indicates, 
there seems to be serious divergence both between different folk psychological 
taxonomies, and between folk psychological taxonomies and the kinds of taxonomies 
required for scientific psychology and cognitive science. In the next section I will 
look in more detail at some case studies of divergence between folk kinds and 
scientific kinds in cognitive science, but for now I will just discuss one illustrative 
example and consider what conclusions we should draw from it. 
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 The folk kinds belief and desire, along with other propositional attitudes, 
have been co-opted by traditional philosophy of mind and put to use in constructing a 
general theory of cognition. According to this theory, cognition consists of 
translating perceptions into beliefs about the world, cross-referencing those beliefs 
with the desires of the organism, and generating the appropriate actions to bring 
about those desires, based on the beliefs currently held (see Fodor 1975 for the 
paradigmatic version of this theory). Whilst this may accurately reflect a certain folk 
theory of mind, and may even allow for successful predictions and explanations of 
behaviour, I have argued in the previous chapter that in many cases it does not match 
up with the fine-grained details of the human cognitive system. However, rather than 
taking this as reason to eliminate belief-desire psychology, as the eliminative 
materialists have traditionally argued, I instead think that we should follow the 
pluralist approach advocated by Dupré and Ludwig, and concede that folk and 
scientific taxonomies might just have different pragmatic aims. If one is trying to 
predict and explain the behaviour of a whole person, embedded in a socio-cultural 
framework, then the kinds picked out by folk psychology might, in a sense, be 
perfectly ‘natural’. However, if one is wanting to predict and explain the micro-
structure of human cognition, then a different set of kinds are needed, cutting the 
world at a different group of joints. Unless one is committed to an extremely 
reductionist ontology, it doesn’t really make sense to say that either taxonomy is any 
more objective than the other. If one was committed to an extremely reductionist 
ontology, then cognitive scientific kinds are unlikely to qualify anyway. 
5.2.4	–	The	Looping	Effects	of	Folk	Psychological	Kinds	
How can it be the case that folk psychology is successful at picking out personal 
level kinds, but fails to pick out sub-personal kinds? As I argued in chapter 3, one 
plausible explanation of this discrepancy can be found in the regulative mechanisms 
described by the likes of McGeer (2007), Zawidzki (2013), and Andrews (2015). 
These, I will now claim, create the sort of “looping effect” described by Hacking 
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(1995), thus qualifying folk psychological kinds as “human kinds”. A human kind,33 
according to Hacking, is a kind that is responsive to our very act of studying it, and 
thus one that we cannot accurately describe it without taking into account these 
‘looping effects’. He gives the example of multiple personality disorder, which prior 
to the early 1970s was rarely diagnosed, then became more frequent, and is now once 
again rarely diagnosed. He suggests that this strange phenomenon can be explained 
by observing that the very act of diagnosing someone with multiple personality 
disorder may inadvertently cause them to exhibit the symptoms of the disorder, via 
mechanisms such as patients wanting to live up to their doctor’s expectations. 
Another example is the phenomenon of stereotype conformity, where someone 
conforms to a stereotype that they either identify with, or are identified with by 
others (see e.g. Sinclair et al 2005; Zanna & Pack 1975). In both cases the act of 
labelling or categorising someone can cause them to exhibit features associated with 
that label, features that they did not previously exhibit.  
 Folk psychological kinds, and the associated phenomenon of folk 
psychologising, may exhibit the same sort of looping effects. If, as I argued in 
chapter 3, the very act of attributing a propositional attitude to someone exerts a 
normative influence for them to conform to that description, then we would see the 
emergence of a looping effect. Folk psychological categorisation could become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, gaining explanatory and predictive success at least partially 
as a consequence of these looping effects. This would make folk psychological 
kinds, such as belief and desire, into human kinds like multiple personality disorder. 
Here it is important to recognise that unlike other human kinds, which are responsive 
primarily to scientific practice, folk psychological kinds are ‘studied’ whenever we 
engage in everyday folk psychologising, and thus will be (potentially) responsive to 
any act of mental state attribution, behavioural prediction, or self-/other- narration 
(via the mindshaping mechanisms described in chapter 3). Thus the looping effects 
                                                
33 Hacking (2000) later suggested the alternative and perhaps more general term “interactive kind”, 
and Khalidi (2013) argues that the looping effects described by Hacking may not be limited to the 
human domain. I will continue using the term ‘human kinds’ here as I think it is useful to highlight the 
particular form of looping effect exhibited by folk psychology.  
 
 
172
exhibited by folk psychology are potentially much broader, and much more 
pervasive, than those exhibited by other human kinds.   
 Hacking sometimes suggests that human kinds are distinct from natural 
kinds, but it would be wrong to interpret him as saying that human kinds are not 
natural. Rather he rejects the essentialism implicit in the distinction between natural 
and non-natural kinds. By distinguishing human kinds from the more usual examples 
of natural kinds he hopes to draw attention to the unique properties of kinds that 
exhibit looping effects. Cooper (2004) argues that these unique effects are 
compatible with human kinds being natural kinds. Insofar as I am willing to adopt a 
pragmatic approach to natural kinds I am inclined to agree. If a human kind such as 
multiple personality disorder is able to support reliable inductive inferences, then I 
see no reason why we should not concede that it is a natural kind (albeit an unusual 
one, that would not exist were it not for the meddling of psychiatrists). Whilst 
Hacking rejects the label ‘natural’ kind, his account can nonetheless be construed as 
naturalistic, in the sense that he thinks the kinds created by these looping effects are 
no more or less natural than any other kinds. We could think of this as an extension 
of the pragmatic accounts discussed in 5.1.4. So, even if folk kinds do not strictly 
qualify as ‘natural kinds’ under the traditional definitions, they might still be usefully 
considered kinds of the looping sort described by Hacking. 
5.3	–	Case	Studies	
In the previous section I have suggested that folk psychological kinds, whilst 
frequently diverging from the kinds deployed in psychology and cognitive science, 
should nonetheless qualify as ‘natural’ insofar as Hacking’s human kinds qualify as 
natural. In this section I will consider several case studies that demonstrate not only 
the unsuitability of folk psychological kinds to scientific practice, but also the 
looping effects that qualify them as human kinds. 
5.3.1	–	Concepts	
Machery (2005, 2009) has argued that the term ‘concept’, as a posit of scientific 
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psychology, does not pick out a natural kind, and thus cannot support inductive 
inference and should be eliminated from our cognitive scientific taxonomy. His 
argument revolves around evidence that the higher cognitive processes typically 
taken to be conceptual “do not constitute a homogenous kind about which many 
inductive generalizations can be formulated” (2005: 445). Here I will focus on his 
claim that that “the main psychological theories of concepts have posited three 
theoretical entities that have little in common, namely, prototypes, exemplars, and 
theories” (ibid: 446). These three theoretical entities are each implemented 
differently and have a distinct functional profile, leading Machery to conclude that it 
would be more productive to treat each of them as distinct cognitive scientific kinds. 
Prototypes identify members of a category in statistical terms, and do not require that 
a member possesses every property in order to belong to a category (ibid: 453-4). 
Exemplars identify a specific individual who stands in for the category as a whole 
(ibid: 454). Finally, the theory view of concepts says that a concept is a theory about 
the properties of the members of the class (ibid.) Whilst he concedes that the term 
‘concept’ might be used informally to refer collectively to all three, he does not think 
that this usage has any real scientific application, as the three senses of concept are 
distinct enough that a claim about concepts in one sense will not necessarily 
generalise to the other two. 
 Machery goes on to advocate what he calls a “scientific eliminativism” 
(2009: chapter 8) with regard to concepts. This kind of eliminativism differs from 
previous eliminativist strategies in that it focuses exclusively on the scientific usage 
of the term ‘concept’, and says nothing about its usage outside of this context. He 
characterizes scientific eliminativism as aiming to demonstrate that ‘concept’ does 
not refer to a natural kind, and hence that “the notion of concept should be eliminated 
from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology” (ibid: 219), if it is to develop into a 
mature scientific discipline. Eliminativism of this kind is essentially the same as that 
which I advocate for folk psychological terminology more generally, and as such it 
will be useful to consider Machery’s proposal in more detail.   
 As described above, Machery first demonstrates that the term ‘concept’ in 
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cognitive science seems to refer to several distinct theoretical entities, including (at 
least) prototypes, exemplars, and theories. Each of these entities, he argues, has little 
in common with the others, as each has a distinct functional profile and plays a 
distinct theoretical role. As such, whilst we can use the term ‘concept’ in an informal 
sense to refer to this general class of theoretical entities, the class itself does not form 
a natural kind. Given that natural kinds (of some sort) seem essential to the project of 
scientific theory building, we should eliminate the term ‘concept’ from our 
psychological ontology, in favour of more precise classifications that do in fact pick 
out (putative) natural kinds. His argument is far more detailed than I have described 
here (see Machery 2009: secs. 8.2 and 8.3), but all that matters for my purposes is the 
general pattern: if a scientific term fails to identify a natural kind, we should 
eliminate that term from our (scientific) ontology in favour of a more precise or 
accurate term. Importantly, this argument need not say anything whether or in what 
sense scientific terms are meant to refer (I return to this topic in 5.4.1), but rather 
appeals on pragmatic grounds to the fact we need something like natural kind terms 
in order to make scientific generalizations, and so we should abandon those terms 
that don’t lend themselves to making generalizations. So rather than using the term 
‘concept’, we should use the more precise terms ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’, and 
‘theory’ (at least, based on our current scientific understanding, which could change 
in the future).  
 Machery does not have much to say about folk psychology, except insofar as 
folk psychology was the target of the classical eliminativist arguments that he rejects, 
but I think that the general argument pattern that he develops for scientific 
eliminativism can in many cases be applied to folk psychological terminology. 
Essentially, whenever a given folk psychological term fails to adequately capture the 
complexity of current cognitive science, we should either eliminate or revise our 
usage of that term in order to more accurately describe the phenomenon in question. 
This is the strategy that I pursue elsewhere in this chapter, and in this thesis in 
general.  
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5.3.2	–	Emotions	
The received view in the cognitive science of the emotions is that there are distinct 
emotions with distinct functional and behavioural profiles, a position that Barrett 
(2006) has described as “the natural-kind view of emotions”. This view meshes well 
with our folk conception of the emotions, and indeed the candidates for ‘natural 
emotion kinds’ are typically drawn from the folk ontology. For example, many 
researchers posit a set of ‘basic emotions’, typically anger, fear, sadness, happiness, 
disgust, and surprise (see e.g. Ekman 1972, 1992). 34 Each basic emotion is supposed 
to correspond to “a more or less unique signature response (within the body) that is 
triggered or evoked by a distinct causal mechanism (within the brain)” (Barrett 2006: 
30). I will follow Barrett in focusing on anger as a paradigmatic example of putative 
emotion kind. 
 Barrett identifies two primary motivations or assumptions underlying the 
natural kind view of emotions. The first is the idea that each emotion kind “produces 
a distinct set of responses (a characteristic property cluster)” (Barrett 2006: 30). 
Anger, for instance, could be characterised as producing a confrontational response 
(of some sort) to the provoking stimuli, along with a certain set of physiological 
responses. The second motivation for distinguishing emotion kinds is the discovery 
of underlying causal mechanisms distinct to each kind. Anger might be associated 
with a certain pattern of neural activation, allowing for the identification of anger 
even in the absence of any external responses associated with the first motivation.  
 Putting the two motivations together, we get a general approach where 
emotion kinds can be individuated either by a distinct set of responses, or by a 
distinct causal mechanism, or by some combination of the two. If the emotion kinds 
identified are labelled using folk psychology terminology, as they typically are, then 
we have the potential for a scientific vindication of the (apparent) folk psychology of 
emotions. Barrett challenges this received view on both fronts, arguing that the folk 
psychological emotions possess neither distinct functional profiles nor distinct causal 
                                                
34 Although see Ortony & Turner 1990 for some early opposition to this view. 
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mechanisms (2006: 33-45). Consider anger: one person might shout and hurl objects 
when they get angry, whilst another person might become very quiet and still. These 
behaviours seemingly have nothing in common, and yet we might nonetheless feel 
confident describing both people as angry. On the other hand, Barrett reports 
evidence against there being any distinct causal mechanism responsible for an 
emotion such as anger. Two very similar expressions of anger might be caused by 
distinct neural mechanisms, undercutting the idea that anger, and other emotions, 
could constitute natural kinds. 
 Barrett goes on to propose a constructivist view of emotions where an 
embodied “core affect” is coupled with a culturally, contextually, and linguistically 
mediated conceptualisation that leads to the application of a label such as ‘anger’ or 
‘fear’. Thus the very same core affect could be interpreted as anger or fear under 
different circumstances, and distinct core affects could under some circumstances 
come to share the same label (see Barrett 2012 for more detail). Importantly for my 
purposes, the resulting position does not deny that folk psychological emotions such 
as anger are very real phenomenon, but rather conceives of them as partially cultural, 
rather than purely biological. Emotions kinds could therefore be seen as human 
kinds, exhibiting some of the same looping effects that we find in the other cases 
described by Hacking (see 5.2.4).  
5.3.3	–	Memory	
Rupert (2013) has argued that memory, a clear case of a folk psychological kind, 
does not in fact constitute what he calls a “generic” natural kind (one that is suitable 
for giving a coarse characterisation of a cognitive phenomenon).35 This comes in the 
context of the cognitive extension debate, where he is seeking to undermine what he 
calls the “natural-kinds argument for the extended mind” (ibid: 25). I introduced this 
argument in the context of the hypothesis of extended cognition in section 4.3, but 
                                                
35 Rupert does not specify what account of natural kinds he has in mind, and I take it that, like me, he 
is primarily concerned with the pragmatics of our choice of scientific terminology, rather than the 
metaphysics of natural kinds. In fact, he explicitly specifies that he wishes to remain neutral “in 
respect of the issue of scientific realism” (Rupert 2013: 33fn8).  
 
 
177 
here I will focus on the implications that Rupert draws for the status of ‘memory’ as 
a natural kind.  
 Essentially, the argument that Rupert is responding to claims that we can 
identify cognitive scientific kinds, such as memory, that “have a significant number 
of instances external to the human organism” (2013: 29), and therefore concludes 
that cognitive science should recognize extended cognitive systems. In response 
Rupert offers a dilemma: “either the proponent of cognitive extension individuates 
the relevant causal-explanatory kinds in a fine-grained way or in a coarse-grained (or 
generic) way” (ibid.). If we take the fine-grained route then it will turn out that 
actual 36  instances of external memory do not share any relevantly interesting 
properties with the functional architecture of internal memory, whilst in the second 
case Rupert suggests that the coarse grained kinds we are left with would no longer 
be of much use to cognitive science. The first horn of the dilemma is similar in 
structure to the disambiguation strategy that I proposed in the previous chapter, 
although the conclusion that I drew there was that extended cognitive processes 
might just be unlike internal ones, in ways that could be of interest to cognitive 
science. Nonetheless, I agree with Rupert that considering the status of putative 
cognitive scientific kinds is going to be an important part of the cognitive extension 
debate.  
 Focusing in more detail on the second horn, Rupert argues that the sort of 
generic kinds that are required to support cognitive extension (typically drawn from 
folk psychology) just aren’t really of any interest to cognitive science. He focuses his 
discussion on ‘memory’, which was the subject of Clark & Chalmers’ original 
“Otto’s notebook” example (see there 1998). The gist of the argument is that whilst 
memory as a generic kind is a suitable explanandum for cognitive science, there is 
nothing aside from this explananda that unites the different kinds of memory 
(declarative, procedural, semantic, etc.), and thus we should reject it as a cognitive 
                                                
36 It is important to note that Rupert does not want to deny that cognitive extension is possible in 
principle, but rather that there are not currently any (or many) actual cases of human cognitive 
extension. 
 
 
178
scientific kind. An analogous situation would be if the generic kind ‘weather’ turned 
out to be caused by several totally distinct mechanisms.37 Here it would seem that the 
generic kind ‘weather’ was not doing any useful scientific work, aside from 
indicating the phenomenon of interest. Rupert’s argument is much more detailed, and 
he discusses several potential counter-examples, but for the sake of space I will not 
consider them here. His argument along is enough to serve as an example of the kind 
of reasoning that might problematize the scientific usage of folk psychological kinds.   
 Despite their apparent failure to pick out cognitive scientific kinds, Rupert 
reserves a role for folk psychological terms in picking out interesting phenomena, 
and as a convenient way of referring to “multiple, distinct kinds” that are related in 
some non-scientific way (such as historically or sociologically) (Rupert 2013: 36). In 
this respect he agrees with Machery’s assessment of the status of the kind ‘concept’, 
insofar as Machery has no objection to its continued informal usage. Rupert also 
indicates a useful role for folk psychology in the initial stages of our formulation of a 
novel cognitive ontology, a role that I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter.  
5.3.4	–	Mind	and	Cognition	
Rupert notes that a version of his argument may also apply to ‘cognition’ as a 
generic kind (2013: 41-4), a possibility that I hinted at in the previous chapter as a 
potential outcome of the cognitive extension debate (Clark & Prinz, ms., make a 
similar suggestion with regard to ‘mind’). If cognition only refers to a general class 
of phenomena that cognitive scientists find interesting, but between which there are 
no inductive generalisation that can be made, then the term does not really seem to 
be doing any work as a scientific kind. Say that it turns out that the only 
characteristic of a cognitive system that anyone can agree on is that such systems are 
studied by cognitive scientists – in this case there is no prima facie reason to expect 
claims about one such system to generalise to another. Even if we find some slightly 
more specific criteria, such as that the systems must exhibit flexible responses to 
                                                
37 Rupert suggested this example during the Q&A of a talk he gave at “Exploring the Undermind” 
(University of Edinburgh, July 15th 2016). 
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environmental stimuli, then it will still be the case that a very wide set of systems are 
‘cognitive’, and that we may not be able to successfully generalise across them.    
 Rejecting the idea of cognition as a natural kind renders much of the 
extended cognition debates moot. Perhaps when Otto uses his notebook he is part of 
an extended system of some kind, but asking whether this is a cognitive system may 
just not be very useful or interesting. I do not think much rests on whether or not 
cognition is a natural kind, and it seems plausible that, as Irvine (2013) argues for the 
term ‘consciousness’, its continued usage is more a reflection of institutional 
pressures to define a coherent area of study than any real epistemic goals. One 
upshot of this would be that folk distinctions between what is and isn’t a cognitive 
system probably shouldn’t have much of a role to play in determining what the 
proper domain of cognitive science is (in the same way that folk distinctions between 
what is and isn’t a ‘chemical’ should not determine the proper domain of chemistry).  
 Rupert in fact defends the status of cognition as a natural kind, provided that 
it refers to a particular, well-demarcated concept. His proposal is that we should 
define cognition “by successfully modelling paradigmatic cases of intelligent 
behaviour” (Rupert, forthcoming), by which he means human behaviour. Whilst I 
agree that it is possible to just stipulate a definition like this, I do not think the pre-
theoretic usage of the term commits us to any such definition, and we could just as 
easily have defined cognition in some other way. In any case, what matters for my 
purposes is the status of the folk concept of mind or cognition, not how we 
eventually come to use the term in cognitive science. 
5.4	–	Further	Concerns	
So far in this chapter I have suggested that cognitive scientific kinds, whatever they 
turn out to be, are unlikely to correspond neatly to folk psychological kinds. This is 
by no means a conclusive argument, and I am happy to admit that my conclusion is 
at least partly hostage to future empirical developments. However, there are also 
some more theoretical concerns that would apply even if the empirical evidence 
turned out exactly as I expect it to. I will consider these in the remainder of this 
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chapter, before turning in chapter 6 to offer a positive account of how we should 
respond to the discrepancy between cognitive scientific and folk psychological kinds. 
5.4.1	–	Causal	theories	of	reference	
So far in my discussion of folk psychological kinds I have assumed that if there turns 
out to be nothing corresponding to the functional profile of, say, beliefs in our 
scientific ontology, then we should stop using the term belief (at least in certain 
scientific contexts). One response to this assumption, originally made by Lycan 
(1988) in response to Stich’s (1983) eliminativism, is to point out that it relies on a 
descriptive theory of reference, where if nothing corresponds to the folk description 
of belief then belief does not exist. If instead we adopt a causal theory of reference, 
as Putnam and Kripke do in formulating their account of natural kinds, then it turns 
out that rather than discovering that belief does not exist, we will instead discover 
that belief is just a very different kind to that which we originally thought it was. 
This line of argument dominated the debates around eliminative materialism in the 
90s, which concluded with Stich renouncing his eliminativism. Whilst my position is 
somewhat different to that which he defended, I nonetheless need to say something 
in response to the causal theory of reference.38  
  I should first reiterate that I am not so much concerned with debates about the 
metaphysics and semantics of natural kind terms, but rather with the pragmatics of 
their usage in scientific discourse. Even if it were proven conclusively that the 
reference of folk psychological terms is fixed causally, it would be a further question 
as to whether it was appropriate or useful to use these terms in cognitive science. In 
any case my claim is not that beliefs (etc.) don’t exist, but rather that they are not the 
kind of thing that we should expect to find at the fine-grained level of analysis 
studied by contemporary cognitive science. In this sense I can fully accept a causal 
theory of reference, but just deny that belief was ever intended to pick out anything 
other than properties of whole people. This, I argue, is how folk psychological terms 
                                                
38 Zoe Drayson and Daniel Burnston both independently brought this issue to my attention at 
conferences where I presented material from this chapter.  
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are actually used by the folk, and why it is problematic to try and use them otherwise 
in cognitive science. Nonetheless, even if it turned out that the correct way of 
interpreting the semantics of folk psychological concepts was in terms of a causal 
theory of reference, it would still be the case that the concepts need to be used 
differently to how they are now.  
 For example, imagine that we discover that some form of the predictive 
processing account described in section 4.4 is correct, and that therefore there is only 
a single kind of mental state, a ‘prediction’, which carries out all of the functions 
previously ascribed to both ‘belief’ and ‘desire’. My argument so far has been that in 
cases such as this we should conclude that there is no space within our cognitive 
scientific ontology for the folk psychological entities ‘belief’ and ‘desire’, but this 
only goes through insofar as we are committed to a descriptive theory of reference. If 
we adopt a causal theory of reference, then we could continue using the terms 
‘belief’ and ‘desire’, but we would have to acknowledge that they now mean 
(descriptively speaking) something different to what they did originally. Any 
plausible folk psychological description of ‘belief’ will surely rule out it being the 
same kind of thing as ‘desire’, so if predictive processing were true then it would at 
the very least turn out that, under the original folk definitions, these terms do not 
straightforwardly apply to cognitive scientific states and processes. 
 Rather than eliminating belief, it would turn out that we had discovered 
something novel and interesting about belief. Nonetheless, we would have to start 
using the term differently, which would mean either re-educating the folk about how 
to use the term, or accepting that our scientific usage of the term is different from the 
folk usage. As I have argued in the first half of this thesis, the folk seem to be getting 
along just fine, so the first option seems to be ruled out. And the second option, i.e. 
acknowledging that our scientific usage of the term needs to change, is essentially 
identical to what would happen under the descriptive theory of reference, the only 
difference being that we could (perhaps confusingly) continue using the term belief. 
So ultimately not much rests on which theory of reference we decide to use.  
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5.4.2	–	Type	identity	theory	and	natural	kind	essentialism	
Thus far I have been assuming a functionalist attitude towards potential kinds in 
psychology and cognitive science, taking it for granted that if there are any such 
kinds they will be individuated functionally. Functional individuation is importantly 
neutral about the physical structure of the states individuated, and therefore 
contributes to the rejection of an essentialist theory of psychological kinds. If pain 
were to be individuated according to the kind of neuron involved, for example, then 
it might turn out that only humans can have pain, a conclusion that mental state 
functionalism typically wants to avoid. All of this is in line with the current state of 
the art in philosophy of cognitive science. But what if that was not the case, and it 
turned out that some form of type identity theory could actually be made to work? 
Imagine, for instance, that for each putative mental state, whether folk psychological 
or not, we could identity a unique neural substance that was associated with that 
state.39 Whenever a subject was in pain, their c-fibres would fire, and whenever they 
believed something, a particular d-fibre would fire, and so on. We might then be 
more inclined to adopt an essentialist theory of psychological kinds, where each kind 
was identified by its unique neural microstructure.  
 Nothing too important seems to rest on whether or not we adopt a type-
identity theory. Even if it turned out that pain really was just c-fibres firing, and thus 
only occurred in humans, it would still be the case that cognitive science as a whole 
would be interested in investigating pain-like behaviours across different animal 
species. We might need to come up with a new term, such as ‘aversion to noxious 
stimuli’ (see 4.3.4), that was neutral with regard to physical structure, but inter-
species ‘pain’ science could still continue under the new name ‘noxious stimuli’ 
science.  
 Indeed, such a result might in fact be more at odds with folk psychology than 
the functionalist analyses that I have discussed elsewhere, as it would rule out the 
kind of everyday animal pains that the folk seem quite happy to talk about (as we 
                                                
39 Botterill & Carruthers (1999: 39) call this kind of realism about folk psychology ‘compositional 
realism’, and note that it is unlikely to be compatible with psychological reality. 
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would now have to say that non-human animals experience ‘aversion to noxious 
stimuli’, rather than ‘pain’). In this sense, at least, it seems that the folk concept 
‘pain’ is partially incompatible with (microphysical) type identity theory, as the folk 
seem to accept that (some) non-human animals may experience pain. Insofar as an 
essentialist theory of psychological kinds based on type identity theory would go 
against folk intuitions in this way, my overall point remains much the same – folk 
psychological kinds are not suitable candidates for cognitive scientific kinds, 
regardless of whether cognitive scientific kinds are typed essentially or functionally.   
5.5	–	Folk	Kinds	as	Human	Kinds	
In this chapter I have argued that even under a fairly permissive account of natural 
kinds, folk psychological kinds do not typically qualify as cognitive scientific kinds. 
I began by assessing several different accounts of natural kinds, and suggested that 
we should adopt a pragmatic account where which kinds count as natural is 
determined partly by our best scientific understanding of the domain in question. 
With this in mind, I then proceeded to consider several case studies, each of which 
suggested that a putative natural kind, drawn from folk psychology, was not suitable 
for application to cognitive scientific research. Finally I considered two further 
complications that arise with regard to causal theories of reference and type identity 
theory, and demonstrated that neither makes a huge difference to my argument.  
 In the next chapter I will propose a methodology for developing novel 
cognitive scientific categories in light of the apparent failure of folk psychological 
kinds. Before moving on, though, I want to return to the positive account of folk 
psychology that I presented in the first half of this thesis, this time with the aim of 
maintaining a space for folk psychological kinds outside of cognitive science. In 
section 5.2.4 I suggested that the mindshaping mechanisms described in chapter 3 
might result in folk psychological kinds constituting what Hacking has described as 
‘human kinds’, i.e. kinds that are only brought into existence via human action, and 
yet nonetheless describe ‘real’ categories out there in the world. So the category 
‘belief’, for instance, might not exist as a fundamental cognitive scientific kind 
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(whatever that might mean), but could still refer to a non-arbitrary set of traits and 
behaviours, and could figure in folk psychological predictions and explanations. 
Crucially, to say that a kind is socially constructed is not to say that that kind doesn’t 
exist. Barrett, discussing her constructivist theory of the emotions, makes this point 
very clearly:  
 
some researchers might believe that arguing against natural kinds of 
emotion is synonymous with claiming that emotions do not exist. This, of 
course, is not the case at all. Most of us (at least in this culture) have felt 
angry and have seen anger in other people. The question is whether anger 
and other similar emotion categories have an ontological status that can 
support induction and scientific generalization, and allow for the 
accumulation of knowledge. (Barrett 2006: 46) 
 
The same goes, or so I want to say, for folk psychology more generally. The fact that 
folk psychological kinds and concepts are culturally specific and socially constructed 
does not in any sense mean that they aren’t real, but it does means that they are 
unsuitable candidates for the primitive kinds of a universal cognitive science.  
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Chapter	6	–	Revising	Our	Cognitive	Ontology	
In this final chapter I will investigate how best to go about developing a novel 
conceptual taxonomy for cognitive science, and I will also consider how this novel 
taxonomy relates to our folk psychological discourse. I will refer to this novel 
taxonomy as a cognitive ontology, following recent work on ontology revision in 
cognitive neuroscience. This work will serve as a template for a more general 
methodology that can be applied across the cognitive sciences, which I will develop 
in the second half of the chapter. The purpose of this methodology is to provide a 
unified account of how scientifically adequate terminology can be refined out of an 
initial foundation provided by folk psychological discourse. 
 In order to explain the relationship between folk psychological discourse and 
our revised cognitive ontology, I will draw on the mechanistic account of 
explanation. I will argue that folk psychological descriptions can sometimes qualify 
as sketches of mechanisms that require further decomposition before genuine 
cognitive scientific explanations can be given. The mechanistic account also allows 
for a non-reductive approach to multilevel integration, which will cast further light 
on the relationship between the ontologies posited by different branches of cognitive 
science. This chapter aims to highlight the positive contributions that folk 
psychology can make to cognitive ontology revision, whilst nonetheless stressing 
that such revision is necessary, as demonstrated by the case studies presented in 
chapters 4 and 5. 
 Section 6.1 will review the current state of the art in cognitive ontology, 
considering four different approaches to cognitive ontology revision, in order to 
establish a foundation from which to develop a general. In Section 6.2 I will apply 
this methodology to several case studies that demonstrate its effectiveness. In Section 
6.3 I will consider some general methodological issues and propose a systematic 
approach to multilevel integration and interdisciplinary convergence in cognitive 
ontology, based around the adoption of the mechanistic approach to explanation. 
Finally, in 6.4 I will discuss the role that I think folk psychology can play in the 
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formulation of novel cognitive ontologies, and outline just how radical the revision 
to our folk ontology could be. 
6.1	–	The	Cognitive	Ontology	Debate	
Price & Friston (2005) introduce the term ‘cognitive ontology’, using it to refer to 
whatever taxonomy of states and processes best captures the functional organisation 
of the brain.40 They argue that the traditional ontologies favoured by cognitive 
scientists have been challenged by neural imaging studies, and propose a systematic 
revision in order to “facilitate the integration of cognitive and anatomical models” 
across the cognitive scientific sub-disciplines.  Subsequently there have been several 
distinct approaches to cognitive ontology, including proposals by Poldrack (2006, 
2010) and Anderson (2015). This section will review each of those proposals in turn, 
before considering some potential issues raised by Klein (2012) and McCaffrey 
(2015). 
 Machery has recently a presented a useful taxonomy of the various 
approaches to cognitive ontology (see figure 6.1), characterising them along two 
axes: the extent to which data from neuroscience is allowed to influence our 
ontology (from ‘not at all’ to ‘exclusively’), and the extent to which our current 
ontology should be revised (from ‘conservative’ to ‘revolutionary’). According to 
this taxonomy Anderson comes out as the most radical overall, favouring a large 
amount of revision based primarily on neuroimaging data, whilst Fodor serves as an 
example of the most conservative position possible, wanting to retain our current 
ontology and dismissive of any potentially subversive neuroimaging data. It should 
be clarified that Fodor is a conservative in the sense of being highly resistant to 
changing the folk psychological ontology, not in the sense of (necessarily) reflecting 
the status quo – in fact it is plausible that many contemporary researchers, both in 
philosophy and cognitive science, come out somewhere nearer the middle of this 
                                                
40 In their 2005 paper they primarily used the term ‘functional ontology’, but I will follow subsequent 
usage and use the term ‘cognitive ontology’. Nothing much seems to rest on the choice of terminology 
here. 
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diagram. In the following sections I will discuss some of these positions in more 
details, focusing on those towards the revolutionary end of the spectrum. 
 
 
Figure	6.1.	Taxonomy	of	approaches	to	cognitive	ontology,	reproduced	with	permission	of	Edouard	
Machery.	
6.1.1	–	Functional	ontologies	for	cognition	(Price	&	Friston)	
Price & Friston’s proposed revisions to our cognitive ontology are motivated by the 
fact that functional neuroimaging has failed to produce a straightforward one-to-one 
mapping between cognitive processes and anatomical regions of the brain. We see 
mapping failures of this kind in both directions of fit: cognitive tasks that we take to 
be discrete “often elicit a distributed pattern of activation” (2005: 262), and discrete 
brain regions “may be activated by tasks with different cognitive processes” (ibid.), 
precluding the identification of single brain areas with single cognitive functions (as 
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we currently understand them). They frame this problem in terms of a disjunction 
between two distinct ways of categorising tasks or processes: a “cognitive set” that is 
specified according to the behaviours being studied, and an “anatomical set” that is 
specified according to the brain regions that are activated (ibid: 263). It is unclear 
which of these categories we should prioritise when conducting research, or even if 
either of them really captures what is going on in the brain. Instead they call for “a 
systematic definition of structure-function relations whereby structures predict 
functions and functions predict structures” (ibid.). This revised ontology will not 
conform exactly to either the cognitive set or the anatomical set as we currently 
understand them, but will rather constitute a novel way of categorising both 
anatomical brain regions and cognitive functions. 
 Consider an illustrative example: the left posterior lateral fusiform region is 
referred to in studies of reading as the visual word form area, because it shows 
activation when reading written words (Cohen et al, 2000). However, it is also 
referred to in studies of category-specific object processing as the lateral occipital 
tactile-visual region, where it is associated with the visual attributes of animals 
(Martin & Chao 2001; Amedi et al 2002). The area therefore appears to have at least 
two functions (visual word processing and animal attribute processing), or perhaps 
one more abstract function (semantic visual processing?), or alternatively it might 
just be two distinct areas that overlap significantly. Examining the data in detail, 
Price & Friston conclude that we should characterise the left posterior lateral 
fusiform region as performing sensorimotor integration, as this best captures the 
range of functions that it is associated with. Applied more broadly, this approach 
would most likely result in a small number of very general functions that accounted 
for the cognitive phenomena being studied. Whilst folk psychological functions such 
as ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ are similarly general, these new functions would most likely 
have a more technical/mathematical flavour, as the example of sensorimotor 
integration suggests. 
 Price & Friston also consider two associated methodological issues. The first 
concerns the accuracy of current neuroimaging techniques. Activation within a given 
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area of the brain could correspond to “spatially proximate but functionally 
independent neuronal populations” (Price & Friston 2005: 263), further clouding any 
attempt to put together a reliable cognitive ontology. This problem is compounded 
by individual differences between subjects, which will further reduce spatial 
resolution when data are pooled. Apparent failures of our current ontology may turn 
out to be artefacts of the spatial resolution that we are thinking at, and mutatis 
mutandis for apparent successes. 
 The second methodological issue that they discuss is that behavioural 
experiments typically target only a limited cognitive domain at any one time, whilst 
in fact implicating many different domains. For example, an experiment designed to 
target word recognition will also implicate general visual processing and attentional 
mechanisms. This can lead to the activation of neural regions that are only indirectly 
related to the task, which may then get (potentially) miscategorised as directly 
related to the behaviour being studied. A task designed around naming pictures of 
tools may be interpreted as targeting “visual processing, object perception, semantic 
processing, phonological retrieval, and articulation” (2005: 264), but this ignores the 
fact that an area associated with “motor processing for hand movements” may also 
be activated implicitly when categorising tools (ibid). The latter area, involved 
primarily in motor processing, could then be categorised as involved in the former 
processes, due only to a failure of imagination on the part of the experimenters. The 
lesson here is that we can never really study a single function in isolation from other 
cognitive processes, which may activate even if they are incidental to the behaviour 
being studied. I will discuss the need for a global ontology and convergence across 
measures in more detail below. 
 Towards the end of their paper Price & Friston outline several “guiding 
principles for functional ontologies” (2005: 269-73). They conclude that a good 
ontology should “have a hierarchical structure that predicts the coactivation of 
anatomical regions” (ibid: 272), where a hierarchical structure is understood as a set 
of nested ontologies. It should also “enable cognitive processing to be predicted 
given any distribution of activations” (ibid.). Their conception of a revised cognitive 
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ontology is basically a one-to-one mapping between structures and functions, where 
neural activation in a given area accurately predicts a single task, and vice versa. 
These may seem like fairly modest criteria, but in practice they can be very hard to 
achieve. Furthermore, what constitutes a one-to-one mapping will depend largely on 
how structures and functions are defined and categorised, which is precisely what is 
at issue. Until we develop a systematic approach to cognitive ontology, it will be 
hard to say whether or not we should expect to find one-to-one mappings between 
functional states and neural structures. 
6.1.2	–	The	cognitive	atlas	project	(Poldrack)	
Poldrack (2010) presents a summary of the current state of the art in cognitive 
ontology research, and argues that current strategies “may be fundamentally unable 
to identify selective structure–function mappings” (ibid: 753), thus calling into 
question the viability of our current cognitive ontologies. He proposes a more radical 
revision to our cognitive ontology, based on the utilization of data-mining 
approaches and a centralized database that he calls the Cognitive Atlas Project. In 
this section I will present an overview of his approach, along with a summary of his 
criticisms of previous strategies.  
 Poldrack opens with a hypothetical comparison of modern neuroimaging with 
19th century phrenology. He asks us to imagine that fMRI technology had been 
developed in the 1860s, and paints a vivid picture of what might have happened: 
 
Instead of being based on modern cognitive psychology, neuroimaging 
would instead be based on the faculty psychology of Thomas Reid and 
Dugald Stewart, which provided the mental ‘‘faculties’’ that Gall and the 
phrenologists attempted to map onto the brain. Researchers would have 
presumably jumped from phrenology to fMRI and performed 
experiments manipulating the engagement of particular mental faculties 
or examining individual differences in the strength of the faculties. They 
almost certainly would have found brain regions that were reliably 
engaged when a particular faculty was engaged and potentially would 
also have found regions in which activity correlated with the strength of 
each faculty across subjects. (Poldrack 2010: 753) 
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The point of this somewhat provocative comparison is to draw attention to the 
reliance of neuroimaging studies on a pre-existing theory of what the relevant 
functional categories for cognition are. Mappings of some sort between these 
categories and neuroimaging results will always be possible, but doing so will often 
involve the kind of problematic one-to-many and many-to-one mappings that Price 
& Friston reject. Echoing Price & Friston, Poldrack calls for “selective association 
between mental processes and brain structures” (2010: 754), where each specific 
structure is associated with a single functional process, and vice versa. He goes on to 
consider current research strategies, which he argues are unlikely to discover 
selective associations. There are two main reasons why this might be the case: the 
underlying ontology might simply be incorrect, or alternatively it might be that the 
tasks we are using fail to investigate that ontology accurately. (He briefly mentions a 
third possibility: that functions might map to networks rather than discrete structures, 
but does not discuss it in detail. I will return to this possibility in 6.3.)  
 Poldrack describes a progression from an early research strategy based 
around conducting a task and reading off which area it was associated with to a more 
refined strategy where activation across different tasks is compared in order to 
determine with greater precision which areas correspond to which functions. He 
notes that whilst this has led to “increasingly sophisticated functional 
characterizations of specific anatomical regions” (2010: 756), it has also been the 
case that single regions have come to be associated with multiple distinct tasks (this 
is the one-to-many mapping problem raised by Price & Friston). If we continue in 
this way, he argues, we will end up with a potentially unhelpfully broad definition of 
which functions each area is associated with, albeit one that is technically valid (see 
6.1.4 below for further discussion). The issues here are related to those that I 
discussed in the previous chapter, as what Poldrack is hoping to discover is 
essentially the set of genuine cognitive scientific kinds. 
 In order to develop a more accurate cognitive ontology, Poldrack has set up a 
central database, which he calls the Cognitive Atlas Project. The aim of this database 
is to develop “a comprehensive, formally specified ontology of mental processes”  
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(2010: 756) by comparing correlations between tasks, concepts, and neuroimaging 
data across a wide range of experiments. Once we have begun to develop this 
ontology, we can use it to carry out more accurate experiments, and thus further 
refine our data. The Cognitive Atlas describes connections between conceptual terms 
such as “working memory”, measures used by particular experimental paradigms, 
and the neural regions that are active when these measures are used. Eventually this 
would allow researchers to make more accurate predictions about which regions will 
be associated with which task, and to propose more fine-grained conceptual 
distinctions to make sense of these predictions. Poldrack describes one early attempt 
at this kind of process, carried out by Lenartowicz et al (2010), which focused on 
four concepts associated with executive function, and discovered that some of the 
concepts were more easily dissociated than others. I discuss this study in more detail 
in 6.2.3.  
6.1.3	–	After	phrenology	(Anderson)	
Anderson (2014) builds on the work of Poldrack and others to propose an even more 
extreme revision to our cognitive ontology. He takes Poldrack’s phrenology analogy 
to heart, connecting it to the computational paradigm that has dominated modern 
cognitive neuroscience, in order to propose a radical departure from this paradigm.  
 One of Anderson’s main concerns with our current ontology is that it fails to 
properly take into account the phenomenon of neural reuse. There is increasingly 
good evidence that neural populations are recruited for numerous distinct tasks, even 
on a relatively small scale (cf. Anderson 2010). This seems to preclude the 
possibility of identifying discrete one-to-one mappings between functions and 
regions, leading Anderson to argue that “the prospect of a clear-cut mapping of 
function to structure appears dim” (2014: 5). According to his analysis, the 
functional structure of the brain just doesn’t lend itself to the kind of one-to-one 
mapping that previous attempts at ontology revision have been looking for.  
 This leads him to propose that we characterise neural regions in terms of their 
personalities rather than function, where personalities are understood as “the 
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functional dispositions of individual regions, their underlying causal powers, and 
their propensities to cooperate with sets of other regions” (Anderson 2014: 114). 
More technically this proposal involves the generation of multidimensional 
“fingerprint plots” that represent the full range of functional properties associated 
with the brain (ibid: 118). These fingerprint plots closely resemble the diagrams used 
to represent human personality traits (see 6.2.2 below), and are intended to predict 
activation in a region across a wide range of tasks. For example, the plot for the left 
inferior parietal sulcus shows the most activation on inhibition tasks, somewhat less 
activation on vision, motor learning, observation, and preparation tasks, and so on. 
Rather than coming up with a novel functional description that predicts this 
behaviour, Anderson wants us to give a multidimensional characterisation that 
accounts for the contributions of this region to a diverse range of tasks. 
 In contrast with both Poldrack and Price & Friston, Anderson suggests that 
we should not expect to find one-to-one mappings even after we have revised our 
ontology. Instead he advocates a move towards a dispositional understanding of 
neural regions, where we understand the general kinds of processes that a region is 
involved in, rather than its precise function. One downside to this strategy is that it 
might seem to lack the kind of sharp explanatory and predictive power that one-to-
one mapping could provide, as it is debatable whether dispositions are able to figure 
in causal explanations (for discussion see Choi & Fara 2016: sec. 6). However, if 
Anderson is correct it might simply be the best we can do, given the prevalence of 
neural reuse. We may need to get used to dispositional explanations in cognitive 
neuroscience, whatever form they might take. 
6.1.4	–	Context	sensitive	mappings	and	multifunctionality	(Klein	and	McCaffrey)	
Klein (2012) is presented as a response to Price & Friston, but the arguments that he 
makes are also relevant to cognitive ontology more generally. His main concern with 
Price & Friston’s approach is that ends up giving extremely vague characterisations 
of neurocognitive functions. Consider their proposal that we should characterise the 
left posterior lateral fusiform region as performing sensorimotor integration. Whilst 
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it is seems clear that this is something that the region does do, it is also what many 
other regions of the brain do, and this characterisation does not tell us anything about 
why the left posterior lateral fusiform region in particular activates during reading 
tasks. As Klein puts it, “the most general function that can be attributed to a region is 
not guaranteed to be cognitively interesting” (2012: 955).  
 Klein’s proposed solution is to make careful use of context specific mappings 
between functions and regions. He suggests that previous disputes in cognitive 
ontology and function-region mapping can be attributed to failures to correctly 
specify the context in which tasks are carried out, along with a more fundamental 
concern that “we might be profoundly mistaken about which contexts there are” 
(Klein 2012: 957). If our neuroimaging studies are set up without paying adequate 
attention to context, it might be unsurprising that we end up with contradictory and 
confusing results. Klein proposes that we could test our assumptions about the 
structure of tasks by looking at similarities and differences across related sets of 
tasks, and cites approvingly Poldrack’s (2010) and Lenartowicz et al’s (2010) work 
in this area. He also suggests using the “neural context” of a task, i.e. looking at what 
other, seemingly unrelated neural areas are activated during a task, as a proxy for 
task context. So if we find that the motor cortex lights up during what we thought 
was only a visual processing task, it might indicate that either this task also involves 
motor processing, or that visual processing of some sort is also carried out in the 
motor cortex. The resulting picture will not give us a one-to-one mapping between 
tasks (as proxies for functions) and brain regions, but it might facilitate a deeper 
understanding of which set of tasks are associated with a particular region. This 
could in turn lead to a reclassification of our tasks in such a way as to support more 
precise mappings and predictions.  
 McCaffrey (2015) raises a similar issue, although he then goes on to argue for 
a distinct solution. McCaffrey agrees with Klein and Anderson that the apparent 
multifunctionality of neural regions stands in the way of clear one-to-one mappings 
between regions and functions. His solution, however, is not to propose a ‘one size 
fits all approach’, as Klein does with context sensitivity or Anderson does with 
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neural personalities, but rather to emphasise what he calls “the brain’s heterogeneous 
functional landscape” (ibid). His suggestion is that, just as elsewhere in biology, 
different kinds of mapping strategy are most appropriate for different cognitive 
functions and brain areas. He outlines three distinct strategies, along with examples 
from both general biology and cognitive neuroscience: 
 
Sub-divide and conquer: This strategy is based on Craver’s mechanistic 
decomposition (2001), and is appropriate whenever two functions appear to activate 
two distinct structures. Here we should distinguish the sub-regions in line with the 
functions, in order to allow for systematic one-to-one mappings. For example, human 
pancreatic tissue performs at least two distinct functions: hormone production and 
digestive enzyme production, but each of these functions is performed by distinct 
cell populations – so rather than saying that the pancreas has two functions, we 
should sub-divide the pancreas into discrete cell-populations that each have a single 
function (McCaffrey 2015: 1016). Similarly, a region of the brain might initially 
appear to perform several functions, but on closer inspection it could turn out to 
consist of several functionally distinct structures, individuated in terms of differential 
activation patterns. 
 
Systematic mapping: This strategy is essentially the same as that suggested by Price 
& Friston, and is appropriate whenever two or more apparent functions are actually 
implemented by a single mechanism. Here McCaffrey recommends that we redefine 
these as a single function, allowing systematic one-to-one mapping between function 
and mechanism. An example where this strategy is appropriate is a case where a 
single gene plays the same role in producing two distinct amino acids, or in the case 
of the brain where the intraparietal sulcus apparently plays the same role 
(representing analog magnitude) in a number of distinct tasks (McCaffrey 2015: 
1017-8). In cases such as these a single higher-level function is “conserved” across 
tasks, and is thus deserving of a unified place in our ontology.  
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Context-sensitive: This strategy is comparable to that proposed by Klein, and is 
appropriate whenever two or more functions are performed by genuinely distinct 
mechanisms. For example, depending on activity elsewhere in the body, liver 
hepatocyte cells either absorb glucose or produce bile, two very different functions 
that cannot be meaningfully united under a single more abstract function (McCaffrey 
2015: 1019). In the brain, it seems that the hippocampus is involved in both spatial 
navigation and episodic memory, and that it performs both of these functions in 
distinct ways (ibid). In both cases it is most useful to say that a single region of the 
brain or body performs two distinct functions depending on context.    
 
What each of McCaffrey’s strategies has in common is an appeal to the underlying 
mechanistic structure of the functions in question. The sub-divide and conquer 
strategy appeals to the notion of mechanistic decomposition, and argues that we 
should treat evidence of distinct functions as evidence of equivalently distinct 
structures, which can be cashed out as components or sub-mechanisms. The 
systematic mapping strategy argues in the opposite direction, appealing to the idea 
that a single mechanism could sometimes be involved in two apparently distinct 
functions. Finally, the context sensitivity strategy appeals to the idea that when 
giving mechanistic explanations, we must always have a target phenomenon in mind 
– in different explanatory contexts, one and the same mechanism might perform two 
or more distinct functions. 
 I will return to the topic of mechanistic explanation later in this chapter, 
where I will suggest that it provides an overarching framework for cognitive 
ontology formation (McCaffrey himself makes a similar claim). First, though, I will 
turn to some more detailed case studies of cognitive ontology formation, in order to 
assess some of the options and strategies that we could adopt in order to revise our 
cognitive scientific ontology and do away with misleading folk concepts. 
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6.2	–	Case	Studies	in	Cognitive	Ontology	Formation	
In this section I will consider several case studies of cognitive ontology formation, 
each of which provides useful insights into how we might move forward with 
cognitive ontology revision. In 6.2.1 I will discuss the development of the popular 
‘five-factor’ model of personality types, which indicates how multidimensional 
reduction from an initial folk taxonomy can be a way to identify functional scientific 
kinds. In 6.2.2 I discuss Wierzbicka’s attempt to construct a ‘natural semantic 
metalanguage’ to help facilitate the identification of cultural universals. Finally, in 
6.2.3 I discuss Lenartowicz et al’s attempt to refine our understanding of different 
concepts relating to ‘cognitve control’. Whilst only the last study relates directly to 
the neuroscientific ontologies that are the main focus of this chapter, the first two 
nonetheless help highlight some general issues surrounding cognitive ontology 
formation. 
6.2.1	–	The	five-factor	model:	a	case	study	in	cross-cultural	convergence	
Contemporary personality psychology has settled on a broadly accepted taxonomy of 
five core personality traits: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism – the so-called “Big Five”. These traits were 
developed by comparing a wide range of distinct categorisations before settling on 
what appeared to be the most universally applicable taxonomy, and as such it 
provides an interesting case study in cognitive ontology formation. The five-factor 
model attempts to provide a kind of grand-unified theory for personality psychology, 
with a history dating back to the early 20th century (Digman 1990). 
 Development of the model began with the work of two German 
psychologists, Klages (1926) and Baumgarten (1933), who “suggested that a careful 
analysis of language” (Digman 1990: 418) could help determine accurate personality 
categories. This work was subsequently systematised by Cattell (1943, 1946, 1947, 
1948), who carried out a series of experiments analysing the terms used by college 
students to describe their peers. Cattell’s initial taxonomy was extremely complex, 
consisting of 30 distinct ratings, but later work in the 40s and 50s settled on five 
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factors close to those that we have today. Norman (1963) and Smith (1967), amongst 
others, demonstrated that these categories had impressive predictive power, 
suggesting that they were tracking something more than mere surface level 
generalisations.  
 John & Srivastava (1999) note that the five-factor taxonomy is not committed 
to any particular theoretical approach, but rather serves to provide a common 
conceptual landscape for researchers working in personality psychology. This is 
certainly a pragmatic advantage of the taxonomy, but it does also suggest a potential 
weakness: does the taxonomy track anything other than behavioural dispositions, and 
if not, should we treat it as an instrumental tool rather than an accurate description of 
how the mind works? In the latter case it seems that we would have come no closer 
to identifying an accurate ontology, rather than a merely useful one. Later on in this 
chapter I will discuss the realism/instrumentalism issue in more general terms, as it 
also applies to other attempts to construct cognitive ontologies. 
 More recent work on the five-factor model has established that it applies 
reasonably robustly across cultures and languages (see e.g. Caprara & Perugini 1994, 
Szirmak & De Raad 1994, Hofstee et al 1997), although in each of these studies at 
least one trait does not seem to apply as well as the others. John & Srivastava 
conclude that “factors similar to the Big Five have been found in many other 
languages but often, more than five factors needed to be rotated and sometimes two 
indigenous factors corresponded to one of the Big Five” (1999: 14). It may be worth 
noting that most of these studies were conducted in European societies – the 
evidence from other cultures is somewhat less clear. It is possible that there may be 
cultural variation in the way that personality traits are expressed, even if the 
underlying traits or mechanisms are the same. Alternatively, the traits themselves 
might be culturally specific, in which case any apparent similarities might be due to 
those features of human existence that are relatively stable across contexts.41 In any 
case, the five-factor model has enjoyed considerably more success across cultures 
                                                
41 See chapter 2 for further discussion of cultural variation in folk psychology. 
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than any other attempt at providing a universal taxonomy of personality traits. 
 The five-factor model has been especially influential in the design of 
standardized questionnaires, which required a shared taxonomy in order to make 
comparisons between different questionnaires at all viable. John & Srivastava (1999: 
15-17) describe this process in some detail, and note that there remains some 
disagreement about exactly which set of five traits should be used; although when 
different labels are used there is still an impressive degree of convergence. They 
suggest that the traits might be best characterised as prototypes with fuzzy 
boundaries, rather than absolutely discrete and well-defined categories. Again, whilst 
this may pragmatically be the best solution, it does call into question the applicability 
of the model for more precise scientific usage. Ultimately this model is still a work in 
progress, and we should expect it to be further refined as the field of personality 
psychology develops. 
 What this study of the five-factor model demonstrates is that even in a 
domain as complex and apparently messy as human personality, it can still be 
possible to agree upon a taxonomy that seems to adequately describe the data. 
Whether or not this taxonomy actually corresponds to any underlying mechanism is a 
further question that may simply not be relevant for the purposes of personality 
psychology, where all that matters is that someone’s result on a standardized 
questionnaire is a relatively good predictor of their performance elsewhere.  
 The process of refining this taxonomy down to 5 traits from an initial set of 
30 is also interesting, and seems like it might generalise to other domains. Similar 
procedures are applied in neuroscience, for example, where an initial dataset 
composed of a large number of variables can be reduced down to a more manageable 
number by applying various dimensionality reduction methods (see e.g. Cunningham 
& Yu Byron 2014). An interesting feature of these methods is that they can 
sometimes reveal patterns that would otherwise have remained opaque, allowing for 
the creation of novel taxonomical categories that go beyond the distinctions 
suggested by folk psychology. Imagine a case that at first glance seems to feature 
many-to-many mappings between neural structures and (folk psychologically 
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defined) functions. By applying some kind of dimension reduction algorithm, we 
might discover that there is a best fit that allows us to group these disparate functions 
into new, non-folk psychological categories that map more neatly onto the existing 
neural structures.42 In such cases McCaffrey’s systematic mapping strategy might be 
appropriate, but this would not have been apparent prior to applying these methods to 
the data. 
6.2.2	–	The	Natural	Semantic	Metalanguage	
Wierzbicka’s work on comparative linguistics as a guide to cognition was discussed 
briefly in 2.2.3. Her claim is that “empirical universals of language” can be used as a 
guide to our understanding of cultural and cognitive universals, and that furthermore 
“genuine cultural and cognitive universals cannot be formulated” without such a 
guide (Wierzbicka 2005: 256). To this end she has attempted to construct a “natural 
semantic metalanguage” (NSM), which “corresponds to the shared lexical and 
grammatical core of all natural languages” (ibid). In terms of folk psychology, if this 
project were successful then the NSM would contain all of the cultural universal 
mental state attributions. Whether or not these attributions would correspond to 
actually universal mental states is an additional question, although they might at the 
very least provide a plausible foundation for further investigation. 
 Each NSM (there is one for each language, corresponding to the core NSM 
but translated into local concepts) consists of a “mini-language carved out of [the 
parent language] and based exclusively on empirically established language 
universals” (Wierzbicka 2005: 258). Whilst the exact expression of these universals 
will depend on the parent language, they are intended to be equivalent across 
languages, and are given definitions in basic terms (“semantic primes”) that aim to 
avoid any ambiguity or unwanted implications. For example, Wierzbicka identifies 
SOMEONE and BODY as two of the ‘substantive’ semantic primes expressed in 
                                                
42 Or, vice versa, we could use this strategy to discover new groupings of neural structures that more 
accurately match our pre-existing functional categories. The choice of which strategy to pursue 
depends partially on the empirically data, and partially on how revisionary ones attitude towards folk 
psychology is. I return to this topic towards the end of the chapter. 
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English, THIS as one of the ‘determiner’ primes, and HAVE as one of the ‘existence 
and possession’ primes (2005: 259). These can then be combined to express one 
aspect of the (apparently) universal model of a human being: “this someone has a 
body” (ibid: 265). 
 In this way Wierzbicka has put together what she claims is “a universal folk 
model of a person”, the full details of which can be found in her 2005 paper (2005: 
265-6). If this model were an accurate depiction of how people across cultures and 
languages talk about ‘the person’, it would at least give us a stable foundation from 
which to discuss cultural variation in folk psychology, and perhaps even allow some 
insight into the genuine structure of human cognition and behaviour At the very 
least, there is something valuable to be said for the way in which Wierzbicka draws 
our attention towards the bias implicit in constructing theories of language and 
cognition based solely on English-language predicates and concepts.  
 However, whilst admirable in scope, the NSM is not ultimately well-suited to 
the construction of an objective cognitive ontology. Wierzbicka herself admits that 
according to her account “language doesn’t reflect reality directly” (Wierzbicka 
1992: 7), although this seems to be in tension with her purported aims. Either the 
NSM is simply reflective of biological or cultural predispositions towards a certain 
kind of linguistic system, which is interesting in its own right but not relevant for my 
purposes, or it picks out genuine features of the world which every language would 
need to represent (or possibly, but implausibly, it could simply be a coincidence that 
all languages seem to be composed of these basic elements). It is unclear which of 
these Wierzbicka has in mind, and this question must be resolved before the NSM 
can be applied to cognitive ontology revision.  
 In attempting to reduce language down to a set of primitive meanings, the 
NSM also opens itself up to the charge of glossing over contextual complexity 
(Blumcyński 2013: 268). A semantic prime such as BODY is meant to refer to a 
limited core of what the word might imply in the full context of spoken English, but 
it is not necessarily so easy to extract meaning from context like this. Wierzbicka 
contends that the English BODY can be taken as equivalent to the French CORPS 
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and Polish CIAŁO (Wierzbicka 2010: 17), but it is unclear whether it will ever be 
possible to rid these words of their original cultural context. Even in an academic 
context our personal background and cultural context exerts an influence on how we 
understand what is said, and what inferences (implicit or otherwise) we make, and in 
idealising away from this complexity NSM is at risk of asserting false (or at least 
misleading) equivalences.  
 Nonetheless, the analysis and tools that Wierzbicka presents are valuable, and 
I will propose something similar to a metalanguage later in this chapter when I 
discuss a methodology for the formation of an accurate cognitive ontology. This will 
not be a ‘natural’ metalanguage, but an ‘artificial’ one, with the meaning of each 
word operationalized in terms of experimental measures and concrete, testable 
claims about the human cognitive system. The end goal, however, is more or less the 
same as Wierzbicka’s: to be able to describe experimental results and theoretical 
constructions as unambiguously as possible.   
6.2.3	–	An	Ontology	for	Cognitive	Control	
Lenartowicz et al (2010) present an attempt to apply Poldrack’s method for cognitive 
ontology to the concept of ‘cognitive control’ (it is worth noting that Poldrack is 
listed as the corresponding author on this paper). They begin by outlining their 
general approach, which is to first specify an initial ontology of candidate mental 
constructs by mining “existing text corpora, such as journal abstracts” (ibid: 682). 
This gives a baseline ontology from which to begin revising with reference to 
neuroimaging data. In this case they used an earlier study conducted by Saab et al 
(2008), which “isolated a set of five key terms that summarized the literature on 
executive function” (ibid). These terms were “working memory”, “response 
selection”, “response inhibition”, “task switching” and “cognitive control”. Each of 
the first four terms regularly co-occurs with “cognitive control”, and is in turn 
reliably associated with a number of indicators (behavioural tasks) and heritability 
measures, suggesting that they already constitute at least a partially accurate 
ontology. However, the indicators associated with cognitive control are also 
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associated with the other constructs, suggesting a degree of conceptual overlap. To 
resolve this ambiguity, Lenartowicz et al conducted a meta-analysis of brain activity 
associated with each indicator task, based on the assumption that genuinely distinct 
components of the ontology for cognitive control should show distinct activation 
patterns. 
 They found that whilst there was a clear distinction between the patterns of 
activation corresponding to response selection on the one hand, and between working 
memory, response inhibition and cognitive control on the other, there was no clear 
distinction between the tasks associated with the latter group. The data corresponding 
to task switching was unclear. Based on this data they conclude that response 
selection is a distinct function associated with the precentral gyrus and middle frontal 
gyrus, and that cognitive control, response inhibition and working memory may 
together constitute a second distinct function associated with “a right-lateralized 
network involving frontal and subcortical regions” (Lenartowicz et al 2010: 688).  
They acknowledge that their data was somewhat noisy, and so do not present these 
results as conclusive, but do take them to be indicative of the kinds of revision that 
we should make to our ontology of cognitive control. 
 One interesting methodological issue that they touch on is the fact that the 
lack of activation differentiation may be a result of the way in which tasks are 
associated with functions, rather than a problem with the functions themselves. For 
example, many tasks targeting task switching may also require response inhibition, 
even if the experimenters do not explicitly mention the latter. Thus the two functions 
may appear to overlap because the tasks are not fine-grained enough, rather than the 
functions themselves being ill formed. In the long run this kind of ambiguity would 
be resolved by collecting data from a large number of distinct tasks, some of which 
would hopefully not overlap, but it does prevent any clear conclusions being drawn 
from Lenartowicz et al’s study, even if their overall methodology is a useful one.  
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6.3	–	Methodological	Issues	and	Mechanistic	Explanation	
In the first half of this chapter I have outlined several basic approaches to cognitive 
ontology revision, and presented three illustrative case studies. I will now turn to 
more general methodological issues, which I have previously only mentioned in 
passing. Resolving these issues will be essential if we are going to be able to settle 
on a systematic methodology for cognitive ontology revision. I will propose that one 
way of doing so is to adopt the mechanistic approach to explanation, which allows 
for non-reductive multilevel integration as a way of accounting for the relationship 
between different kinds of domain-specific cognitive ontologies. 
6.3.1	–	Systematic	underdetermination	
Both Klein (2012) and McCaffrey (2015) raise doubts about the possibility of 
establishing one-to-one mappings between neural structures and cognitive functions 
(see section 6.1.4 above). If they are correct then this might seem to call into 
question the viability of any systematic cognitive ontology revision. The 
underdetermination originally identified by Price & Friston might turn out to be an 
intractable feature of our best cognitive neuroscience, rather than a conceptual issue 
that can be resolved by adopting a novel ontology. 
 Indeed, there is precedent for this elsewhere in philosophy of science. 
Stanford (2016) proposes a useful distinction between two different kinds of 
scientific underdetermination, holistic and contrastive. Holistic underdetermination 
occurs when a hypothesis cannot be tested in isolation from other hypotheses, whilst 
contrastive underdetermination occurs when our evidence is equally compatible with 
two or more distinct theories. Additionally, underdetermination is not an all-or-
nothing affair; a theory or hypothesis might be more or less underdetermined. 
Presumably the global underdetermination posited by Quine would be no worse for 
cognitive neuroscience than for any other scientific discipline, so if cognitive 
ontology is interestingly threatened by underdeterminacy it must be in a way that is 
distinctive to cognitive science. 
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 The underdeterminacy that I am concerned with is contrastive in nature, and 
relatively limited in scope. Consider the original example given by Price & Friston: 
the left posterior lateral fusiform region is associated with both visual word 
processing and animal attribute processing, leaving us with (at least) three distinct 
hypotheses. The region might have two distinct functions, or it might perform a 
single function that contributes to both tasks, or it might actually be two distinct 
regions, one performing visual word processing and the other performing animal 
attribute processing. The neuroimaging data alone gives us no reason to prefer one 
hypothesis to the others. However, this underdeterminacy is far from total: we have 
good reason to prefer a relatively limited range of hypotheses about brain functions, 
and we can triangulate data from across a range of measures in order to further limit 
that range. Such triangulation will be a core feature of the methodology that I will 
describe later in this section. 
 Whilst Price & Friston conclude that the region is performing sensorimotor 
integration, this requires additional assumptions about neural organisation, and it is 
relatively straightforward to make a plausible case for either of the other hypotheses 
that they mention. Furthermore, as Klein (2012) points out, it is not entirely clear that 
‘sensorimotor integration’ is an explanatorily productive function to attribute to the 
region. Once we allow mappings at this level of abstraction, it turns out that large 
areas of the brain can be construed as performing sensorimotor integration, and 
similarly that many tasks can be understood as requiring sensorimotor integration. 
Pushed to its limits, Price & Friston’s reasoning might lead us to conclude that all the 
ever does is sensorimotor integration. Clearly a more detailed story about the 
function of the left posterior lateral fusiform region is required. McCaffrey points 
towards one way of constructing such stories, by allowing for a range of distinct 
mapping strategies, which I will later argue is a core feature of mechanistic 
explanation. 
 H. Clark Barrett (2012) suggests an alternative solution to this 
underdetermination problem, coming from the perspective of evolutionary 
psychology. He specifically addresses the case of what is traditionally identified as 
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the visual word form area (ibid: 10737), which as noted above appears to be 
somewhat misnamed as it associated with tasks other than visual word processing. 
Barrett notes that given the timescale of the evolution of language, it would be 
strange to find a region devoted to language alone. He proposes that this region is 
specialised for “category specific object recognition”, a function that could be 
recruited both for visual word processing and other visual processing that require 
category specific object recognition. Thus a region that predates the evolution of 
language could plausibly be recruited for visual word processing despite never 
having been selected for this specific task. This solves the apparent 
underdetermination problem, i.e. the problem of determining what the visual word 
form area is specialised for, by proposing a novel (and perhaps more evolutionary 
plausible) specialisation that accounts for all of the data. His approach also lends 
itself to the mechanistic account that I will propose later in this section, as he stresses 
that evolutionary plausible specialisations will be “hierarchically organised”, i.e. that 
complex specialisations can be decomposed into a series of increasingly simple 
specialisations, perhaps bottoming out in the basic activation profiles of single 
neurons.     
 One way to solve the underdetermination problem, I want to suggest, is to 
acknowledge that we are unlikely to find one-to-one mappings between the kinds of 
high-level functions that folk psychology is interested in, such as word recognition, 
and the actual structural organisation of the brain. Rather we should expect to find a 
hierarchy of increasingly simple functions, each of which can be recruited for 
multiple distinct tasks and none of which should be expected to easily conform to 
folk psychological categorisations. This cuts both ways, in the sense that a single 
(folk psychological) task, such as word recognition, is plausibly going to recruit 
functions associated with numerous neural structures, but also that a single neural 
structure, such as the left fusiform gyrus, is plausibly going to perform a function, 
such as category specific object recognition, that is recruited for several distinct 
tasks. Approached in this way, underdetermination because a feature of the 
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relationship between tasks defined at the personal level and functions specified at the 
neural level, not a negative consequence of our lack of understanding.  
6.3.2	–	One	ontology	or	many?	
Each of the approaches that I discussed in 6.1 would lead to slightly different 
revisions to our ontology. If we followed Price & Friston’s original suggestion we 
might end up with a small number of very general functions, such as ‘sensorimotor 
integration’. Poldrack’s Cognitive Atlas project aims to uncover a large number of 
finely individuated states, processes, and functions, although it could take a long 
time and a large quantity of data before these settled into any kind of stable ontology, 
if indeed there is a stable ontology to be found. Alternatively, we might turn to 
Anderson’s reclassification of neural functions in terms of state spaces, which would 
consist of a core ontology of ‘personality types’ with which each distinct region 
could be classified. Klein and McCaffrey both advocate choosing different strategies 
for ontology revision depending on the context (in Klein’s case) or on the 
region/function in question (in McCaffrey’s case). Is one of these approaches clearly 
superior? If not, can we reconcile the different approaches, or should we accept a 
pluralistic approach to cognitive ontology revision?  
 As suggested in the previous section, what I want to propose is that there is 
no incompatibility between tasks defined in folk psychological terms at the personal 
level and functions defined according to some other criteria at the neural level. 
Relatedly, the criteria we choose for individuating neural level functions might 
depend somewhat on whatever it is that we are currently interested in explaining. 
This is not to say that there is no determinate answer to the question of what function 
a region performs, but rather that there might be a hierarchy of regions and functions 
that allows for some selective interpretation of which particular function is most 
relevant at any given time. 
 The analogy that I made with computational individuation in section 4.2.3 
will once again be useful here. Shagrir (2001) presents a case where a computational 
system is sensitive to three different categories of voltage level, and yet can be 
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interpreted as performing the logical function AND, which is sensitive to only two 
kinds of logical category (TRUE and FALSE). Should we say that the ‘ontology’ of 
this system consists of three states (according to voltage level) or two states 
(according to logical function)? In response to this puzzle I have argued that whilst 
ultimately the mechanistic structure of this system forces us to recognise three 
distinct states, it can easily be interpreted as instantiating two states, and there is no 
incompatibility between acknowledging the pragmatic value of this interpretation 
whilst also recognising the existence of the underlying three-state mechanistic 
structure (see Dewhurst 2016). Analogously, whilst I think it is important that we 
should eventually agree upon a single basic ontology that reflects the actual 
mechanistic structure of the brain, this is not incompatible with the existence of 
higher-level ontologies that are posited relative to our explanatory interests. This is a 
pluralism of sorts, but if Craver (2012) is correct, then it is an explanatory pluralism 
that is inherent to the project of mechanistic explanation, and not one that in any way 
calls into question the ‘objectivity’ of our scientific explanations. I will expand on 
this further in the next subsection, where I outline a mechanistic approach to the 
cognitive ontology project. 
6.3.3	–	Mechanistic	explanation	and	multilevel	integration	
Over the past two decades mechanistic explanation has come to be seen by many as 
the primary mode of explanation in cognitive science (see Craver & Tabery 2016 for 
an overview). In this section I will argue that adopting the mechanistic account of 
explanation is the best way to make sense of cognitive ontology revision, as it allows 
for a principled non-reductive stance towards the different levels of our ontology. 
Furthermore, adopting the mechanistic model of explanation will allow us to clarify 
the relationship between folk psychological discourse and cognitive scientific 
explanations. I will argue that folk psychology can sometimes provide sketches of 
mechanisms, which can be a useful starting point for scientific investigation, but that 
will eventually have to be replaced with full mechanistic explanations. This will 
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further support my claim that we can revise our cognitive ontology without needing 
to eliminate folk psychological discourse. 
 Mechanistic explanation is typically contrasted with the traditional deductive-
nomological model of explanation, which attempts to discover ‘covering laws’ that 
will apply universally across a given domain. For example, given the laws of 
Newtonian physics and some data about the current positions, masses, and velocities 
of the objects in the solar system, we can deduce to a fairly high degree of certainty 
what the future positions of these objects will be (Woodward 2014: 2.1). Explanation 
of this sort works well in the physical sciences, where generalisable laws are 
relatively easy to discover, but it is less well suited to the special sciences, where 
exceptions and special cases abound. Whilst in theory it would be possible to posit a 
large enough number of well-defined general laws to cover every case, in practice 
this has proved unfruitful. In contrast, mechanistic explanation proceeds by positing 
a particular mechanism whose components interact to produce a given phenomenon, 
rather than attempting to cover every case all at once. 
 A mechanism is defined by Glennan as ‘a complex system that produces the 
target phenomenon by the interaction of a number of parts’ (paraphrased from 
Glennan 1996 and 2002). The ‘target phenomenon’ is simply whatever we, or the 
community of scientists that we are studying, are interested in explaining. Typically 
an initial functional analysis provides a basic sketch of the system that produces the 
target phenomenon, which is subsequently refined through experimentation until a 
full mechanistic explanation can be given (Piccinini & Craver 2011). The system 
(i.e. the mechanism) will be broken down into interacting components, thus revealing 
its causal structure. It is the interaction of these components that produces the target 
phenomenon, and taken as a whole this process provides an explanation of how the 
target phenomenon is produced. 
 Mechanistic explanation, strictly speaking, is just a special kind of causal 
explanation. The contribution that each component makes towards the production of 
the target phenomenon is typically cashed out in causal terms, and ultimately it 
should be possible to fully decompose the mechanism into basic relations that can be 
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explained in terms of chemical or physical laws. However, this does not mean that 
mechanistic explanation is reductive. The production of the target phenomenon 
should be understood as a function of the mechanism as a whole, and mechanistic 
explanation can span multiple levels, as discussed by Piccinini & Craver (2011). 
 In the case of cognitive ontology revision, this framework gives us the tools 
necessary to explain the relationship between different levels of the ontology. To 
return again to Price & Friston’s original example, there might be one high-level 
sense in which the left posterior lateral fusiform region is best described as 
performing sensorimotor integration, but another more specific sense in which it 
performs word recognition. Craver (2012) has argued that mechanistic functions 
should be individuated in terms of an explanatory perspective, which would allow 
for distinct functional ontologies for different branches of cognitive neuroscience. 
One implication of Craver’s account is that there is no single, determinate function 
performed by each mechanism, but rather a multitude of context-specific functions. 
This is no bad thing. As Hochstein (2016b) demonstrates, a single mechanism can 
contribute to several distinct explanatory contexts. For instance, this allows us to 
account for the fact that the left posterior lateral fusiform region can be attributed 
different functions depending on the task (i.e. the target phenomenon) being 
investigated. 
 More generally, the way in which neural mechanisms are individuated will 
have to be sensitive to whatever it is that we are currently trying to explain. This 
does not meant that we won’t be able to give a single unified description of the 
neural system as a whole, but rather that until we know what we are trying to 
explain, there is no objective sense in which we can say what the function of any part 
of this system is. Think of it like this: what we have before us is an extremely 
complex mechanism, and even if we can explain in great detail what the structure of 
this mechanism is and how it all fits together, we still won’t have answered the 
additional question of what it is for. Once we understand the structure though, we 
can put the mechanism in a situation (i.e. ask it to perform a task), and see how it 
responds to that situation. At this point we can begin attributing functions, and begin 
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saying, for instance, that when this mechanism is engaged in a reading task then 
such-and-such a component of the mechanism performs a word recognition function. 
In another context, say when the mechanism is performing a hunting task, the very 
same component might perform an animal recognition function. Barrett’s 
evolutionary psychology project (discussed in 6.3.1) could also be construed as an 
explanatory context in its own right, from the perspective of which this component 
might be best understood as a ‘category specific object recogniser’. 
6.4	–	The	Contribution	of	Folk	Psychology	to	Cognitive	Ontology	Revision	
Adopting the mechanistic explanation framework described in the previous section 
allows us to reconcile the revision of our folk ontology for scientific purposes with 
our retention of it for everyday usage. In order to do this I will argue that folk 
psychological descriptions can sometimes function as sketches of mechanisms, 
giving a broad-brush picture of the phenomenon that we are trying to explain. This 
means that applying folk psychological concepts to cognitive scientific explanations 
constitutes a sort of category error – it would be comparable to using a common-
sense description of a ball falling to the ground when dropped in order to explain 
why the ball falls to the ground when dropped. If we were to try and explain this 
phenomenon by appealing to the unanalysed folk notion of ‘dropping’, we would 
rightly be accused of offering a circular explanation. Here it is important to 
distinguish a description of a phenomenon from a genuine explanation, where an 
explanation must in some sense go beyond the initial description in order to be 
genuinely explanatory. Folk psychology can sometimes give genuine explanations, 
but these are posited at the level of persons rather than mechanisms, and constitute a 
distinct mode of explanation to that given by cognitive science. When it comes to 
genuinely cognitive scientific explanations, we should aim to treat folk psychological 
description as useful sketches of the phenomenon to be explained, which can give 
suggestive hints at the form our explanation should take, but nothing more than that. 
Of course, it will not always be the case that the folk psychological description can 
provide any useful guidance, for example if it identifies a purely social phenomenon 
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with no corresponding cognitive scientific mechanism. However, given that we may 
not be able to identify these cases ahead of time, it will often be worthwhile 
attempting to treat the folk psychological description as a mechanism sketch, even if 
ultimately this turns out not to be a useful exercise. The key point is that the folk 
psychological description of a phenomenon is only one source of data, and should be 
cross-referenced with other sources in order to uncover the actual structure of the 
underlying mechanisms. 
 In the second half of this section I will describe how the process of cognitive 
ontology revision can draw on data from across multiple disciplines, including those 
that study folk psychological concepts and intuitions. I will also present a 
preliminary account of how radical our cognitive ontology revisions might be, 
although ultimately whether or not this account turns out to be accurate will be an 
empirical matter. I present it primarily as an exercise in exploring the potential limits 
of cognitive ontology revision, rather than a definitive proposal, as the empirical 
evidence is currently too limited to make any conclusive predictions. 
6.4.1	–	Folk	psychological	descriptions	as	sketches	of	mechanisms	
Piccinini & Craver (2011) describe how functional analyses of cognitive systems can 
be interpreted as giving what they call “mechanism sketches” – i.e., incomplete 
outlines or “elliptical descriptions” of full mechanistic explanations. By functional 
analysis they have in mind a classical approach to psychological explanation that 
focuses on the functional properties of a system, and which maintains that those 
properties are distinct from their physical implementation (ibid: 286ff). Whilst this 
classical approach will allow that every functional analysis must ultimately be 
implemented by a physical mechanism, it denies that functional explanation is reliant 
on mechanistic explanation, or even constrained in any way by the details of the 
implementation. Piccinini & Craver argue that functional analyses and mechanistic 
explanations do in fact constrain one another in interesting ways, and that the 
autonomy and distinctness claims are therefore false. According to them, there is 
really only one kind of (scientific) psychological explanation – mechanistic 
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explanation – and functional analyses are only explanatory insofar as they contribute 
to full mechanistic explanations.  
 In line with this approach, I think that we should treat (some) folk 
psychological descriptions as high-level mechanism sketches, in the sense that they 
can usefully be interpreted as providing functional analyses of cognitive systems. It 
is important to note that this treatment will not apply to all folk psychological 
descriptions, but only to those that appear to be attempting to describe sub-personal 
processes that properly fall into the domain of scientific psychology. In the next 
section I will outline a way of distinguishing personal from sub-personal 
explanations, and argue that folk psychological descriptions that fall into the latter 
domain should be interpreted as mechanism sketches.     
 One advantage of this treatment of folk psychological descriptions is that it 
allows us to acknowledge that such descriptions are often incomplete or inaccurate, 
without having to commit to a fully reductionist or eliminativist position. As 
Piccinini & Craver are keen to stress, mechanistic explanation is not reductive, and 
interpreting a functional analysis as a mechanism sketch does not imply that that 
analysis is false – it is simply incomplete. Furthermore, functional analyses can serve 
a useful explanatory role by constraining the range of possible mechanistic 
implementations. So interpreting folk psychological descriptions as mechanism 
sketches allows us to accommodate them into our explanatory practices as a useful 
guiding heuristic. 
 Consider an illustrative example. A folk description of what happens when I 
duck to avoid a flying object might go something like this: 
 
He saw the duck flying towards him, and didn’t want to get hit, so he 
ducked to avoid it.  
 
 In one sense this description is perfectly accurate, and even seems to provide 
an adequate explanation of what happened. I did see the duck, and I didn’t want to 
get hit, so I ducked to avoid it. In the next sub-section I will characterise this mode of 
 
 
214
explanation as ‘personal level’. However there is another sense in which this 
description doesn’t really explain anything at all: all it has done is re-describe what 
happened in psychological terms, without providing any causal mechanism that 
might account for my ducking. Nonetheless, if we treat this description as a 
mechanism sketch it might provide a useful starting point for developing a full (sub-
personal) explanation: 
 
He saw the duck flying towards him [visual system], and didn’t want to 
get hit [motivational system], so he ducked to avoid it [motor system].43  
 
 We have now begun the process of mechanistic decomposition, using the 
initial sketch provided by the folk description to determine that there might be three 
distinct sub-systems involved. From here we can draw on other theories of cognitive 
processing to posit further sub-components and sub-sub-components (etc.) that might 
make up the systems in question, and eventually we will have a full mechanistic 
explanation of why I ducked to avoid the duck. Of course, the folk description might 
turn out to be unhelpful, if for example the distinction between motivational and 
motor systems turns out to be misleading. This will become apparent during the 
process of decomposition and testing, and at the very least the sketch provided by the 
folk description will have given us somewhere to start our investigation. The 
possibility of error, in both folk and scientific explanations, is why it is important 
that our methodology allows for convergence across multiple disciplines, as I will 
describe in section 6.4.3. 
6.4.2	–	Personal	level	explanations	and	sub-personal	sketches	
The personal/sub-personal distinction was originally introduced by Dennett (1969), 
“as a distinction between two ways of explaining human behaviour” (Drayson 2014, 
see 2.1.1 for further discussion). Personal level explanations are those that are 
                                                
43 It is important to note that this is a deliberately scientistic description that is not intended to capture 
every nuance of the situation. 
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familiar to us from everyday, folk psychological accounts of behaviour, whilst (for 
Dennett) sub-personal explanations are those that attribute psychological or 
mentalistic capacities to parts of people, rather than people as a whole. Whilst I do 
not want to endorse the straightforward attribution of folk psychological states and 
processes to parts of people (such as brain states), I do think that Dennett identifies a 
useful distinction between two quite different modes of explanation. 
 For my purposes, personal level explanations are those given by folk 
psychology, whilst sub-personal level explanations are those given by cognitive 
science. These two modes of explanation are distinguished primarily by what counts 
as a genuine cause. For sub-personal explanation, the only causes are those that can 
be associated with physical mechanisms, whilst personal level explanations also 
allow rational or normative causes. A rational or normative cause is one that appeals 
to a person’s rationality or norm-compliance as a reason for some event occurring. 
So to return to the example used above, to say that I ducked because I didn’t want to 
get hit is an appeal to a rational cause, which might serve as a perfectly adequate 
personal level explanation, but can only provide an initial sketch of a sub-personal 
mechanism. This initial sketch could, for example, posit that there is some kind of 
mental state corresponding to my desire not to be hit, without properly spelling out 
what that state is like, or how it is able to cause behaviour. The task of cognitive 
science, given this initial personal level sketch, is to either uncover the sub-personal 
mechanisms corresponding to ‘desire not to be hit’, or else to posit some other 
mechanism that produces the personal level behaviour, if it turns out that the initial 
sketch was inaccurate. 
 Personal level explanations can also invoke physical causes, such as if 
someone was to say that I fell over because I was hit.  Whilst it invokes a physical 
cause, this explanation still only provides a sketch of a mechanism, as it has not yet 
spelled out in detail what happens when I am hit, and why that causes me to fall 
over. In this case, however, the full mechanistic explanation that we might eventually 
reach would probably be better classed as belonging to the domains of physics or 
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anatomy, rather than that of cognitive science, as the explanation would have been 
much the same if I were just an inert lump of flesh (i.e. not a cognitive system).   
 The upshot of this distinction is that whilst for the purposes of scientific 
psychology we must treat folk psychological descriptions as mere sketches of full 
mechanistic explanations, we can nonetheless admit that for the distinctive personal 
level domain, folk psychology does sometimes give full explanations. The 
explanations given by folk psychology just constitute a distinct mode of explanation 
to those given by scientific psychology. This is not a particularly novel observation, 
but it does help explicate the error that I think is made when folk psychological 
concepts are applied to cognitive scientific explanations:  these concepts are typically 
appropriate for the personal rather than the sub-personal mode of explanation 
(although see Figdor 2014 for a contrasting opinion). 
6.4.3	–	Convergence	across	disciplines	
As we saw in the case of the OCEAN model and Wierzbicka’s NSM, it is possible to 
use a broad survey of folk intuitions as a way to get an initial sense of the layout of a 
target domain. Turner (2012) also advocates a strategy of this kind as part of a 
combined, interdisciplinary effort to revise our cognitive scientific taxonomy. 
Coupled with the data mining strategies outlined by Poldrack (in cognitive 
neuroscience) and proposed by Apicella & Barrett (2016) for the domain of 
psychological anthropology, we can begin to see what a unified strategy for 
interdisciplinary convergence would look like in practice.  
 Figure 6.2 (below) gives a rough idea of the convergence strategy that I have 
in mind. Folk psychological descriptions can provide an initial sketch of the target 
domain, whilst public databases collating data from both cognitive neuroscience 
(Poldrack’s Cognitive Atlas project) and cross-cultural psychology (Apicella & 
Barrett’s as-yet unrealised proposal) will allow for cross-referencing. Theoretical 
analysis is still required in order to bring all of this together, but it should be 
constrained by the experimental evidence. As our conceptual taxonomy is updated 
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and revised we can create better experimental designs that allow for more accurate 
data, leading to further revisions, and so on, in an on-going, iterative process.  
 
Figure	6.2.	A	convergent	strategy	for	cognitive	ontology	revision.	
 
 This kind of convergent strategy is important if we want to avoid 
parochialism in individual disciplines. Without comparing your results with those 
from other cognitive scientific disciplines, you can risk reifying a specialised 
ontology that works perfectly for your own theoretical purposes but is incompatible 
with those of other theories (cf. Sullivan 2016). However, this does not mean that the 
conceptual distinctions that apply in one context will necessarily apply in others – a 
useful analogy here is the situation in biology, where distinct taxonomical 
classifications of species can exist alongside one another whilst still acknowledging 
that there are facts about the world that remain true across all taxonomies (Ludwig 
2015: 48-55). The balance between achieving a level of objectivity and respecting 
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domain-specific ontologies is a difficult one to achieve, but adopting some sort of 
unified approach to ontology formation will make it somewhat easier. 
 Convergence need not be incompatible with a certain kind of pluralism either. 
Earlier in this chapter I suggested that we should accept that the correct mapping 
between function and structure will depend to some extent on explanatory context. 
This is compatible with there being some general consensus with regard to the kinds 
of functions and structures that there are, even if they are grouped differently by 
different disciplines. Partly this is a question of grain: for some purposes we might 
be interested in mapping entire cortical structures, whilst in others we might want 
map specific voxels, or even individual neurons. So, for example, we might all come 
to accept a version of Anderson’s neural personality-based ontology, but nonetheless 
carve up this ontology differently depending on the grain of the phenomenon that we 
are currently investigating. The same goes for functions: in one context ‘reading’ 
will be a sufficiently detailed description of the task being investigated, whilst in 
another we might need to specify that it is word or letter recognition that we are most 
interested in.  
6.4.4	–	How	radical?	
The only question that remains is what our revised cognitive ontology is actually 
going look like. Whilst this is ultimately an empirical question, depending on both 
experimental results and to some extent sociological conditions, I will hazard some 
rough predictions as to how it might turn out.  
 If Anderson is correct, then we ought to move away from an ontology 
populated by discrete functional states and processes, and towards one populated by 
regions that have multiple functions depending on how and when they are recruited. 
The labels attached to these region would have to move beyond those provided by 
folk psychology – rather than having a region devoted to memory or belief 
formation, we might have a region that is associated with a range of tasks including 
memory and belief formation, but that is also associated with other tasks, perhaps 
semantic visual processing and intentional motor action. Whilst the tasks described 
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above can plausibly be individuated in folk terms, this will not be the case for the 
region, which we would be better off inventing an entirely new term for, either 
thematically (visuo-motor-memory region), or anatomically (voxel 174). The latter 
seems like it might be less confusing, although we see both kinds of naming 
convention at work in contemporary cognitive neuroscience.  
 However, if we were to adopt something more like Price & Friston and 
Poldrack’s proposals, then the revisions to our ontology might be somewhat less 
radical, at least in the sense that we would still be looking for on-to-one mappings 
between structures and functions. Nonetheless, the functions in question would be 
increasingly divergent from the folk ontology, as they would follow the functional 
architecture of the brain rather than that of observable behaviours. Price & Friston’s 
proposal for the localisation of the function ‘sensorimotor integration’ provides one 
example of this, as does the case study presented by Lenartowicz et al.  
 Finally, we could adopt a version of the pluralism advocated by McCaffrey. 
In this case the revisions to our ontology might be even less radical still, as we could 
concede that in some contexts folk psychology concepts turn out to capture useful 
distinctions, whilst in others they do not. Following my discussion of folk kinds and 
natural kinds in the previous chapter, this is ultimately the strategy that I believe will 
prove most successful. In psychology and cognitive science, much like in biology, 
we should not expect to find a single, discrete set of taxonomical principles that 
apply across all domains. Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that the folk 
ontology is often incapable of capturing the fine-grained distinctions required for 
contemporary cognitive scientific enquiry, especially in domains such as cognitive 
neuroscience and psychophysics. 
6.5	–	The	Relationship	Between	Folk	Psychology	and	Cognitive	Science	
In this chapter I have reviewed several recent proposals as to how we should go 
about revising our cognitive ontology (6.1), focusing on discussions of how best to 
interpret the relationship between psychological tasks and neurological functions. I 
then briefly considered three historical cases of cognitive ontology revision (6.2), 
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each of which provides useful lessons. In section 6.3 I introduced and addressed 
several related methodological issues, before proposing that these issues can be at 
least partially resolved by adopting a mechanistic framework for cognitive ontology 
revision. Finally I considered how folk psychology might be able to contribute to 
such revision (6.4), concluding that folk psychological descriptions can serve as 
initial sketches of mechanisms, and can also help to enable convergence across 
disciplines. I ended that section by offering some suggestive comments as to how 
radical our eventual cognitive ontology revision might be.   
 Before moving on I want to say a little more about how I envision the 
relationship between folk psychology and cognitive science, both in order to clarify 
what I have said previously and also to assuage some concerns that might arise. As I 
have indicated previously, the kind of elimination or revision of folk psychological 
concepts that I am arguing for here is strictly limited to the cognitive scientific 
domain, and says nothing at all about the use of such concepts in the folk 
psychological domain. However, it is not always clear where to draw the line 
between these two domains. Construed broadly, cognitive science includes the likes 
of anthropology and social psychology, where folk psychological phenomena are 
sometimes exactly what is being studied. When studying personal level interactions 
that involve the attributions of mental states, for instance, surely folk psychological 
concepts are suitable or even necessary? In fact there is no great puzzle here; my 
concern is only with the inappropriate usage of folk psychological concepts in 
cognitive science, and so in a case like this, where their usage is demonstrably 
appropriate, there is no issue. Similarly, if it turned out that there was a low level 
neural state with a functional profile very much like that of belief, I would not 
necessarily be opposed to the term ‘belief’ being used. 
 In the previous section I suggested that folk psychology could sometimes be 
seen as providing a sketch of a mechanism, in the sense that it identifies a target 
phenomenon and gives some rough suggestions as to how that phenomenon might be 
produced. Whilst this might seem to concede that folk psychology can offer some 
insights into the structure of the underlying mechanism, it is also important to 
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recognise that a mechanism sketch is often crucially incomplete. Consider an 
analogy with folk physics: an intuitive sketch of what happens when you release a 
weight that is being spun on the end of a piece of string is roughly correct about the 
fact that the weight will fly off in some direction, but (typically) completely wrong 
about which direction that will be (cf. Churchland 1979; Clark 1987 also suggests a 
similar analogy). Analogously, whilst a folk psychological sketch of some cognitive 
process is likely to be roughly correct about the coarse grained behavioural 
outcomes, it is unlikely to say anything at all about the sub-personal processes that 
generate those outcomes. It is also likely to get some of the more fine-grained details 
wrong: if I ask you to predict what I will do if I see that it is raining outside, you 
might say that I will pick up an umbrella, but actually I am more likely to put on a 
coat. For most day-to-day purposes these fine-grained details do not matter in the 
slightest (i.e. you would be able to predict that I will take some preventative measure 
to avoid getting rained on), but it is important to acknowledge that folk psychology 
does not always give us an entirely accurate picture of human behaviour – whilst also 
admitting that scientific psychology is itself often no better in this regard. What 
scientific psychology is good at is giving explanations at the sub-personal level, 
whilst what folk psychology is good at is giving coarse-grained behavioural 
predictions in everyday situations (and even these may be somewhat dependent on 
the mindshaping mechanisms described in chapter 3). This means that whilst folk 
psychology is good at predicting, it is less good at explaining, at least in the 
mechanistic sense that I have been describing in this chapter (folk psychology may 
well be good at giving normative or narrative explanations, but I take it that these are 
not typically the kinds of explanation that scientific enquiry aims at).  
 To sum up, folk psychology can serve as an initial guide to the kinds of 
phenomena that cognitive science is interested in studying, and in this sense can 
sometimes provide preliminary mechanism sketches. However, it is important to take 
the conceptual ontology provided by folk psychology with a pinch of salt, as we have 
good reason to think that the way this ontology carves up the world is not appropriate 
for many areas of cognitive science. This is because the folk psychological ontology 
 
 
222
is heavily influenced by cultural and linguistic factors, and reflects socially 
constructed kinds that, whilst in a sense just as real as the kinds of a mature cognitive 
ontology, can only appropriately be applied within the social domain. To this end we 
should adopt some version of the methodology that I described in this chapter, 
revising our initial folk psychologically derived ontology with reference to data from 
across the cognitive sciences, with the aim of developing a complex, multi-level 
ontology that more accurately captures the mechanistic structure of cognitive 
systems.	
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Conclusion:	From	Folk	Psychology	to	Cognitive	Ontology	
In this thesis I have aimed to elucidate the complex relationship between two 
different kinds of discourse about human behaviour, folk psychological on the one 
hand and cognitive scientific on the other. I began by clarifying the many different 
ways in which the term folk psychology has been used in the past, and argued that 
we should conceive of folk psychological discourse as a complex social practice, 
including not only mental state attributions, but also behavioural predictions, 
narrative explanations, and regulative constraints. Contrary to the received view in 
philosophy, this discourse varies across cultures, and thus equating folk psychology 
with the attribution of beliefs and desires gives a very limited perspective on the 
phenomenon. I then argued that folk psychology is not primarily in the business of 
explaining the sub-personal or mechanistic structure of human cognition, and that we 
can explain its predictive and explanatory success without being committed to it 
having any scientific basis or validity. By the end of the first half of my thesis I 
hoped to have articulated a strong positive account of folk psychology as an 
everyday, commonsense discourse that stands by itself and does not require (or ask 
for) any vindication from cognitive science. This positive account was intended to 
undermine the classical debate between realists (such as Fodor) and eliminativists 
(such as Churchland), and to therefore allow for a more nuanced discussion of the 
role played by folk psychological concepts in philosophy and cognitive science. 
Wilkes (1991), Botterill & Carruthers (1999), and others have all suggested a similar 
response to debates about the relationship between folk psychology and scientific 
psychology, but I hope that I have been able to add to this by elucidating in more 
detail the positive role played by folk psychological discourse.   
 The second half of this thesis began with an initial look at how folk 
psychological concepts might struggle to capture the full complexity of several 
contemporary debates in philosophy and cognitive science, including the false belief 
task in social cognition, the individuation of the senses, the extended cognition 
debate, and the emerging predictive processing paradigm. In each case I advocated a 
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disambiguation strategy where coarse-grained folk psychological concepts are 
replaced with novel, finer-grained concepts that better capture the complexity of the 
domain being studied. I then proceeded to look in more detail at the status of natural 
kinds terms in psychology and cognitive science, and argued that whilst folk 
psychological terms constitute ‘human kinds’ that are suitable for describing whole 
persons, they cannot be expected to fulfil the role of natural kinds in a mature 
cognitive science. Finally, I looked at recent work on ontology revision in cognitive 
science, and proposed an integrated strategy for developing novel cognitive 
ontologies. This strategy respects the role played by folk psychology in identifying 
target phenomena and providing inspiration, but seeks to eventually replace folk 
psychological concepts with a more empirically motivated taxonomy drawing on 
data from across the cognitive sciences. In closing I suggested a few possible 
directions that this taxonomy might take, although ultimately I think this is an 
empirical matter, the results of which cannot be determined a priori.  
 Whilst writing this thesis I discovered that Jenson (2016) appears to have 
independently reached a conclusion very much like my own, albeit focusing on the 
more restricted case of belief. He advocates a ‘scientific eliminativism’, arguing that 
“belief is not an appropriate category for cognitive science” (ibid: 967), whilst 
rejecting the ‘old-school eliminativist’ project of eliminating belief (or folk 
psychology) from everyday use. His argument focuses on robustness and fragility – 
theoretical entities, he argues should, should be robust, meaning that their existence 
can be confirmed by a number of distinct methodologies or measurements. “A 
theoretical entity is fragile”, on the other hand, “if the results of multiple, 
independent, putatively reliable measures of that entity turn out to radically vary and 
this variation cannot be adequately explained away” (ibid: 969). Belief, according to 
Jenson, is a fragile theoretical entity, and should thus be eliminated from our 
scientific ontology. Our agreement on the status of belief (and perhaps other folk 
psychological concepts) in cognitive science could itself be taken as a sign of the 
robustness of what Jenson calls scientific eliminativism. Insofar as we have both 
reached this conclusion via distinct methodologies, it seems plausible that we are 
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beginning to home in on a genuinely serious concern with the use of folk concepts in 
cognitive science.    
 Whilst it may sometimes seem as though I am proposing an extremely 
reductionist or scientisitic approach towards the study of the mind, this is not at all 
my intention. Rather I think it is important to recognise the value of two distinct 
ways of looking at the world, neither of which is more correct or objective than the 
other. We truly are persons with beliefs and desires, it just turns out that those beliefs 
and desires are more akin to character traits, like being brave, than they are to 
discrete functional units, like 1s and 0s in a digital computer. At the same time, we 
are also complex physical systems composed of interacting parts whose functions 
often defy folk description. This should not dishearten us – in fact I think this way of 
conceiving of folk psychology and cognitive science is far more humanistic and 
intuitive than the realist reading of propositional attitude psychology, where we 
either end up identifying beliefs and desires with functional states of a computational 
architecture, or else eliminating them from our ontology once it turns out that we 
cannot identify any such states. Reconceiving of folk psychology and cognitive 
science as discourses with distinct domains of enquiry allows us to preserve the 
autonomy of our everyday interactions and understanding of human behaviour, 
whilst continuing to uncover the sub-personal mechanisms underlying that 
behaviour. A cloud does not become any less real once we learn it is composed of 
water vapour, and a person does not become any less a person once we discover the 
mechanisms that are responsible for their behaviour.  
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